Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Mangrum
Citations: 403 S.W.3d 152; 2013 WL 1223385; 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 312Docket: M2009-01810-SC-R11-CD
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court; March 27, 2013; Tennessee; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
A grand jury in Dickson County indicted Kimberly Mangrum on multiple charges, including especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree felony murder. A superseding indictment added criminal conspiracy charges against her and her husband. Following the granting of immunity to the defendant's step-daughter and her testimony, a second superseding indictment included a charge of accessory after the fact against the husband. Kimberly filed motions to quash the subpoena for her step-daughter's testimony and to dismiss the indictments, both of which were denied by the trial court. Ultimately, the jury convicted her of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree felony murder, leading to a life sentence for murder and concurrent sentences for the other charges. On appeal, Kimberly asserted prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury process, but the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed this judgment. The case originated from the discovery of the victim, LeeAnn Mangrum, whose body was found with signs of blunt force trauma and drowning. Initial police interviews with key individuals, including Kimberly and her family, revealed no admission of involvement in the murder, although they noted the victim had visited their home seeking pain medication shortly before her death. The Defendant was implicated in a murder case involving the victim, who drove a dark-colored Mustang. Following interviews, police searched the victim’s disordered trailer, discovering signs of a struggle, including a broken window, overturned furniture, scattered clothes, blood on the exterior of a window, and fingerprints on shattered glass. Despite initial investigative challenges, DNA from Terry Jr. matched blood found at the scene, and his fingerprints were identified on the glass. A palm print from another individual, A.M., was also found. In February 2004, police obtained a DNA sample from the Defendant, who then claimed to have met the victim for lunch prior to the murder and admitted to visiting the trailer. She acknowledged her DNA was present on a cigarette butt found at the scene. The grand jury subsequently indicted her for especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree felony murder, later adding charges of criminal conspiracy against her and Terry Sr. After her arrest, the Defendant denied involvement but indicated suspicion towards Terry Jr. regarding her missing car. She claimed to have given the victim a Klonopin pill prior to the murder and mentioned that A.M. found something in her backpack related to the case. A.M. initially maintained the family's original account but later recanted, admitting that Terry Sr. and Terry Jr. had gone to the victim's trailer and that Terry Jr. confessed to killing the victim after an argument about custody. A.M. also provided a handwritten confession from Terry Jr. admitting to the murder, which she claimed to have found in her backpack. Officers interviewed Terry Jr. at his high school after he waived his Fifth Amendment rights, during which he claimed he accidentally drove the victim’s Jeep into a creek, resulting in her death. He noted his status as a minor and suggested he would receive a lesser punishment due to his age. Doubting his claims, officers took him into custody. Following his arrest, Terry Jr.'s grandparents hired attorneys for him and his sister, A.M. In December 2004, the State subpoenaed A.M. to testify before a reconvened grand jury regarding the murder. A.M. refused to testify without immunity, which the State granted in exchange for her cooperation. The Defendant filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing it was an abuse of the grand jury process aimed at further investigation. During the hearing, the District Attorney testified he was skeptical of the Mangrum family's initial claims about the victim's last known whereabouts and acknowledged previous discussions with A.M.'s attorney provided new insights into the case. He recognized that A.M.’s testimony could yield additional incriminating evidence against the Defendant and noted the intention to explore further charges or individuals involved in the murder. The District Attorney denied using the grand jury as an investigative tool, asserting the purpose was to present the case for potential new charges, while also emphasizing the importance of A.M.’s testimony in understanding the circumstances surrounding the crime. The grand jury foreman corroborated that the aim of the proceeding was to ascertain the involvement of all parties related to the case, acknowledging complexities due to familial connections among suspects. The trial court denied the motion to quash the grand jury subpoena, ruling that the subpoena's purpose was not solely for discovery related to pending charges, thereby finding no abuse of the grand jury process. Following this decision, the grand jury reconvened on January 20, 2005, to hear testimony from A.M., a fourteen-year-old who confirmed she had immunity regarding the murder charges. A.M. described her relationship with the victim as troubled but indicated it was better than her relationship with the Defendant, who she claimed subjected her and her brother, Terry Jr., to severe physical abuse. A.M. alleged that the Defendant coerced her into making hostile calls to the victim and her father, threatened to kill them, and frequently made derogatory remarks about the victim. On the night of September 7, 2002, A.M. recounted events where the Defendant, equipped with gloves, forced her and Terry Jr. into her car to pursue the victim. After failing to find the victim at her trailer, the Defendant encountered the victim in a Jeep, subsequently attacking her with a baseball bat while coercing Terry Jr. to participate in the assault. A.M. described the victim as bleeding and unconscious, detailing how the Defendant forced them to move the victim to a creek, where she directed A.M. to administer pills to the victim and ultimately roll her into the water. The Defendant threatened both A.M. and Terry Jr. to ensure their silence regarding the incident, and when Terry Jr. hesitated to ensure the victim was dead, the Defendant physically forced him into the water. After the assault, the Defendant returned to the victim's trailer, ordered Terry Jr. to break in, and destroyed the victim's belongings while instructing A.M. to steal valuables. A.M. testified that the Defendant instructed her to call her maternal grandmother using the victim’s cell phone, directing her to impersonate the victim and specifying what to say. After leaving the trailer, the Defendant informed Terry Sr. of the murder, leading to a loud argument between them. About a month later, A.M., Terry Jr., and the Defendant disposed of the baseball bat used in the murder in a nearby creek. Following A.M.'s testimony, the grand jury issued a second superseding indictment against the Defendant and Terry Sr., adding a charge of accessory after the fact against Terry Sr. On March 9, 2005, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress A.M.'s testimony, claiming the District Attorney had improperly compelled her testimony for the investigation of the pending charges. On March 14, 2005, the Defendant also moved to dismiss all indictments, alleging abuse of process. During the hearing, the grand jury foreman testified that A.M. was called to provide additional information, and changes to the indictment included correcting Terry Jr.'s name and adding the accessory charge against Terry Sr. The foreman believed A.M.'s testimony significantly contributed to the investigation. The trial court ultimately denied the motions to suppress and dismiss, stating that A.M. was not called solely for the purpose of obtaining inculpatory information. The Defendant's trial on the second superseding indictment was separated from her co-defendants. Witness Robert C. Smith recounted meeting the victim and friends at a bar before the victim left around midnight on September 7, 2002. The victim's mother, Betty Wade, received a call from the victim's cell phone at 5:20 a.m. the next morning, but the caller was not the victim. Instead, someone pleaded for help, which alarmed Ms. Wade, prompting her to contact neighbor Agnes Sullivan. Sullivan found the victim's trailer in disarray upon entering, indicating a potential struggle. A.M. testified at trial, mirroring her grand jury statements from January 20, 2005. Terry Jr., having pled guilty to second-degree murder, supported the State’s case by detailing a history of conflict between the Defendant and the victim, characterized by multiple altercations. He recounted instances of severe abuse inflicted by the Defendant on him and A.M., including being burned and having his throat cut. Terry Jr. described how the Defendant forced A.M. to make derogatory calls to the victim and corroborated A.M.'s account of the murder, asserting that the Defendant dragged the victim from a Jeep and attacked her with a baseball bat. He claimed the Defendant compelled him to hit the victim with wood and insisted he hold her underwater to ensure her death. Terry Jr. also testified about breaking into the trailer with the Defendant to steal valuables and being coerced into cleaning the Mustang afterward. He alleged that the Defendant fabricated a story regarding the victim visiting the Mangrum house for pain pills and threatened both him and A.M. to maintain this narrative during police interviews. Despite initially claiming sole responsibility for the murder in a note after being threatened at knifepoint, Terry Jr. later recanted, stating he lied under duress from the Defendant. Ronald Durham, a neighbor, confirmed seeing Terry Jr. and A.M. cleaning the Mustang on the murder day. TBI Agent Joe Minor established that DNA from a cigarette butt at the crime scene matched the Defendant's, while DNA from blood on the trailer window matched Terry Jr. Fingerprint evidence linked Terry Jr. and A.M. to the broken window at the trailer. Forensic pathologist Dr. Thomas Deering noted severe blunt force trauma as well as drowning as causes of death. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of especially aggravated burglary but allowed the State to proceed with aggravated burglary and other charges. The jury found the Defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the attempted premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction, resulting in concurrent sentences: life imprisonment for felony murder, twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping, and six years for aggravated burglary. The Defendant appealed, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury process. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's judgment. This case involves a review of grand jury procedures, specifically whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to quash a subpoena for witness A.M., as well as motions to suppress A.M.’s trial testimony and to dismiss all indictments against the Defendant. The grand jury, rooted in common law, serves as a screening body that assesses evidence to establish probable cause for indictments. Under Tennessee law, no individual can face criminal charges without a prior presentment or indictment verified by a grand jury. The grand jury functions independently of the district attorney and the court, possessing inquisitorial powers to investigate and report on criminal cases. Witnesses may be subpoenaed by either entity, and those compelled to testify are granted immunity from prosecution for related offenses. The district attorney may attend grand jury proceedings to advise but cannot participate in the voting process on indictments. A grand jury is composed of twelve jurors and a foreperson, totaling thirteen members, with the foreperson serving as a spokesperson but holding equal voting power. An indictment requires the agreement of at least twelve jurors. The district attorney has broad discretion to decide whether to prosecute and which charges to bring, provided there is probable cause. After an indictment is returned, judicial authority takes over the case's disposition, although the district attorney can reconvene the grand jury for additional evidence and possible superseding indictments. However, the discretion of the state is not unlimited; trial courts can dismiss indictments for defects or improper delays. Courts have ruled that using a grand jury to prepare for trial on pending charges is improper, with the key inquiry being whether the primary purpose of the grand jury proceeding is discovery related to existing charges. While the investigatory power of the grand jury is protected, it cannot be used primarily for gathering evidence in ongoing litigation. The grand jury's role is to determine if sufficient evidence exists to justify a trial. The document emphasizes that grand jury proceedings are presumed to be regular unless proven otherwise. Trial courts are required to impose on defendants who claim abuse of the grand jury process the burden of proving that the primary aim of the grand jury proceeding was to gather information regarding pending charges for trial preparation. A valid reason for convening a grand jury, such as considering new evidence for potential new charges, maintains the presumption of regularity, even if the information also benefits the prosecution's case on existing charges. Defendants typically cannot overcome this presumption if the grand jury results in indicting previously uncharged individuals or adding charges against an already indicted defendant, as these outcomes align with the grand jury's institutional objectives and validate prosecutorial conduct. When new charges arise from evidence presented during the grand jury sessions, the presumption of regularity is generally upheld. If a trial court is made aware of a possible abuse of the grand jury process before it occurs, the correct course of action is to quash any inappropriate subpoenas. If abuse is discovered post-proceeding but pre-trial, the standard remedy is to suppress any evidence obtained improperly. The document emphasizes that while some jurisdictions apply a "sole or dominant purpose" test for evaluating prosecutorial abuse, the adopted standard focuses solely on whether the grand jury's dominant purpose was improper, avoiding redundancies in legal interpretation. A claim of abuse of the grand jury process, when raised in a motion for a new trial or on appeal, is evaluated under harmless error analysis. The trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to quash a subpoena for A.M.'s grand jury testimony is scrutinized for abuse of discretion, defined as applying an incorrect legal standard, making an illogical or unreasonable decision, or basing a decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of evidence. The Defendant argues that the District Attorney's awareness that A.M.'s testimony would be incriminating demonstrates that the subpoena's primary purpose was to gather evidence for the existing charges. Conversely, the State asserts that the subpoena aimed to explore potential new charges with a second superseding indictment. The trial court incorrectly required a more stringent standard, ruling that the subpoena's purpose must be solely to avoid improper grand jury proceedings. However, applying the correct standard, it is concluded that the Defendant did not sufficiently rebut the presumption of a legitimate purpose for the subpoena. Evidence supporting this includes prior communication between A.M.'s attorney and the District Attorney regarding the testimony and the District Attorney's choice to have A.M. testify before the grand jury rather than directly offering her immunity. Additionally, the complexities of the investigation, including conflicting accounts from the Mangrum family about the murder events, indicate that the grand jury's consideration was warranted. Conflicting testimonies hindered the grand jury's ability to determine appropriate charges against family members involved in a murder, kidnapping, and burglary case. The grand jury foreman noted the difficulty in establishing precise charges and sought to hear from A.M., who had direct involvement in the crimes. The District Attorney acted within discretion by compelling A.M. to testify, which was crucial for the grand jury to evaluate credibility and decide on charges. A.M.'s testimony led to a new charge against Terry Sr. and provided substantial benefits to the State, offering both incriminating information about the Defendant and Terry Jr. and exculpatory details regarding Terry Sr. A.M.’s testimony also served as a preview for her trial statements and a means for potential impeachment if her story changed. It is established that if the grand jury's dominant purpose is legitimate, any evidence obtained can be used at trial. The Defendant failed to demonstrate that the grand jury's purpose was compromised by the investigation into her pending charges. Consequently, the trial court's decisions to deny the motions to suppress A.M.'s testimony and to dismiss the indictments were upheld, as findings of fact by the trial court are generally binding unless contradicted by overwhelming evidence. Issues of witness credibility and evidence weight are typically resolved by the trial judge. Findings of fact that rely solely on evidence without witness credibility issues are reviewed de novo by appellate courts, with no presumption of correctness applied to the trial court’s application of law to these facts. In contrast, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment is evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard. The defendant's claims regarding motions to suppress and dismiss lack merit. During the hearing, the grand jury foreman confirmed that the grand jury reconvened to gather additional testimony from A.M., leading to a second superseding indictment against Terry Sr. for accessory after the fact, which aligns with A.M.’s testimony indicating that Terry Sr. did not participate in the murder but discussed it with the defendant post-event. Terry Sr. later pled guilty to the accessory charge, and the State dismissed other charges against him. This grand jury process contrasts with rare cases of abuse related to trial preparation, exemplified by instances where subpoenas served a primary purpose of trial preparation rather than grand jury investigation. Such cases illustrate a misuse of the grand jury process when subpoenas are employed to gather evidence for pending trials rather than for legitimate investigatory purposes. The court reversed the trial court's determination that no abuse of the grand jury occurred and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, as the trial court denied the defendant's request to question the prosecutor about the grand jury's purpose. The defendant did not prove that the grand jury's legitimate purpose—gathering testimony from A.M. to inform potential charges—was pretextual or solely aimed at trial preparation for existing charges. The court upheld the presumption of regularity, concluding that the grand jury proceeding’s primary purpose was not to gather facts for trial. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant had been appropriately charged with an accessory count arising from the proceeding. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motions to suppress and dismiss. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, ruling that the District Attorney did not improperly compel A.M.’s testimony. The defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and due process violations were unsupported by legal authority, and the court declined to address constitutional issues, confirming that constitutional questions are only resolved when necessary for adjudication. Costs were assessed against the State since the defendant is indigent.