The case involves Rutland Herald's appeal against the Vermont State Police (VSP) and the Office of the Attorney General regarding access to public records related to a criminal investigation into child pornography involving employees of the Criminal Justice Training Council at the Vermont Police Academy. The trial court had granted summary judgment to the State, denying the Herald's request for disclosure under the Access to Public Records Act (PRA). The court determined that the requested records, including inquest materials, were exempt from disclosure as they pertained to the "detection and investigation of crime" and were also classified as "confidential" by law.
Key facts include the initiation of the VSP investigation in January 2010, prompted by the Vermont Department of Human Resources' discovery of suspicious materials on employee David McMullen’s work computer, alongside inappropriate emails on other employees' devices. Following McMullen's suicide, the VSP investigated his death. After compiling various files, the Attorney General reviewed them but chose not to prosecute, concluding there was no criminal conduct by anyone other than McMullen.
In July 2010, the Herald submitted a public records request for access to both criminal and death investigation files. The VSP and Attorney General denied the request, citing the exemptions under PRA. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, maintaining the denial of access to the records.
The Herald initiated a lawsuit in August 2010, seeking summary judgment, which the State opposed, filing a cross-motion for its own summary judgment. The court requested an in camera review of the withheld materials, ultimately granting summary judgment to the State, determining that the records pertained to a criminal investigation, with few exceptions, and contained no information regarding policy or employment practices unrelated to the investigation. The court also found that the statutory language in 317(c)(1) allowed for continued confidentiality of inquest materials. The Herald's argument that the exemption ceased due to the conclusion of the investigation following McMullen's suicide was rejected, as was the claim that the exemption was time-limited under 317(c)(5). The court interpreted the law as allowing an indefinite confidentiality period.
The appellate review of the summary judgment is de novo, requiring no material fact disputes and eligibility for judgment as a matter of law. The Public Records Act (PRA) emphasizes a strong public interest in accessing governmental documents, affirming that government officials are accountable to the public. However, individual privacy rights and the State’s interests in law enforcement and crime prosecution can at times outweigh public disclosure interests. Exemptions under the PRA are interpreted strictly against record custodians, placing the burden of proof on them to justify non-disclosure.
Section 317(c)(5) exempts from disclosure records related to the detection and investigation of crime, including those kept on individuals or compiled during a criminal or disciplinary investigation by police or licensing agencies. However, records concerning the management of a law enforcement agency and initial arrest records are public. The trial court found the records in question to be related to crime detection and investigation, a determination not challenged by the Herald.
The Herald argues for disclosure based on the completion of the investigation and public interest, citing precedent for a "time-based" element in 317(c)(5). It suggests applying a balancing test to weigh privacy concerns against the need for governmental accountability. The Herald contends that since the investigative target is deceased and remaining employees have no privacy expectation regarding their professional conduct, the public interest in disclosure is heightened.
The court emphasizes its goal to interpret the statute according to legislative intent, starting with the plain meaning of the text. It finds no basis for imposing a time limitation or a balancing test, asserting that the language of 317(c)(5) indicates a permanent and categorical exemption for all criminal investigatory records from public disclosure. It clarifies that the terms "maintained" and "compiled" suggest these records remain exempt even after an investigation concludes, countering the Herald's argument that the exemption ceases after the compilation process.
The Legislature's intent regarding the exemption of public records under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5) suggests that it did not mean to impose a temporal limitation on the confidentiality of records related to criminal investigations. The document cites examples of other exemptions within the Public Records Act (PRA) that include specific temporal conditions, contrasting them with 317(c)(5), which lacks such language. The Herald argues for public oversight of law enforcement and claims that records should not remain confidential indefinitely. However, it is asserted that policy arguments fall within the Legislature's purview, not the Court's, which must uphold the statute as written. Previous cases, including Walton and Trombley, are discussed; Walton specifically focused on whether citation records were exempt under 317(c)(5) and concluded they were not, as they are considered a "product" of an investigation rather than records of the investigation itself. The Herald contends that the timing of arrests suggests a temporal element in 317(c)(5), but this interpretation is rejected. The Court emphasizes that the records in question cannot be reclassified as the “product” of an investigation without contravening statutory language and the purpose of the exemption, maintaining the presumption against interpretations leading to absurd results.
The Herald references various opinions from other jurisdictions to support its argument for imposing a temporal limitation on investigative material disclosure. However, these cases present challenges due to differing statutory language across states that have adopted similar provisions to the Public Records Act (PRA). Many cited decisions include specific qualifying language absent in the relevant statute (317(c)(5)), such as those from Florida, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, which emphasize conditions under which disclosure exemptions apply, particularly concerning the status of investigations. These cases illustrate how legislative bodies could have addressed the Herald's concerns yet chose not to.
Conversely, more relevant decisions indicate that without explicit temporal language, no such limitation exists on the disclosure exemptions for records related to crime investigation. An example is the California Supreme Court case, Williams v. Superior Court, which evaluated a request for sheriff’s disciplinary records. The court noted that the relevant statute did not impose any time restrictions on the exemption for investigatory files, reinforcing the position that the absence of specific temporal language signifies no such limitation.
The court ruled that the exemption for investigatory files remains in effect even after an investigation concludes, meaning that materials related to an investigation are permanently exempt unless specified otherwise by statute. This decision aligns with similar rulings in other jurisdictions, such as in Ohio, where the absence of ongoing enforcement activity does not negate the exemption status of investigatory records. The court also referenced federal law, indicating that no imminent enforcement action is required to maintain exemption for investigatory files, as long as they were compiled for enforcement purposes.
Regarding the case of Trombley, which involves a different exemption relating to personal documents, the court interpreted the exemption as prohibiting the disclosure of personal information regardless of where it is filed. The term "personal documents" was deemed vague, prompting the court to limit its application to instances where disclosure would infringe on personal privacy. Although the exemption did not explicitly include a privacy clause, the court inferred one from the Public Records Act's broader privacy policy, directing that a balance be struck between public interest in disclosure and individual privacy concerns when determining the release of records under this exemption.
The Herald advocates for a balancing test regarding the disclosure of records under 317(c)(5), but the court finds the statute's language to reflect a clear legislative intent to permanently protect all records related to crime detection and investigation, without ambiguity. The statute provides a categorical exemption for such records, regardless of their content, aligning with precedent that emphasizes broad and unqualified language in similar exemptions. The court rejects the Herald’s suggestion to allow for redaction of investigatory records, emphasizing that 317(c)(5) imposes a record-based limitation, not content-based, and therefore does not permit any balancing process or redaction. The court also dismisses the Herald’s claim that records related to law enforcement management should be disclosed, stating that the statute does not differentiate between investigations of police officers and those of other citizens. The court asserts that interpreting the records as management-related would undermine the specific exemption for crime investigation records, thus failing to give effect to the statute's language as a whole.
The legislative history does not indicate that the management proviso was intended to disclose actual investigation files. The trial court correctly identified the records as related to a specific investigation, not to policy or other management activities. The investigatory files are entitled to a blanket exemption under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5), negating the need to assess if certain materials qualify for exemptions under 317(c)(1). Once classified as records concerning crime detection and investigation, they are entirely exempt from public access. The dissent's introduction of a novel issue regarding inquest records as judicial branch records is deemed inappropriate, as it was not raised by the parties and lacks necessary briefing. The appeal involves a Public Records Act (PRA) request directed at the Vermont State Police and the Attorney General’s Office, focusing on their public records rather than judicial branch records. The Herald argues that barring disclosure under the PRA would render the crime investigation exemption unconstitutional, referencing the Vermont Constitution. However, the State counters that these constitutional arguments were not adequately preserved in the trial court. Despite the Herald's lack of specificity in raising constitutional issues below, it sufficiently articulated these concerns in its complaint and motion for summary judgment, warranting consideration of its arguments.
The Herald argues that the Public Records Act (PRA) should be interpreted in a manner that permits public access, intertwining constitutional issues with statutory interpretation. While the Herald emphasizes constitutional arguments on appeal, these were initially framed as avoidance arguments in the trial court. Both parties addressed the constitutional matters, warranting their consideration here. The court rejects the Herald's claim that the Vermont Constitution mandates disclosure, specifically referencing Chapter I, Article 6, which asserts that government officials are accountable to the people. This principle, derived from earlier state constitutions, lacks the specificity necessary to establish enforceable legal rights or entitlements in this context. The court emphasizes that Article 6 is a broad statement of principle, not a basis for judicially enforceable rights or a private right of action. Instead, it underscores the concept of accountability through popular election, reinforcing that no relief has been granted based solely on Article 6. Other states have similarly interpreted analogous provisions as non-enforceable.
Article 6 of the Vermont Constitution is not self-executing, meaning it does not provide direct judicial enforcement unless the Legislature acts in a way that severely contradicts its principles. Legislative action can realize the aims of Article 6 through specific laws like the Public Records Act (PRA) and the Open Meeting Law, which are seen as implementations of the Article. The Legislature has discretion in determining how to execute the broad principles of Article 6, and it is not the court's role to challenge its determinations regarding public access to records.
In a case concerning 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(5), which exempts certain executive branch records from public access, the court affirmed the Legislature's decision to not mandate disclosure of these records. Justice Dooley concurred in part, agreeing with the majority that the exemption applies to records related to crime detection and investigation, even post-investigation. However, he expressed concern that the exemption may be overly broad and limit public oversight of law enforcement actions.
Dooley also concurred with the majority's conclusion regarding the inapplicability of a proviso for records related to the management of a law enforcement agency. He found the Herald's argument flawed, as it misinterpreted the intended scope of the proviso, which specifically addresses management rather than the agency's criminal activities. The Herald failed to adequately demonstrate that the investigation pertained to the management of the police academy rather than the actions of its employees.
The law enforcement agency referenced in the proviso is identified as the one conducting the investigation, necessitating the proviso due to the broad exemption from public access that could obscure all agency records, even those unrelated to specific investigations. This exemption threatens transparency regarding the agency's overall management and direction. Legislative history indicates that the proviso was added at the request of the Vermont Public Interest Research Group (VPIRG) to ensure public access to non-investigative records. The records sought by the Herald do not pertain to the agency's management, meaning the proviso does not apply.
The dissent expresses disagreement with the majority's ruling that inquest records are not publicly accessible, particularly criticizing the majority's rationale, which suggests no party argued that these records are judicial branch records requiring disclosure under the Rules for Public Access to Court Records (PACR). This argument was not raised in prior proceedings and is seen as a novel issue introduced without proper notice or opportunity for argument. The dissent asserts that the Herald did argue for the disclosure of inquest records as judicial records, and the omission of specific citations to PACR does not alter the legal context regarding inquest records.
The affidavit from the assistant attorney general indicates that the records include an application for an inquest and related documents, which the superior court denied access to based on 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(1), citing confidentiality under 13 V.S.A. 5134. This statute mandates confidentiality for stenographers involved in inquests, limiting disclosure of testimony and records to specified legal authorities. The dissent criticizes the majority for dismissing arguments related to the inquest materials without adequately addressing the case's specifics or providing the necessary information for a merits-based decision. Three critical points are deemed essential for resolving the issue regarding these materials.
The Herald requested records regarding David McMullen's death and potential criminal activity from the Vermont State Police (VSP) and the Attorney General's office, which denied access without revealing the existence of inquest records. These records were disclosed only during the Herald's motion for summary judgment. The Herald argued that inquest materials are court records under 4 V.S.A. 693, which the Attorney General cannot restrict, and criticized the lack of basic docket information provided by the Attorney General. The Herald requested that the superior court release the inquest records, citing legal statutes and case law supporting disclosure. The defendants contended that inquest records are confidential under 13 V.S.A. 5134 and that the criminal investigation exemption under the Public Records Act (PRA) applies. The superior court upheld the confidentiality ruling, which the author believes is incorrect. The Herald subsequently moved for disclosure in a higher court, but the majority denied the motion without explanation. The Herald's arguments are based on two prior court decisions: In re D.L., establishing that inquest records are judicial records, and In re Sealed Documents, recognizing the public accessibility of search warrant records. The author supports the Herald's position, asserting that these precedents dictate that inquest records should be publicly accessible. Additionally, the author critiques the reliance on outdated inquest procedures, noting that modern inquests primarily involve court-issued subpoenas without traditional testimonial proceedings, making the claim for confidentiality inapplicable.
Documents and evidence collected in investigations are provided directly to law enforcement officers, as outlined in recent case law, including *State v. Simmons* and *In re Inquest Subpoena*. In the latter case, all proceedings and documents were publicly accessible, contrasting with the current case's superior court ruling. The inquest process in this case is limited to four key documents: a request for an inquest on a standard form, an affidavit detailing the grounds for this request, a subpoena for the judge's signature, and the subsequent response from the records keeper. The subpoena allows compliance by sending records directly to law enforcement instead of the court.
The inquest, as defined by 13 V.S.A. 5132, typically involves sworn witnesses and testimonies; however, in this instance, no witnesses are involved, and the procedure is likened to a search warrant, emphasizing its role in gathering evidence involuntarily. This use of the term "inquest" deviates from its traditional judicial meaning. The inquest process is viewed as judicial power, akin to a search warrant issuance, which underscores the critical balance between law enforcement needs and citizens' privacy rights. Investigatory subpoenas, while essential for law enforcement, represent a significant intrusion into personal rights, necessitating careful oversight to prevent misuse.
Oversight of subpoena power is emphasized due to its limited constitutional restrictions compared to search warrants. Judges have discretion in granting subpoenas without established standards for exercising that discretion. In this case, three records withheld are judicial branch records related to judicial actions, based on the precedent set in State v. Tallman, which clarified that certain executive branch records must be inspected by a court before determining public access. The specific records in question include the application for the inquest, the affidavit, and the subpoena, all of which the defendants possess. A fourth record, not under judicial control, is governed by the Public Records Act (PRA) and is not publicly accessible under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5).
The statute broadly states that inquest hearings are secret, but it does not extend to documents related to inquests that do not involve testimonial hearings. Previous case law supports the interpretation that only the evidentiary hearing is secret. The majority opinion incorrectly ruled that the Herald lost part of its appeal for failing to request inquest records from a superior court clerk, despite the public records request being made in July 2010. The defendants only clarified the nature of the records during litigation, not in their initial response.
The Herald requested the release of judicial records related to an inquest, citing a lack of information from the defendants about the inquest's location and timing. The inquest was initiated by an assistant attorney general based on a police officer's affidavit and could have taken place in any superior court, but it was conducted in Rutland County, a detail the Herald only discovered through this dissent. There is no designated venue for inquest proceedings, leading to challenges in accessing related records, similar to issues currently surrounding search warrant records in Vermont, where legislation is pending to create a searchable database.
Under the Public Records Act (PRA) and Public Access to Court Records (PACR), government records are presumed accessible unless the custodian can demonstrate an exemption, placing the burden of proof on the custodian. The public records request process should be expedited, but a new procedural requirement introduced by the majority complicates access, suggesting requests must be directed to the superior court clerk of the county where the records are kept. This creates unnecessary barriers, denying the Herald access after 18 months due to a technicality that it could not comply with because of the lack of information.
The access issue has been legally decided in the superior court and argued in this court, with the majority's objections seen as mere technicalities. The Herald has requested the release of the inquest records, and it is argued that the case should be resolved on its merits rather than procedural grounds. Additionally, the case originated from a request to defendants for public records they possess, which includes the three inquest-related records, and the PRA and PACR do not differentiate between original and copied records.
The holder's status of a record does not determine the right to access it under relevant legal frameworks. Access rights remain consistent whether records are requested from a superior court clerk, the Attorney General, or the Vermont State Police, as these records fall under the provisions of 4 V.S.A. 652(4) and PACR. The Herald has the right to request these records from defendants, akin to requests made to the superior court. The notion that access depends on the request source contradicts both common sense and the Public Records Act (PRA), which promotes agency consultation for public records requests. Legislative intent suggests that agencies should not deny requests solely because records originated from another entity. Drawing parallels with the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), courts have ruled that agencies cannot refuse requests by redirecting applicants to original sources. Agencies are responsible for producing responsive records in their possession, regardless of the records' origin. In this case, the Herald's request was outright denied without referral. It is asserted that the Herald maintained its stance for the judiciary to release inquest records and that defendants waived objections related to the request location. Alternatively, the Herald is entitled to the same public access rights from defendants as from the judiciary. The dissenting opinion calls for releasing the three inquest records classified as judicial records. Minor exceptions to disclosure included a press release and an email related to law enforcement management. Additionally, the Herald contested the trial court's handling of documents, specifically three compact discs (CDs), which the court described without reviewing, leading to questions about the adequacy of the court's assessment.
The review of materials on the CDs confirms the trial court's description as accurate. The Herald disputes the trial court's finding that the State provided all records for in camera inspection. Affidavits from an assistant attorney general and the chief criminal investigator indicate that the records requested by the Herald were reviewed, but the Herald is concerned about the absence of records from the VDHR investigation. There is no evidence that the VSP accessed VDHR records, and the Herald did not request these records directly from VDHR, leading to the conclusion that they were outside the scope of the Herald's Public Records Act (PRA) request.
The Herald argues that a Vaughn index should have been produced, but it is deemed unnecessary in this case since the records fall under a categorical exemption from public access. Citing **Church of Scientology v. IRS**, it is noted that a Vaughn index is not helpful for records exempted by generic exclusions. The discussion also references multiple cases cited by the Herald that are distinguishable, as they involve exemptions related to non-criminal investigations or different legal contexts. The court acknowledges that the situation merits legislative attention.
Confidentiality of investigatory records is justified during an investigation but diminishes over time, suggesting that stale records should not remain secret if their disclosure poses no harm, and a court should be able to declare the expiration of confidentiality. The Legislature has established a process to thoroughly investigate allegations of misconduct by state police, with the internal affairs office responsible for such investigations and required to report findings to relevant authorities, unless no criminal statute is violated. Records from this internal investigation office are exempt from public disclosure. A motion by the Herald for the release of inquest materials was denied, with the court finding that the Herald's arguments lacked sufficient preservation of claims for disclosure. The dissenting opinion was critical of the Herald's interpretation of the law regarding public records, distinguishing it from previous cases that established duties for public officials, indicating that the Herald's claims did not create an obligation for the State to disclose records. The discussion also questioned whether any statutes imposed the duty the petitioners claimed.
Section 317(c)(5) of the PRA originally lacked a proviso regarding the management and direction of law enforcement agencies. A representative from VPIRG proposed the addition of such language during a House Committee hearing, arguing that the section was too broad and that only actual investigatory files should be exempt from public view. The suggested amendment aimed to clarify that records related to police management, direction, or efficiency should be considered public records. This proviso was later recommended by a member of the Committee and incorporated into the PRA on March 28, 1975.
The Legislature repealed 4 V.S.A. § 693 on June 3, 2010, due to judicial system reorganization, with similar provisions now found in 4 V.S.A. § 652(4). In State v. Tallman, it was determined that these sections held the same meaning. Concerns were raised about the validity of the current inquest practice, noting that while prosecutors have investigatory subpoena power in specific cases, the use of inquest procedures for other purposes is not clearly supported by statutory language. The authority under which inquests are conducted must be strictly interpreted, as established in previous cases, and the current practice may not meet this standard. The case at hand involves access to inquest records rather than the legitimacy of the inquest process itself.
Tallman's ruling applies equally to the now-governing 652(4). The omission of citations to PACR by the Herald was deemed insignificant, as PACR merely adopted existing case law precedents. The term "testimonial" refers to hearings where testimony regarding possible crimes is taken. The record from these hearings may not be regulated under existing statutes, but they were publicly accessible in a related case.
