Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 28, 1946; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The Court, led by Mr. Justice Black, addresses the constitutionality of a state's ability to impose criminal penalties on an individual distributing religious literature within a company-owned town, specifically Chickasaw, Alabama, owned by Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. The town has typical characteristics of an American community, including residential areas, streets, and a business block utilized by residents and the public. A company-paid deputy sheriff serves as the town's law enforcement. The appellant, a Jehovah’s Witness, attempted to distribute religious literature on a sidewalk near the post office but was confronted by management's prohibition against solicitation without a permit, which they refused to grant. The appellant argued that this prohibition violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After being arrested and convicted under Alabama law for remaining on private property after being warned, her conviction was upheld by the Alabama Court of Appeals, which ruled that the statute was constitutional as the property was privately owned and not irrevocably dedicated to public use. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari, and the case is now under appeal. The Court suggests that if the property had been owned by a municipal corporation rather than a private entity, the outcome would likely differ, indicating a potential distinction in the application of constitutional rights in privately owned versus publicly owned spaces.
Neither a State nor a municipality can entirely prohibit the distribution of literature with religious or political content in public spaces, nor can they impose a licensing system that allows arbitrary denial of such distribution. The right to disseminate ideas in public areas is fundamental to preserving individual freedoms, including door-to-door literature distribution. Ownership of property by a single entity does not grant that entity the authority to infringe on these rights. The State argues that the corporation’s ownership allows it to control inhabitants as a homeowner might with guests, but this is rejected; ownership does not equate to absolute control. Property opened for public use is subject to statutory and constitutional rights, limiting the owner's rights. Examples include privately owned public transport facilities, which must comply with regulations to avoid unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce. The ownership of a town by a corporation does not alter the public's interest in free communication channels, paralleling the rights associated with a municipality. The conclusion emphasizes that regardless of ownership structure, the public maintains an equal interest in ensuring community functions that facilitate free expression.
The town of Chickasaw operates like any other municipality, with its “business block” serving as a public shopping center accessible to all. Managers of the corporation cannot limit the freedoms of press and religion of the residents, as doing so would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The state statute aiming to criminally penalize the distribution of religious literature is unconstitutional. Residents of company-owned towns, like those in other municipalities, are entitled to the same rights as any citizen, including the right to be informed without censorship. The balance of property rights against individual liberties favors the latter, emphasizing that the rights protected by the First Amendment are foundational to free government. The court finds that the state cannot justify allowing a corporation to restrict these fundamental rights, leading to the reversal of the lower court’s decision regarding the criminalization of distributing religious literature. While the state court's ruling on "dedication" is acknowledged, it does not address the federal constitutional issues at hand. The corporation's authority does not extend to infringing upon freedoms of press and religion. Additionally, historical context is provided, noting that a significant portion of miners lived in company-owned towns during the early 20th century, highlighting the need for constitutional protections in such communities. The court cites various precedents emphasizing the necessity of safeguarding civil liberties against suppression.
