Jonathan Pulley appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition regarding convictions for aggravated sexual battery and assault, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Pulley had originally faced two counts of child rape but accepted a plea deal to lesser charges, resulting in an eight-year sentence served at 100 percent, and concurrently a six-month sentence for assault.
In his evidentiary hearing, Pulley claimed he was under the influence of Xanax during the plea process, which he admitted to taking in the courtroom, despite telling the judge otherwise. He argued that he felt pressured by his attorney, who suggested that accepting the plea was in his best interest given the potential for a significantly longer prison sentence. Pulley expressed that his military background influenced his decision to follow his attorney's advice, although he maintained his innocence and preferred to go to trial. He acknowledged that he had multiple meetings with his counsel, who discussed case details and expressed confidence in his acquittal. The court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision, finding no error in the denial of relief.
The petitioner asserted that he was misinformed by his trial counsel regarding the plea offer, believing it required only 30 percent of an eight-year sentence, whereas he later discovered it required 100 percent service. He claimed a lack of recollection regarding the trial judge's explanation of this during the plea hearing and attempted to contact his counsel afterward without success. Despite previously stating satisfaction with his counsel to the trial court, he later insisted this was said only to expedite the process and expressed dissatisfaction with the representation.
During cross-examination, the petitioner maintained he had no memory of the plea submission hearing, attributing his decision to enter pleas to being under the influence of Xanax. He acknowledged understanding that the plea deal offered a lower sentence compared to potential trial outcomes but claimed he did not recall signing documents waiving a jury trial or entering nolo contendere pleas, describing his signature as "a little tiny." He admitted that counsel discussed incriminating evidence against him, including DNA found on the victim's pajamas, and informed him of the serious consequences of going to trial.
C.W., the 15-year-old victim, testified that she fabricated the allegations against the petitioner out of anger and to distance him from her life. She recanted her accusations, stating she felt guilty for lying and sought to help the petitioner after realizing the impact of her false statements. In her testimony, she acknowledged having previously made specific claims to authorities, including instances of sexual assault, but later expressed that she could not remember details because they were untrue. C.W. also indicated that her living situation remained unchanged despite the recantation and mentioned a potential threat of eviction from her aunt if she did not retract her statements.
C.W. recanted her testimony a few months after the petitioner was imprisoned, revealing she confided in only a few people to avoid being labeled a liar. She could not remember the specifics of her sworn affidavit's preparation but confirmed her intent was to help the petitioner. Trial counsel met with the petitioner 20 to 25 times, discussing case details, potential sentencing, and the implications of a conviction. He recalled a conversation about the petitioner’s semen found on the victim’s pajamas and negotiated a plea deal based on forensic findings that indicated the victim’s hymen was intact. Counsel described the petitioner as intelligent and assertive, denying that the petitioner viewed him as a commanding officer. He acknowledged making a metaphorical comparison between prison and military service but maintained that he did not use this to influence the petitioner’s plea decision. After agreeing to the plea, the petitioner requested a delay for family matters, which counsel facilitated. Counsel reviewed all legal documents with the petitioner, who showed no signs of misunderstanding or intoxication during the plea submission. Counsel did not interview C.W. or A.R. due to their ages but did speak with C.W.'s mother. Overall, counsel expressed confidence that the petitioner understood the plea's ramifications and proceeded voluntarily.
The petitioner consulted family members and a friend who are physicians to comprehend the medical evidence in his case and interviewed two DCS workers involved. His counsel stated he generally avoids building expectations regarding trial success. During the hearing, Sabrina Wilson, C.W.’s mother, testified that C.W. initially accused the petitioner of abuse while she was asleep, prompting Wilson to contact the police and seek medical attention for C.W. Wilson stated C.W. showed no signs of recanting her allegations until later, after the petitioner was incarcerated, when C.W. expressed a desire for his release and stated that the events "didn’t really happen." Despite her initial belief in C.W.'s truthfulness, Wilson could not confirm the authenticity of the recantation. She indicated a willingness to accept a plea deal for the petitioner if the allegations were true, emphasizing her desire for him to be released. Wilson admitted to expressing sympathy for the petitioner’s family to DCS workers and the prosecutor and acknowledged living in a home owned by Aunt Ruby, who had initially asked her to leave but later allowed her to stay.
DCS Team Leader Susan Franks testified that she interviewed C.W. shortly after the allegations were made. C.W. described multiple instances of molestation by the petitioner at Aunt Ruby’s home, detailing a specific incident involving a razor and penetration. Franks confirmed that C.W.'s pajamas were collected and sent for forensic testing. Wilson later reported to Franks that Aunt Ruby had threatened her to influence her testimony about the petitioner. Franks noted that she had not interviewed C.W. after her recantation but had spoken with another victim, A.R., who reported inappropriate touching by the petitioner. The petitioner was also interviewed, where he admitted to touching A.R. but halted his confession when interrupted by his father. Ultimately, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the petitioner received effective counsel and that his pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily.
The court found trial counsel credible, affirming that he conducted a thorough investigation and adequately prepared for trial, without coercing the petitioner into entering pleas while the petitioner was drug-free. The court deemed the petitioner’s credibility severely lacking, as the plea hearing transcript contradicted his claims of being under the influence, not understanding the plea implications, and having memory lapses regarding the proceedings. The court expressed skepticism about C.W.'s credibility, noting her motivation to release the petitioner from jail, and criticized Ms. Wilson for her lack of regard for the truth about her daughter’s case. It was noted that the petitioner’s family exerted pressure on C.W. to alter her testimony both before and after the plea.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that his pleas were not made voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently due to ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that counsel failed to interview witnesses who later retracted their allegations against him and did not pursue potential alibi witnesses. The petitioner contended that had he been aware of the witnesses' willingness to recant, he would not have accepted the plea deal.
For post-conviction relief to be granted, the petitioner must prove that his constitutional rights were violated and that he bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. The post-conviction court's factual findings are conclusive unless evidence contradicts them, while legal conclusions do not receive deference. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below acceptable standards and that this deficiency adversely affected the defense, showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the errors not occurred. If the petitioner fails to establish either prong, relief will be denied. The court emphasized that it will not engage in hindsight analysis or second-guess reasonable trial strategies made by counsel, provided those strategies were based on adequate case preparation.
A guilty plea is invalid if made unknowingly or involuntarily, which raises constitutional concerns under due process. A plea cannot stem from ignorance, coercion, or threats. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary pleas are mixed questions of law and fact, reviewed de novo without presumption of correctness regarding the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law. The claim that trial counsel inadequately addressed the credibility of witness C.W. is dismissed, as C.W. admitted to fabricating allegations months after the petitioner’s conviction, and her credibility was significantly questioned by the post-conviction court. The court found C.W. and her mother untrustworthy, and the petitioner’s claims of bias lacked evidentiary support. The petitioner entered his plea based on sound counsel advice following a thorough investigation, resulting in a significantly reduced sentence compared to potential trial convictions. The plea submission transcript confirmed the petitioner understood the charges and implications of his plea, leading to the affirmation of the post-conviction court's judgment.
