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State of Tennessee v. Raynella Dossett Leath
Citations: 461 S.W.3d 73; 2013 WL 2420639; 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 461Docket: E2011-00437-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; June 3, 2013; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Raynella Dossett Leath was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In her appeal, Leath raised multiple issues: 1. Violation of double jeopardy protections. 2. Error in not excluding victim blood and urine test results. 3. Admission of estate planning documents as evidence. 4. Denial of a mistrial after a witness expressed fear of Leath. 5. Insufficiency of evidence for the murder conviction. 6. Failure to instruct the jury on the State’s duty to preserve evidence. 7. Improper jury instruction regarding the defense of alibi. 8. Failure to instruct the jury on Leath's theory of defense. 9. Improper selection method for the alternate juror. 10. Jury misconduct due to premature deliberation and exposure to extraneous information. 11. Withholding of favorable evidence by the State, violating Brady v. Maryland. 12. Entitlement to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 13. The trial court's acceptance of the guilty verdict as an abdication of its role. 14. Entitlement to a new trial due to cumulative errors. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, addressing the issues raised by Leath, and reorganized them for clarity. The opinion was delivered by Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., with concurrence from Judges James Curwood Witt, Jr. and Robert W. Wedemeyer. The State was represented by multiple attorneys from the Tennessee Attorney General’s office and local district attorneys. The factual background detailed a 911 call made by Leath on March 13, 2003, in which she reported her husband had shot himself, displaying distress during the call. Sergeant David Amburn of the Knox County Sheriff’s Office testified that he and Assistant Chief Deputy L. Keith Lyon were the first officers to respond to the Defendant's residence, where they found the front door open and the Defendant lying motionless in the yard. Upon nudging her, she began crying heavily and was described as very hysterical, claiming her husband had been shot. Amburn noted that her behavior seemed genuine and characterized her as "overcome by grief." After assisting her, the officers entered the dark house to check on the victim, who was found deceased in bed with a revolver near him. They did not disturb the scene and thoroughly cleared the residence to ensure no one else was present. Amburn confirmed that neither he nor Lyon entered the house alone, and he remembered the Defendant’s vehicle felt warm, suggesting it had been used recently. Sergeant Robert D. Lee arrived shortly after and provided a different account, stating that Chief Lyon was alone inside the house while Amburn tended to the Defendant. Lee expressed concern for Lyon's safety, entered the house, and confirmed the victim's condition. Both officers stated that no one had touched the victim's body or the gun, and Lee secured the scene, starting a crime scene log to document the investigation. Sgt. Lee testified that Chief Lyon escorted paramedics to confirm the victim's death, noting a large crowd of approximately thirty civilians present on the Defendant's property, although none were permitted near the crime scene. Detective Sergeant Perry Moyers, the lead investigator, received a brief situation report upon arrival, indicating no evidence had been disturbed. He observed a bullet hole in the victim's bedhead and found a bullet lodged in the wall, along with additional bullet holes in the mattress and fragments in the bed frame. The victim had a gunshot wound above the left eyebrow and was positioned on his right side with a gun near his left hand. Moyers noted the presence of lividity, suggesting the victim had been deceased for over thirty minutes but less than six hours, with blood pooling on the bed and floor. The Colt .38 caliber revolver found next to the victim showed no blowback marks and contained three live rounds and three spent casings, with no fingerprints present. There were no signs of a struggle in the bedroom, leading Moyers to suspect the death was not a suicide, particularly given the blood spatter patterns and undisturbed gunpowder around the bullet hole in the mattress. Samples for gunshot residue were collected from both the Defendant and the victim, and the Defendant provided the clothing worn that day for forensic analysis. Three latex gloves were also discovered on a shelf in a bathroom adjoining the victim's bedroom. An open Bible was discovered on a bathroom counter, while the police only searched the bedroom and adjacent bathroom, not examining other rooms. They checked for signs of a break-in based on the Defendant's claim that she had secured the home prior to leaving, but found no evidence of forced entry. However, officers did not confirm whether the doors were locked. Initially, the Defendant claimed ignorance about the origin of a gun found in the house, but later suggested it belonged to the victim’s deceased father. The Defendant informed Detective Moyers about the victim’s medical issues and depression related to his mother's terminal illness, providing a calendar with notes describing the victim as 'hateful,' controlling, and 'paranoid,' along with instances of him staying in bed all day. On March 8, 2003, the day of an argument regarding chores, the Defendant noted the victim's 'slurred speech' and emotional state. In contrast, the victim’s daughter and neighbor testified to his generally laid-back demeanor and observed no significant decline in his health prior to his death. The victim's emotional distress over his mother’s illness was acknowledged by his neighbor, who also noted the victim's reliability in meeting commitments. On March 13, 2003, the Defendant's unexpected phone call to Ms. Wilkerson, the victim's daughter, raised suspicions, particularly as the Defendant discussed the victim's eating habits and her visit to the hospital, leaving Ms. Wilkerson feeling that something was amiss. Ms. Wilkerson observed that the Defendant's voice seemed unusual and overly cheerful, noting her infrequent visits to Mrs. Leath in the hospital, where Wilkerson visited daily. Wilkerson indicated it was strange for the Defendant, who had a liver condition that limited her exposure to sick individuals, to be present at the hospital without a mask. She learned of her father's death from the Defendant's son-in-law around 2:00 p.m. and was told by the Defendant that he "had committed suicide" due to killing cows. Wilkerson expressed disbelief that her father would harm himself, citing his fear of becoming incapacitated. She identified the gun used in her father's death as belonging to his father, which she had seen previously at Mrs. Leath’s house. Gordon Armstrong, a friend, corroborated that he recognized the gun from past use. James A. Safewright, a cremation company owner, recounted meeting the Defendant on March 1, 2001, when she arranged for the cremation of herself and the victim. He noted that the Defendant mentioned the victim's ill health, and he later cremated the victim’s body on March 14, 2003. Randall Carr, a hospital HR director, described an unusual meeting with the Defendant on March 19, 2003. She attended wearing a clinical mask and was accompanied by her daughter and a private investigator to interview hospital staff regarding the victim's care. During the meeting, the Defendant recalled speaking with a physical therapist on the morning of the victim’s murder and attempted to call the victim to cheer him up, but he did not answer, leading her to cry. Carr found a notation in the medical records confirming the Defendant's presence at 9:53 a.m. on March 13, but there were multiple entries at that time, suggesting the therapist might have seen Mrs. Leath earlier. Wilkerson was unaware of the Defendant's documented involvement in Mrs. Leath’s care decisions. Subsequently, Wilkerson discovered an empty holster in Mrs. Leath’s underwear drawer, which she handed over to Det. Moyers. Det. Moyers testified that a gun found beside the victim matched a holster that was examined for fingerprints; however, the fingerprints found were not suitable for identification. Ms. Wilkerson stated that the Defendant had Mrs. Leath's pocketbook and keys before the victim's murder and returned them after visiting Mrs. Leath in the hospital only once post-murder. On March 20, 2003, the Defendant reportedly told Ms. Wilkerson that Mrs. Leath was merely a neighbor and implied that Mrs. Leath was not her responsibility. Charles Child, a licensed attorney, testified about the victim's estate planning. He had drafted wills for both the victim and Defendant. The victim's 1993 will named the Defendant as the estate administrator, leaving his property to Mrs. Leath and Ms. Wilkerson. This will was destroyed in 1996 when a new will was created, leaving everything to the Defendant and providing Mrs. Leath with a life estate in part of the real property, excluding Ms. Wilkerson entirely. The Defendant also had a similar will drafted in 1996. Child discussed three quitclaim deeds from 1999 that appeared self-drafted by the Defendant, transferring individually owned properties to joint ownership, establishing a tenancy by the entireties with the right of survivorship. These deeds ensured that the Defendant would inherit the victim’s real property regardless of the will's stipulations, although the will would dictate the remaining estate distribution. Mr. Child last met with the victim on February 4, 2003, when they discussed the 1996 will. The victim was emotional and agitated about it, but he did not change the will, and Child was unaware of any attempts by the victim to do so. The will was lost after the victim's death, with only a copy remaining. If the victim had died intestate, Ms. Wilkerson would have been entitled to a significant portion of his estate. Ms. Wilkerson testified that the Defendant administered the estate, under which she received nothing, while her children received minimal items. She acknowledged that her father never discussed his estate plans with her and subsequently sued the Defendant, who countered by alleging that Ms. Wilkerson killed the victim. Ms. Wilkerson stated that the Defendant was the only person to accuse her of murdering her father. Forensic evidence presented by Dr. Darinka Mileusnic-Polchan, Knox County's chief medical examiner, revealed that the victim died from a close-range gunshot wound to the forehead, specifically above the left eyebrow. The entrance wound was teardrop-shaped, indicating a downward angle, and the presence of stippling on the forehead suggested the gun was fired from approximately twelve inches away, ruling out contact wounds. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan noted that forehead wounds are uncommon in suicides and even less likely to be non-contact. The victim was right-handed and blind in his left eye. The bullet traversed the left hemisphere of the brain, severing the brain stem before ricocheting inside the skull, resulting in instantaneous death; the victim would have been unable to pull the trigger after this injury. Although an exact time of death could not be established, Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan estimated it occurred between one to six hours before the body was found, with some cooling already noted. An examination of the victim's stomach and bladder indicated the stomach was empty while the bladder was full. Toxicology results showed the presence of several drugs: Demerol (0.8 µg/mL), Sinequan (1.6 µg/mL), and Phenergan (0.05 µg/mL), all without a prescription. Norpethidine, a Demerol metabolite, was also detected, suggesting chronic use over several days. No evidence linked the drugs to the Defendant, who had no access to them. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan described Demerol as a sedative for moderate to severe pain, typically post-surgery. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan testified that Phenergan is a sedative commonly used to treat nausea and is often combined with Demerol to enhance its effects, creating a 'sedative cocktail' for pre-surgery. Sinequan, an antidepressant that also acts as a sedative, was found in the victim’s blood at levels bordering on toxicity. She characterized the combination of Sinequan, Demerol, and Phenergan as a 'very unsafe combination,' which did not render the victim completely unconscious but significantly impaired him. Mileusnic-Polchan opined that the victim could not have performed daily activities such as going to work or driving. Although unsure of how the drugs were administered, she suggested possible ingestion with food or injection, noting the absence of needle marks. She also indicated that the victim could have consumed the drugs the night before and still had an empty stomach at the time of autopsy. Based on toxicology results, she concluded the victim’s death was a homicide, not a suicide. Paulette Sutton, a retired forensic scientist, analyzed crime scene photographs and blood spatter patterns. She described the victim's position at the time of death as lying on his side, with an entrance wound above the left eyebrow being the source of blood found in the room. Sutton identified two additional gunshots: one to the headboard and another to the mattress. She determined that the headboard shot occurred before the fatal shot, as victim's hair was found in the headboard splinters. Blood spatter analysis indicated that the victim was in a raised position when shot, with blood traveling upward and striking the wall at a right angle, suggesting his body fell straight down after the gunshot. Sutton concluded that the blood spatter patterns were inconsistent with the victim's final position, supporting the homicide determination. No blood was detected on the clothing provided by the Defendant for forensic testing, nor on three latex gloves found in the victim’s bathroom, although the Defendant’s DNA was present on the gloves. Joe Minor from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation noted that washing could have removed blood and gunshot residue from the items. Gunshot residue was discovered on the pillow under the victim’s head and on the back of his left hand. A good distribution of gunshot residue elements was found on the victim’s hands, with all three elements present only on the back of the left hand. No gunshot residue was detected on the Defendant's hands, and forensic scientist Laura Hodges noted that such residue can be washed off. TBI special agent Donald Carman analyzed a Colt .38 caliber revolver located near the victim, along with multiple cartridges and spent bullets. He confirmed that the spent bullets from the wall and the victim's brain matched characteristics of a Remington bullet and were fired from the Colt revolver. The bullet fragment under the bed was identified as a Western bullet, and Carman suggested that a shot into the mattress occurred after the shots to the victim. Defendant's alibi witnesses included Barbara Sadler, a nurse at Parkwest Hospital, who recalled a distressed Defendant on the morning of March 13, 2003, but could not pinpoint the exact time of their encounter, estimating it to be between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. Sadler stated that the Defendant was not acting unusually. Sergeant Thomas Fox, a neighbor and friend of the Defendant, testified that he saw her that morning, describing her as cheerful and engaged in casual conversation, without any signs of distress. Both witnesses did not observe anything suspicious regarding the Defendant's demeanor on that date. Sgt. Fox could not remember the direction the Defendant drove after their encounter or the exact time of their conversation, which he estimated to be around 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. on March 13, 2003. He characterized the interaction as an "inadvertent passing" and noted that the Defendant had never approached him at his mailbox before or after that date, although he acknowledged the Defendant had visited his wife multiple times since then. Ann Troutman, a guidance counselor at Karns High School, testified that the Defendant's daughter, Katie, called him at around 10:15 a.m. that day to request stomach medicine. The Defendant arrived at the school near 11:00 a.m., brought drinks, and spent approximately fifteen minutes in Troutman’s office, during which he appeared friendly and normal. Kathy Hobson, a secretary at KHS, confirmed the Defendant's arrival sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m., noting he conversed with her and another secretary for a while and appeared happy and jovial. Betty Lenoir, a member of the Defendant’s church, testified that the Defendant and the victim had a normal and good relationship, regularly attending church together. She recalled comforting the Defendant after the victim's murder but could not remember specifics of the Defendant's remarks to the congregation afterward. Raynella Magdelena Connatser, the Defendant’s oldest daughter, testified that her mother loved the victim, whom she described as the best person to her. She emphasized their loving relationship and the victim's supportive role during family tragedies. Connatser was informed of the victim's death while at the University of Tennessee and described the chaotic scene when she arrived at her mother’s house, where the Defendant was visibly shaken. Moyers engaged in conversation with the Defendant, who was visibly deteriorating, as noted by Ms. Connatser, who described the Defendant as needing support, shaking, and appearing almost catatonic and in tears. Concerned for her well-being, Ms. Connatser removed the Defendant to a hospital after observing her worsening condition. Det. Moyers recalled discussions about hospitalizing the Defendant due to her distress. Ms. Hobson witnessed the Defendant looking close to shock and very upset when she arrived at the Defendant’s home after driving Katie’s car. After parking, Ms. Hobson entered the kitchen to leave homework and was not stopped by police. Ms. Connatser took care of the Defendant for two weeks post-murder, describing her as "a mess," glassy-eyed, and fragile, expressing fears for her life. Connatser noted the Defendant's home was filled with the victim's belongings, creating an atmosphere of sadness. There were personal details regarding family graves on the property, but uncertainty about future ownership remained. The jury ultimately convicted the Defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, resulting in a life sentence with parole eligibility. The Defendant filed motions for a new trial, which were denied, and subsequently filed a motion to vacate the order, also denied after a hearing. The Defendant appealed, arguing a double jeopardy violation occurred due to the trial court's improper declaration of a mistrial, which lacked adherence to procedural requirements for determining jury deadlock versus acquittal on lesser charges. The State contended that the Defendant consented to the mistrial declaration and thus could not claim double jeopardy. The Defendant was tried from March 2 to March 12, 2009. After seven hours of jury deliberation, the jury reported being “hung” and requested additional instructions. When informed, defense counsel suggested a mistrial, but the trial court opted to inquire if the jury could reach a verdict with further deliberation. The jury foreman indicated significant philosophical divides among jurors, with some insisting on the need for a “smoking gun” for a conviction and stating that dissenting jurors would not change their stance without multiple eyewitnesses. The court encouraged further deliberation, and the jury agreed to continue. Immediately after, the Defendant requested a mistrial, claiming the court’s interaction pressured dissenting jurors. This motion was denied. Subsequently, the jury communicated that they were closer to a unanimous verdict but wanted to break for the day, prompting the Defendant to renew her mistrial motion, arguing the jury felt compelled to decide. The court denied this motion again, asserting it did not desire a verdict and that the jury had not been coerced. The following day, the Defendant submitted a written mistrial motion, citing excessive deliberation, which was also denied. Later, the jury sent a note indicating they could not reach a verdict, leading the court to declare a mistrial after thanking the jury. The court did not ascertain whether the jury was hung on the original charge of first-degree premeditated murder or lesser offenses, and the Defendant raised no objections to the mistrial or jury dismissal. About a month later, the Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing procedural violations and double jeopardy concerns, which the court denied, along with an interlocutory appeal. The Defendant has since raised the issue on direct appeal. Both federal and state constitutions prohibit a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, as outlined in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Tennessee courts interpret this prohibition similarly to the federal doctrine, which includes a defendant's right to have their trial completed before a specific tribunal. However, retrial is permissible when there is a "manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrial, even without the defendant's consent. A jury's inability to reach a verdict is recognized as valid grounds for a mistrial, but only when no feasible alternative exists. In Tennessee, sequential jury instructions require juries to consider the most serious charges before moving to lesser offenses, complicating the determination of which charge caused a deadlock. If a mistrial is declared due to a jury's failure to reach a consensus on a lesser offense, double jeopardy concerns arise if the jury has effectively acquitted the defendant of greater charges. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(d)(2) mandates a specific inquiry process for trial courts when a jury reports deadlock on multiple charges. In this case, the trial court declared a mistrial after determining the jury was deadlocked but did not follow the required inquiry to ascertain which charges were in dispute. Despite this procedural error, the defendant's retrial was not barred, as the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply if the defendant consented to the mistrial. A defendant who requests a mistrial effectively waives their right to an initial determination of guilt or innocence by the first jury. The court ruled that a defendant's silence in the face of a mistrial may imply consent to the mistrial, allowing for a subsequent prosecution without double jeopardy implications. However, this inference requires that the defendant had an opportunity to object before the trial court unilaterally declared a mistrial. In this case, the defendant had requested a mistrial three times before the court's declaration and thus waived her right to contest the necessity of the mistrial. The court noted that the defendant cannot argue against double jeopardy protections based on procedural errors since she acquiesced to the trial court's actions by failing to object. Regarding the admissibility of test results from the victim's blood and urine, the defendant claimed the trial court erred in denying her motion to exclude these results due to the destruction of samples, which she argued was grossly negligent and critical to the prosecution's case. The State defended the admissibility, stating the samples were destroyed according to TBI policy and that there was no evidence presented to dispute the accuracy of the test results. During the victim's autopsy, blood and urine samples were tested, revealing the presence of Demerol, Sinequan, and Phenergan. Jeff Crews, a TBI special agent, testified that blood and urine samples are destroyed 60 days after the TBI report is issued, with the samples in this case destroyed on February 2, 2004. Although the report was sent to the medical examiner and District Attorney, the Defendant was not notified about the destruction. Crews noted that the narcotics in the samples would degrade over time, making future testing unlikely to yield accurate results. The Defendant had not been indicted when the samples were destroyed, but after her indictment in November 2006, she requested preservation of the samples. Upon learning they were destroyed, she moved to exclude TBI test results, but the trial court ruled that while the State had a duty to preserve samples, the results would not be excluded due to TBI policy, lack of necessity for establishing the indicted offense, and no challenge to the validity of TBI testing. For a fair trial, the State must provide exculpatory evidence material to guilt or relevant to punishment. If evidence claimed to be exculpatory is lost, trial courts assess whether a trial without it is fundamentally fair. The first step is determining the State's duty to preserve evidence; if established, a balancing test follows, considering negligence degree, significance of the destroyed evidence, and sufficiency of remaining evidence. The trial court's conclusion that the State had a duty to preserve the samples is disputed. The State's preservation duty is limited to evidence with apparent exculpatory value before destruction and that cannot be obtained through other means. The duty does not extend to evidence that is consumed during testing or is otherwise unpreservable. Human blood is perishable, and samples can only be preserved for a limited time. In the case State v. David Lynn Jordan, the victim's blood and urine samples were collected during an autopsy in March 2003, but the Defendant did not request their preservation for independent testing until after her indictment in November 2006. Testimony indicated that the narcotics in the samples would likely degrade over time, making accurate testing years later improbable. Therefore, the State had no obligation to preserve the samples. Additionally, the Defendant failed to prove that the destruction of evidence impacted her right to a fair trial. The State acted in accordance with established policy, and the evidence was not collected or tampered with improperly, nor was the accuracy of the TBI’s analysis disputed. Regarding the admissibility of “estate planning” documents, the Defendant argued that the trial court wrongly denied her motion to exclude this evidence, claiming it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The State countered that the evidence was relevant to establishing motive. The court's discretion in determining relevance is generally upheld unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Under Tennessee law, relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is significantly outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. The estate planning documents indicated that the Defendant would inherit the victim's entire estate upon his death, excluding his daughter, and that the victim would inherit the Defendant's estate, excluding her children, had she died first. The Defendant and the victim jointly owned significant real property, with the Defendant poised to gain sole ownership upon the victim’s death. This established a financial motive for the Defendant to kill the victim, which the court deemed to have high probative value, outweighing any danger of unfair prejudice. The Defendant's claim that the “quitclaim deeds” served the same purpose as the victim’s will was an argument regarding the evidence's weight and credibility, which is for the jury to decide, not an admissibility issue. Consequently, the trial court did not err in admitting the estate planning documents. Regarding a motion for mistrial, the Defendant argued that a witness's statement expressing fear of the Defendant constituted improper evidence of a prior bad act under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). The State maintained that this testimony did not meet the threshold of clear and convincing evidence of a prior bad act. When the witness, Barbara Sadler, confirmed her fear but also stated that the Defendant had never harmed her, the trial court denied the mistrial motion, determining that fear alone did not qualify as a prior bad act. The court emphasized that granting a mistrial requires a "manifest necessity," which must be demonstrated by the party requesting it, and should be based on a comprehensive consideration of the circumstances, not a rigid formula. A mistrial may be declared to rectify harm to the judicial process that affects the impartiality of a verdict, and a trial court's decision on this matter is only overturned if there is an abuse of discretion. Evidence of prior crimes or acts is typically inadmissible to establish a person's character under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). However, Ms. Sadler's testimony indicating she was "scared" of the Defendant did not constitute evidence of a prior bad act, as it did not specify any actual prior misconduct by the Defendant, creating only a vague inference of wrongdoing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the mistrial motion after this testimony, especially since Ms. Sadler later clarified that the Defendant had never harmed her. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for the Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, the Defendant argued that the evidence was speculative and inadequate to confirm her identity as the perpetrator, particularly noting she left the victim's house shortly after 8:30 a.m., suggesting insufficient time to commit the crime. Despite this, the State contended that the circumstantial evidence was adequate to uphold the conviction. An appellate court reviews the evidence in favor of the prosecution, determining whether a rational jury could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, without reweighing the evidence or assessing witness credibility, as such matters are reserved for the jury. A guilty verdict shifts the burden of proof from the State to the defendant, who must demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to uphold the conviction. A conviction cannot rely on conjecture or speculation, yet the State is not required to present flawless evidence or eliminate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. Both direct and circumstantial evidence are equally valid in establishing guilt, and the jury's conviction must be beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court's role is to draw reasonable inferences favoring the State rather than the defendant. Premeditated first-degree murder is defined as an intentional act of killing, requiring that the intent to kill be formed prior to the act, but not necessarily for a specific duration. Premeditation can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing, and factors indicating premeditation include using a deadly weapon against an unarmed victim, the cruelty of the act, statements of intent to kill, weapon procurement, preparations for concealment, and the defendant's demeanor following the act. Factors indicating premeditation include the absence of victim provocation and the defendant's failure to assist the victim. Evidence at trial supported that the victim's death was a homicide, with the victim shot from about twelve inches away above the left eye, despite being blind in that eye. Medical testimony indicated that non-contact forehead wounds are rare in suicides and that the victim was heavily sedated. Forensic evidence showed a gunshot was fired into the headboard, and the victim's body fell onto the bed, where it was subsequently moved and wrapped in sheets, contradicting the blood spatter patterns. A third gunshot was fired into the bed after the body was moved, which the victim could not have fired post-injury. The defendant was the last person to see the victim alive and made the 911 call reporting the death, but provided conflicting accounts regarding the victim's condition. The defendant asserted the victim had committed suicide while suggesting he was home sick. Contradictory statements about the victim's mental health were made, despite expert testimony affirming he was in good health. The defendant had prepaid for the victim's cremation without his presence, and cremation occurred the day after the autopsy. No signs of forced entry or struggle were found at the scene. The victim may have been sedated through food, as the defendant prepared all the victim's meals. The murder weapon, belonging to the victim's father, was kept at a residence accessible to the defendant, where an empty holster matching the weapon was later discovered. Witnesses stated the victim disliked handguns and would not have shot himself in the face. Latex gloves with the defendant's DNA were found near the victim’s body. Additionally, a calendar provided by the defendant contained negative entries about the victim and documented conflicts between them leading up to the murder. Just days before the incident, the defendant made threatening remarks about the victim. The victim had also consulted an attorney about his will shortly before his death, although he made no changes, leaving his entire estate to the defendant. Quitclaim deeds indicated that the Defendant would inherit all real property upon the victim's death. Witnesses described the Defendant's behavior on March 13, 2003, as unusual; she contacted Ms. Wilkerson at work, which was atypical, and exhibited a "chipper" demeanor that raised concerns. The Defendant visited the victim, Mrs. Leath, in the hospital without her usual face mask and engaged in an unusual conversation with neighbor Sgt. Fox, which he noted was out of character. Following the victim's death, the Defendant, accompanied by a private investigator, interviewed hospital staff, during which she recalled a conversation with a physical therapist on the same day. Ms. Wilkerson stated that the Defendant visited Mrs. Leath only once after her death to return personal items and expressed that Mrs. Leath was merely a neighbor, shifting responsibility to Ms. Wilkerson as the next of kin. The Defendant claimed she could not have killed the victim due to time constraints, asserting her daughter left for school between 8:00 and 8:15 a.m., although there was no evidence to confirm the exact time. The Defendant stated she was home with the victim until shortly after 8:30 a.m. to stop for flowers and speak with Sgt. Fox before arriving at the hospital by 9:00 a.m. However, multiple testimonies indicated varying timelines of her interactions and movements that morning, including a notation in medical records at 9:53 a.m. confirming her presence at the hospital. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan estimated the victim's death occurred one to six hours prior to investigators arriving at the house after 11:30 a.m. The State was not obligated to eliminate all other hypotheses regarding the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant's argument suggests that the court should favor her plausible inferences while disregarding those supporting the State. Evidence indicated that the Defendant may not have arrived at Parkwest Hospital until 9:30 a.m. or later on March 13, 2003. The jury's rejection of the Defendant's alibi does not undermine the validity of its verdict, as established in Williams, where the jury is empowered to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and competing theories. The court, following the Dorantes standard, affirms that the jury is better positioned to assess the evidence than the court itself. A rational juror could infer the Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator and the evidence sufficiently established premeditation and intent. Notably, a shot was fired into the victim's headboard before he was shot in the forehead, resulting in instant death while the victim was unarmed and heavily sedated. Circumstantial evidence included the moving of the victim's body to stage the scene. The Defendant's unusual behavior on the morning of the incident and her interactions with others were also noted. Consequently, the evidence supported the conviction for first-degree premeditated murder. Regarding jury instructions, the Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not providing a Ferguson instruction about the State's duty to preserve evidence since samples of the victim's blood and urine were destroyed before her indictment. The State maintained that no such duty existed in this case and that the destruction of samples did not affect the Defendant's right to a fair trial. The court agreed with the State, concluding that the trial court acted correctly in denying the request for a Ferguson instruction. Additionally, the Defendant challenged the alibi instruction, claiming it improperly shifted the burden of proof. The Defendant contends that the phrase "if believed" in the jury instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof, implying she had to prove her alibi. The State argues that the instruction clarified that the burden remained on it to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant was present at the crime scene. A defendant is entitled to a proper legal charge based on the trial evidence, which requires reviewing jury instructions in their entirety rather than in isolation. The Tennessee Supreme Court has previously approved a jury instruction for alibi that stipulates if the Defendant was not present at the crime, she cannot be guilty, emphasizing the State's burden to prove her presence. The State asserts that the alibi instruction did not improperly shift the burden, as it clearly outlined the State's responsibility and the consequences of failing to meet it. The Defendant references a case from New York where an "if believed" instruction was deemed problematic due to its lack of clarity on the prosecution's burden. However, the instruction in question here does not face the same issue since it explicitly states the State's burden alongside the "if believed" phrase. Other cases cited further support that an alibi instruction can remain valid as long as it clarifies the prosecution's burden. The trial court appropriately utilized the Christian alibi instruction without error. The Defendant argued that this instruction improperly commented on evidence, but the record indicates that the court merely read the approved pattern jury instruction without additional commentary. Furthermore, the Defendant claimed the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on her theory of defense, which was that the State failed to prove her presence at the crime scene and that she did not kill the victim. However, the State contended that the Defendant waived this issue by not submitting a written request for the jury instruction, as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a). The court agreed, noting that oral requests are insufficient for appellate review, and the Defendant did not include this issue in her motion for a new trial, as mandated by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e). The court considered whether plain error review was warranted but determined it was not, since the Defendant did not show that addressing the alleged error was necessary for substantial justice. The requested jury instruction was essentially a repetition of her alibi defense, which the trial court had already adequately instructed the jury on. Consequently, the court found no merit in the Defendant's claims. The trial court provided proper instructions to the jury regarding the Defendant’s presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof, leading to the conclusion that no plain error review is necessary for this aspect. The Defendant claimed the trial court improperly selected the alternate juror, arguing that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(f)(2)(A) requires randomly selecting twelve jurors and discharging the remaining ones, rather than selecting one to be an alternate. The State countered that the Defendant waived this issue by not objecting contemporaneously and failing to include it in her motion for a new trial. During discussions, defense counsel incorrectly interpreted the rule, prompting the trial court to clarify its method of selecting the alternate juror. Ultimately, the trial court selected the alternate juror by random draw, and the Defendant did not object at that time. Consequently, the court determined the Defendant waived the right to full appellate review of this issue due to the lack of a contemporaneous objection and failure to raise it in her motion for a new trial, which aligns with Tennessee appellate rules. The court indicated it would only assess the matter under plain error review, noting that Rule 24(f)(2) allows trial courts to choose between methods for selecting alternate jurors, and the trial court correctly employed the single entity method as outlined. A juror not selected for the deliberating jury is discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict, as stipulated in Rule 24 (f)(2)(A). The Advisory Commission Comment clarifies that before deliberation, additional jurors are randomly deselected and discharged. The Defendant's argument contradicts the rule's text and spirit, and plain error review is not warranted as no clear breach of law is established, rendering the issue meritless. Regarding juror misconduct, the Defendant alleges that jurors prematurely deliberated and reviewed extraneous prejudicial information during the trial. Specifically, the Defendant claims that jurors began deliberating during the State's case-in-chief, a concern raised with a court officer who took no action. Additionally, it is alleged that an alternate juror shared prejudicial information with the jury. The State counters that testimony from the alternate juror, Joseph Brian Creech, indicates no premature deliberation occurred and that the Defendant has not proved exposure to extraneous information. Creech disclosed to private investigators that he complained to a court officer about another juror making comments but did not believe these constituted premature deliberation. He noted that the juror was eventually excused for a family emergency. After the verdict, Creech stated that some jurors found a picture of an open Bible significant, linking it to the Defendant's motives, which he believed influenced their decision. During a post-trial hearing, Creech testified that the jurors did not engage in premature deliberation, although one juror made casual comments questioning the trial's purpose and evidentiary support for guilt, which he felt were not intentional acts of deliberation. Mr. Creech alerted a court officer to certain statements, who advised him to "self-police" and remain vigilant. He testified that he did not discuss evidence with other jurors during the trial. Any information he provided to the Defendant's investigators regarding jurors' thoughts on the evidence stemmed from discussions after the verdict was reached. During the trial, a photograph of an open Bible, prominently displaying Psalm 69 but partially obscured by a pair of glasses and a glasses case, was shown to the jury. After viewing the picture, Mr. Creech read Psalm 69 and other biblical passages in his hotel room, but he did not share his findings regarding Psalm 69 with fellow jurors during the trial. Post-verdict, he inquired about the picture's impact, and some jurors described it as "an interesting piece of evidence." He assumed they had read or were familiar with Psalm 69 based on their responses but was not aware of any jurors seeing an unobstructed version of the text. Mr. Creech noted that the obscured verse included significant messages about God's people inheriting the land. Regarding premature deliberation, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits juror testimony about deliberative processes unless it pertains to extraneous prejudicial information or outside influences. The court has ruled that inquiries into premature deliberation are not permitted as they do not involve these factors. Consequently, the Defendant's attempts to investigate allegations of premature deliberation were barred by Rule 606(b). Despite some confusion in his statements to investigators, Mr. Creech affirmed to the trial court that the jury did not engage in premature deliberation. A juror expressed doubts about the State's burden of proof, but other jurors advised against discussing it further, emphasizing that jurors should not be expected to remain silent. The document cites legal precedents affirming that a jury's fairness is paramount, allowing for imperfections as long as the trial remains fair and impartial. A new trial may be warranted if a jury encounters extraneous prejudicial information. If a juror is exposed to such information, a presumption of prejudice arises, placing the onus on the State to prove the conduct was harmless. Extraneous information refers to data from outside the trial, and the jury's consideration of facts not admitted as evidence can warrant a new trial if deemed prejudicial. Juror testimony is limited under Rule 606(b), permitting evidence of extraneous information but not its impact on deliberations. The testimony regarding Psalm 69 was ruled inadmissible, as biblical readings not specific to the case are generally not prejudicial. The references in Psalm 69 were accessible during the trial, and the only obscured line did not significantly alter its context. The jury's potential exposure to an "unobstructed" version of Psalm 69 is not deemed prejudicial, as established in Keen, which notes that reversible error cannot be inferred from mere possibilities of juror influence. Evidence indicated that only the alternate juror, Mr. Creech, read Psalm 69 in full, aligning with Taylor's conclusion that lack of exposure to extraneous information did not warrant a new trial. The defendant claims a violation of Brady v. Maryland regarding the withholding of exculpatory evidence, asserting entitlement to a new trial based on newly discovered information. Specifically, the defendant references a statement from former KCSO Sergeant Steve Robinson, who claimed to be the first officer at the victim’s house and witnessed another officer remove the gun. The State counters that there was no Brady violation since Robinson’s statement emerged post-trial, and its content was not critical enough to impact the trial's outcome. Robinson later recanted his assertion about the gun's removal, stating he and Officer Joe Preston were indeed among the first responders but had minimal involvement in the investigation. Officer Preston contradicted Robinson's claims, asserting that he did not interact with the crime scene meaningfully, thereby discrediting Robinson's affidavit as untrue. During a post-trial hearing, Robinson confirmed the accuracy of his initial recollections but acknowledged that his understanding evolved after the affidavit was signed. Sgt. Robinson acknowledged that he had misremembered details regarding a specific incident, stating he did not see Officer Preston remove a weapon from the scene and believed Officer Preston would not engage in such misconduct. He described the Defendant as being visibly upset upon his arrival but could not recall other officers present or specific actions taken by the Defendant, admitting his memory of that day was poor. The document discusses the State's obligations under Brady v. Maryland regarding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. It asserts that the State is not required to disclose evidence already known or accessible to the Defendant, nor is it obligated to seek out or gather evidence not in its possession. The State also cannot be held accountable for suppressing evidence that did not exist at the time of the trial. The focus on a potential Brady violation centers on whether the State failed to disclose Sgt. Robinson's name to the Defendant. However, since the Defendant had contact with Sgt. Robinson on the day of the incident, she should have been aware of his presence, negating any responsibility on the State's part for not disclosing his name. Sgt. Robinson’s absence from the crime scene log and his limited involvement further support the conclusion that the State did not suppress relevant evidence. Robinson, accompanied by Officer Preston, arrived at the victim's residence, with Officer Preston's name listed in the crime scene log provided to the Defendant. The post-trial hearing revealed that Sgt. Robinson did not possess any exculpatory evidence, leading to the conclusion that the State did not violate Brady by not disclosing Robinson's name. For a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must demonstrate: 1) reasonable diligence in evidence discovery, 2) the materiality of the evidence, and 3) that the evidence would likely alter the trial's outcome. The trial court has discretion in granting or denying such motions. Prior rulings indicate that if newly discovered evidence only serves to discredit or impeach a witness, a new trial is warranted only if the impeaching evidence is compelling enough to ensure a different trial result. Sgt. Robinson's testimony contradicted his earlier affidavit, stating he was among the first officers on the scene and did not recall the Defendant emerging from the house in distress. Officer Preston corroborated that other officers were present before them. Additionally, Sgt. Amburn's testimony differed, claiming the Defendant was initially "motionless" before becoming "very hysterical." These discrepancies were deemed insufficient to guarantee a different trial outcome. Sgt. Robinson also recanted his affidavit's claim regarding Officer Preston removing a gun from the victim's house, rendering the affidavit inadmissible as hearsay. The Defendant could not call Sgt. Robinson solely for impeachment purposes, following evidentiary rules. The recantation and Preston’s denial undermined the affidavit's credibility significantly. Robinson acknowledged at a post-trial hearing that his prior affidavit was inaccurate and his memory of the events on March 13, 2003, was unclear. Consequently, the Defendant did not meet the burden of demonstrating that the affidavit could potentially alter the trial's outcome. Therefore, the court properly denied the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The Defendant also claimed the trial court failed in its role as the "thirteenth juror" by accepting the jury's guilty verdict, arguing that a rational person could not have convicted her based on the insufficient evidence presented. In response, the State noted that the trial court explicitly approved the jury’s verdict in its order denying the motion for a new trial, fulfilling its duties as the thirteenth juror. Under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d), the trial court is obligated to act as the thirteenth juror, and approval of the jury’s verdict is necessary for a valid judgment. The appellate court presumes the trial court approved the verdict when it denies a motion for a new trial without further comment, unless there are indications of dissatisfaction with the jury's decision. In this case, the trial court not only denied the motion but also evaluated the evidence and law, thus meeting its obligations. The Defendant's assertion of the trial court's abdication of its role lacks merit and is not a valid challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Additionally, the Defendant's claim that Judge Richard Baumgartner was impaired and thus could not serve as the thirteenth juror was unsupported by any substantial argument or evidence, leading to a waiver of this issue on appeal. Issues not accompanied by arguments, legal citations, or relevant record references are waived in court. There is no evidence indicating Judge Baumgarten was intoxicated or incompetent when he approved the jury's verdict and denied the Defendant's new trial motion. Prior rulings, such as in State v. Manuel Haynes, established that a new trial isn't warranted without proof of juror intoxication or misconduct affecting trial proceedings. The Defendant's claim of cumulative error, arguing that multiple trial errors undermined her defense, is countered by the State, which asserts that no single error was proven. The cumulative error doctrine necessitates multiple harmless errors that collectively warrant reversal to ensure a fair trial, but such cases are rare. Since no errors were found in the Defendant’s second trial, the claim of cumulative error lacks merit. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.