State v. V.H.

Citation: 2013 Ark. 344Docket: CV-12-1018

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; September 26, 2013; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the Baxter County Circuit Court's order removing V.H.'s name from the Arkansas sex-offender registry. The State of Arkansas appealed, arguing the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because V.H. was twenty-five years old when he filed his petition. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal for statutory interpretation and to address procedural compliance with Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 3. 

V.H. had been adjudicated delinquent for sexual assault at age sixteen and was required to register as a sex offender. After completing a sex-offender program and being released from youth services in 2005, he was classified as a moderate-risk offender. In 2007, V.H. filed a petition to remove his name from the registry, citing a future twenty-first birthday, and was reassessed as a low-risk offender in 2008. 

In 2012, he filed another petition claiming he posed no threat, prompting the State to move for dismissal, asserting lack of jurisdiction since V.H. was no longer a juvenile and interpreting the statute to allow petitions only on the offender's twenty-first birthday. The circuit court ruled in V.H.'s favor, leading to the State's appeal, which the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, indicating the appeal was proper and the circuit court had jurisdiction. The case demonstrates the complexities of juvenile adjudications and sex-offender registration laws in Arkansas.

According to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-343, appeals from juvenile court must follow the same procedures as outlined in the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, in delinquency cases, a petitioner can only appeal in circumstances that would allow the State to appeal in criminal cases, as stated in section 9-27-343(b). This limitation aligns with Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2 (c)(1), where the State's appeal rights are confined to final orders from misdemeanor or felony prosecutions, with specific exceptions for interlocutory appeals.

The court has recognized significant differences between appeals by criminal defendants and those by the State, noting that the latter's right to appeal is not constitutionally granted but is instead limited to Rule 3. However, there are instances where the State is not bound by Rule 3, particularly in civil appeals arising from collateral proceedings. Notable cases, such as State v. Webb and State v. Burnett, illustrate that appeals related to expungements and sealing criminal records are considered civil in nature, thus exempting the State from Rule 3 requirements.

In the current case, the State is appealing a decision to remove a former juvenile delinquent from the sex-offender registry. This appeal is classified as arising from a collateral proceeding, similar to recent precedents where appeals concerning sex-offender registration were deemed civil. Consequently, the State is not required to adhere to Rule 3 for this appeal.

The State contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to remove the individual from the sex-offender registry because the individual was twenty-five at the time of the decision. The State argues that interpreting section 9-27-356(h) as allowing the court jurisdiction over the individual for life, except during a narrow period at the conclusion of probation until age twenty-one, would yield an unreasonable outcome.

Appellee asserts that the circuit court had jurisdiction under section 9-27-356(h) and that Amendment 80 of the Arkansas Constitution supports this jurisdiction for his petition. The resolution of the appeal depends on the interpretation of section 9-27-356(h), which the court reviews de novo, focusing on the intent of the General Assembly as the primary rule of statutory construction. The court emphasizes that statutes must be interpreted as written, using ordinary meanings, and will avoid interpretations that lead to absurd outcomes. 

According to the statute, a juvenile may petition to have their name removed from the sex offender registry while the circuit court retains jurisdiction or when the juvenile reaches twenty-one years of age, whichever comes later. The court notes that the word "or" indicates that the circuit court can consider the petition even after the juvenile turns twenty-one. The court rejects the State's interpretation that would require the petition to be filed on the juvenile's twenty-first birthday, arguing that such a reading would undermine the statute's purpose. Consequently, the court affirms the circuit court's order, finding the State's appeal meritless.

Justice Hoofman dissents, arguing that the appeal is not valid under the rules governing juvenile-delinquency cases. He contends that the State can only appeal under conditions similar to those in criminal proceedings, as outlined in the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure and relevant statutes, and therefore believes the appeal should not proceed.

The State is prohibited from appealing delinquency proceedings deemed "civil in nature," as established in case law, including State v. R.H. and Gilliam v. State. Delinquency cases are classified as civil rather than criminal, meaning appeals must follow criminal procedure rules only under specific circumstances outlined in Rule 2 (c)(1) and section 9-27-343 (b). The majority opinion conflicts with these rules by allowing the State to appeal civil delinquency matters without restriction while imposing restrictions on criminal-related appeals. The author contends that the 'civil in nature' exception should not apply to delinquency appeals, declaring the State's appeal in this instance improper due to non-compliance with Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Criminal. This rule mandates the prosecuting attorney to file a notice of appeal within thirty days and outlines the role of the attorney general in reviewing the trial record and lodging the appeal. A precedent case, City of Little Rock v. Tibbet, confirms that an independent appeal by a city without the attorney general's involvement constitutes non-compliance with appellate procedures.

Jodi Carney, the deputy prosecutor, lodged the record for the appeal on November 28, 2012, and filed the appellant's brief. The attorney general's office reviewed the record on December 3, 2012, but failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 3(c), as Carney, not the attorney general, lodged the record. The letter from the attorney general’s office only indicated that Carney would be the attorney of record and did not authorize her to pursue the appeal on the attorney general’s behalf. As a result, Carney is pursuing the appeal independently.

The appeal is further problematic because it does not conform to the limited categories of interlocutory appeals allowed under Rule 3. Citing State v. K.H., the dissent argues that the current appeal does not arise from a misdemeanor or felony prosecution, as it concerns the removal of V.H. from the sex-offender registry, a matter not encompassed by Rule 3(a). Consequently, the appeal is deemed improper and should be dismissed for failing to comply with the established rules governing State appeals in delinquency cases. Justices Baker and Hart concur with this dissent.