Jeffrey Thomas Lynch was charged with indecent liberties and second degree rape after T.S. reported that he forcibly penetrated her and coerced her into sexual contact. Lynch asserted that T.S. consented to the sexual activity. The trial court, over Lynch's objection, instructed the jury that he bore the burden of proving consent by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Lynch on both charges. The Court of Appeals upheld the rape conviction but reversed the indecent liberties conviction. Lynch's appeal focused on the trial court's error in instructing the jury regarding the burden of proof on consent, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment right to control his defense and was not harmless. The Supreme Court of Washington granted review to address these issues.
Allegations of constitutional violations are reviewed de novo. The trial court's instruction to the jury on the affirmative defense of consent, against Lynch's objections, raises questions about his Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair trial and implicitly includes the defendant's autonomy to control their defense, as established in Faretta v. California. This right is essential for truth-seeking in trials and respects individual dignity. Prior cases indicate that instructing the jury on an affirmative defense without the defendant's consent violates this right, as seen in State v. Jones and State v. McSorley.
The recent case of State v. Coristine illustrates this principle. Coristine was charged with second-degree rape, and his defense strategy focused on demonstrating that the victim was not incapacitated during the incident. During the instruction conference, the trial court considered whether to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of reasonable belief, which requires the defendant to prove that they reasonably believed the victim was not incapacitated. Coristine objected to this instruction, asserting that it imposed an undue burden on him while maintaining his defense that the State failed to prove the victim's incapacitation.
The trial court instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of reasonable belief over Coristine's objections, leading to his conviction, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, this court later reversed that decision, emphasizing that the Sixth Amendment grants defendants the right to control their defense, which includes the choice to present or reject an affirmative defense. The court stated that forcing a defense on an unwilling defendant compromises their autonomy. In Lynch's case, similarly, the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by instructing the jury on consent despite his objections, which conflicted with his strategy of challenging the element of forcible compulsion. The State argued that the consent instruction was warranted due to Lynch's evidence, but this was rejected based on the precedent set in Coristine.
The court explained that any constitutional error is presumed prejudicial, and the State must prove it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contended that the consent instruction did not contradict Lynch's defense; however, the court found that the instruction imposed a greater burden on Lynch than necessary to create reasonable doubt about forcible compulsion. Even if the State's assertion of consistency were true, it would not suffice to demonstrate harmless error. The court reiterated that a violation of a defendant's right to control their defense constitutes significant error, regardless of the accuracy of the jury instructions. Thus, the instruction on consent, though legally accurate, was impermissible when given against Lynch’s wishes, reaffirming the principle that a defendant's control over their defense is paramount.
The State contends that any error regarding the jury's consent instruction was harmless, arguing that the jury assessed the State's burden of proof accurately. However, the State's claim is unsubstantiated, relying solely on the assertion that the jury would have convicted Lynch regardless of the consent instruction. The trial court's decision to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of consent without Lynch's consent violated his Sixth Amendment right to control his defense. The court found the State failed to demonstrate that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the Court of Appeals' ruling that the trial court did not violate Lynch's rights is reversed, and Lynch's second degree rape conviction is vacated, with a remand for a new trial. The discussion also highlights that the consent instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof onto Lynch, conflicting with established due process principles under the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion criticizes prior cases (State v. Camara and State v. Gregory) for conflicting with Supreme Court precedent and misinterpreting the legislative intent of Washington's rape laws, suggesting these cases should be overruled. Lynch's challenge to the jury instruction is grounded in the assertion that the prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
A state cannot reduce the burden of proof for the prosecution by categorizing a fact that negates an essential element of a crime as an affirmative defense, which the defendant must prove. This principle, established in Mullaney v. Wilbur, underscores the distinction between elements of a crime and mitigating factors. While a defendant may be required to prove mitigating factors, this does not extend to elements that negate the crime itself. In Patterson v. New York, the Court allowed states to require defendants to prove certain factors without increasing the prosecutorial burden. However, it emphasized that there are constitutional limits on how states can reallocate burdens of proof, and a legislature cannot declare a defendant guilty or presumptively guilty. The Court revisited these limits in Martin v. Ohio, where it upheld a statute requiring defendants charged with aggravated murder to prove self-defense, noting that self-defense can coexist with the elements of aggravated murder. Most courts interpret Patterson and Martin as prohibiting any requirement for defendants to prove facts that negate elements of the charged crime, thereby upholding due process. Several jurisdictions have ruled in line with this interpretation, reinforcing the constitutional protection against shifting the burden of disproving elements of a crime to the defendant.
Two jurisdictions maintain that the prosecution has no constitutional obligation to disprove an element-negating defense, as established in Smart v. Leeke and Hobgood v. Housewright. In Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631, the defendant challenged a jury instruction that suggested he needed to prove his victim's consent to avoid conviction for second-degree rape. Camara argued that this instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof, implying that jurors could convict unless he disproved the allegation of forcible compulsion. The court rejected this claim, affirming Camara's conviction and interpreting prior case law (Martin) to imply that whether an affirmative defense negates an element of a crime does not carry constitutional weight.
The court revised the two-part Patterson test used to assess if a defendant could be tasked with proving a defense. The first prong examines if the legislature intended to equate an element of the crime with the absence of a defense, while the second prong considers if the defense negates an element the prosecution must prove. The court found that the Washington legislature had intentionally shifted the burden of proof on consent to the defendant in the 1975 reform of the rape statutes. Consequently, it concluded that due process is not violated by requiring a defendant to negate an element of the crime.
In its analysis, the court merged the concepts of affirmative defenses that overlap with elements of charged crimes and those that negate them. It interpreted Martin as casting doubt on the validity of the second prong of the Patterson-derived test and chose not to apply it to Camara’s case. This interpretation was reaffirmed in Gregory, with the majority citing Martin to support Camara's outcome, although two Justices dissented, arguing that consent is fundamentally opposite to forcible compulsion.
Allen Gregory requests the overruling of the Camara decision, asserting it misinterpreted the Martin case. The argument is that in first-degree rape, the element of forcible compulsion cannot coexist with consent. Camara's ruling is deemed harmful as it improperly shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, conflicting with United States Supreme Court precedents. Specifically, in Smith v. United States, the Court clarified that the prosecution must disprove defenses that negate an element of the crime, while it can place the burden on the defendant for defenses that merely excuse conduct. The distinction between defenses that negate versus excuse elements of a crime was further reinforced by Smith, which clarified that Camara's reasoning is inconsistent with this rule.
In light of Washington's Rape Statute, the text argues that consent negates the element of forcible compulsion, as demonstrated by jury questions during deliberations. There is a noted contradiction in the burden of proof instructions given to the jury, where the state must prove the second-degree rape charge beyond a reasonable doubt, yet the defendant bears the burden to prove consent. The Camara court's reliance on legislative history to assert that Washington's 1975 rape statute reforms intended to shift the burden to the defense is challenged, stating that the intent was to focus on the perpetrator's conduct rather than the victim's reaction. The conclusion drawn by Camara is claimed to misinterpret both legislative intent and the analysis provided in academic discussions of the 1975 reforms, which aimed to maintain nonconsent as an essential element of rape.
Statutory interpretation aims to ascertain and fulfill legislative intent, primarily through the plain language of the statute. For the second degree rape statute under which Lynch was charged, the language is clear and does not impose a burden on the defendant to prove consent. Washington's chapter 9A.44 RCW includes specific provisions that recognize affirmative defenses for certain sex offenses, such as those involving health care providers or based on the victim's mental state or age. However, the legislature has not included any affirmative defense for charges of sexual intercourse or contact by forcible compulsion, indicating intentional exclusion. Courts are prohibited from inferring omitted language or defenses that the legislature did not codify. The five specified categories where affirmative defenses are recognized include: (1) second degree rape involving a health care provider during treatment; (2) indecent liberties during treatment; (3) offenses where lack of consent is due to mental incapacity or physical helplessness; (4) offenses related to the victim's age; and (5) custodial sexual misconduct.
Legislative history surrounding Washington's rape law indicates that the legislature did not intend to place the burden of proving consent on defendants charged with sexual contact or intercourse by forcible compulsion. The reform of rape laws began in 1967, primarily driven by women's advocacy groups, notably the Seattle Women's Commission (SWC) and the National Organization for Women (NOW), in response to rising rape incidents and low prosecution rates. Between 1974 and 1975, four reform bills were proposed, with Senate Bill 3173 being the first to explicitly state that lack of consent is an essential element of rape. This bill aimed to eliminate the corroboration requirement previously absent in Washington's rape statute and reflected the advocacy efforts to address the complexities surrounding consent and the prosecution of rape cases. The reforms ultimately culminated in a law enacted in 1975, co-authored by key members of the SWC.
The legislature's failure to enact an amendment may indicate a rejection of its substance, as seen in State v. Schwab. However, in the case of Senate Bill 3173, such an inference is not warranted because the sequence of legislative drafts does not solely determine intent and can be countered by other evidence. In Washington's context, the legislative record strongly suggests that nonconsent was intended as a key element of forcible sexual contact. Extensive documentation from the debates surrounding the 1975 rape law reforms—such as letters, testimonies, and news articles—demonstrates no intent to exclude consent. Instead, the legislature focused on reforms including the elimination of resistance as a requirement, limitations on evidentiary admissibility regarding a victim’s past sexual behavior, and the establishment of degrees of rape. The treatment of consent in these discussions affirms its centrality to rape prosecutions, emphasizing that consent must reflect the victim's discretion and choice, distinct from past behavior. The 1975 reforms redefined rape to focus on the victim's will and consent, reinforcing the importance of determining consent based solely on the victim's actions and statements at the time of the incident.
Sexual intercourse is deemed "against the person's will and without the person's consent" if the victim's resistance is forcibly overcome or obstructed by fear of immediate bodily harm. Historically, rape laws emphasized the victim's physical resistance, requiring evidence of strenuous opposition for a conviction. In Washington, courts have criticized the necessity of physical resistance, deeming it unrealistic and impractical, as juries cannot accurately assess the limits of a victim's strength under duress. Case law reflects that mere threats, without physical force, do not excuse nonresistance, and a lack of physical resistance due to circumstances does not equate to consent. The rigid interpretation of nonconsent as requiring physical resistance contributed to legislative reforms in 1975, aimed at removing "resistance" as a necessary element in rape cases, highlighting the need for legal clarity in addressing sexual assault.
Under the statutory regime regarding rape convictions, defendants frequently appealed on the basis of insufficient evidence of the victim's resistance, though such appeals were rarely successful. Courts held that the absence of resistance was a matter for the jury to determine, with various cases affirming that fear could prevent resistance. The statutory concept of resistance is not a definitive element of the crime itself but serves as evidence of lack of consent, which is essential for establishing rape. Courts have clarified that reluctant submission does not equate to consent and that the degree of resistance is merely one factor among many indicating willingness or consent.
In most cases, it is necessary to demonstrate that a woman's resistance was forcibly overcome or prevented due to fear of immediate harm. Reform advocates questioned why victims should be expected to resist to the point of injury, unlike robbery victims, who are not penalized for complying. They emphasized that eliminating the requirement for resistance does not equate to removing the necessity of proving nonconsent, as nonconsent remains the core of the crime of rape. The focus of rape statutes should be on consent and the circumstances surrounding it, arguing that victims should not have to endure additional harm for a conviction. Moreover, modern law recognizes that force and nonconsent are interconnected, with various factors, including fear of harm or threats, potentially impeding resistance.
Lawsuit State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas, No. 87882-0) addresses the evolution of rape law in Washington, emphasizing the reform statute's focus on the culpability of the accused while maintaining that nonconsent remains a fundamental element of the crime. Loh's article highlights the symbolic significance of this shift but confirms that nonconsent is essential for establishing the crime of rape. Reformers aimed to restrict the admissibility of evidence regarding a victim's prior sexual conduct rather than eliminate nonconsent as an element. Traditional common law allowed the victim's sexual history to be used as evidence of consent, based on two assumptions: that prior consent demonstrated a propensity to consent and that an unchaste woman lacked credibility as a witness. By the time of the 1975 reforms, Washington law had already begun limiting the admissibility of such evidence, establishing that specific acts of sexual misconduct by the victim were typically inadmissible because they did not directly relate to consent or credibility. Despite these legal developments, lower courts sometimes failed to adhere to these standards, leading to a trial environment that discouraged many victims from pursuing charges, prompting reformers to advocate for a presumption against the admissibility of prior sexual behavior. The overall legal landscape reflects a growing sensitivity toward victims' experiences, although inconsistencies in court practices persist.
The 1975 Washington State law reform concerning sexual misconduct evidence established that a victim's past sexual behavior is generally inadmissible for credibility assessments. Evidence regarding a victim's sexual history is also inadmissible for consent considerations, unless: (1) the victim and perpetrator have previously engaged in sexual intercourse, and that history is relevant to consent, or (2) the court, after a closed hearing, determines that the evidence is relevant, its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, and excluding it would deny the defendant substantial justice. Since 1975, these protections have been expanded; defendants must now file a written pretrial motion with an affidavit to introduce evidence of an accuser's sexual history, followed by a court hearing to assess its admissibility.
The reform also included the codification of degrees of rape, moving away from a singular definition that previously imposed a minimum five-year sentence without distinguishing severity levels. Advocates believed this lack of distinction led to jury nullification in less severe cases. The changes aimed to facilitate convictions for less aggravated instances of rape by allowing for graduated sentences and addressing plea bargaining issues, thereby providing a more nuanced understanding of the crime's seriousness.
The reform statute in Washington established three degrees of rape to enhance legal clarity and victim protection. First degree rape involves burglary or kidnapping, weapon use, or serious physical injury, with a minimum sentence of three years. Second degree rape includes sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, with a victim who is physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, or when the victim is vulnerable and dependent on the perpetrator. Third degree rape occurs when sexual intercourse happens under circumstances not qualifying as first or second degree, particularly when the victim has clearly expressed a lack of consent or if the perpetrator threatens substantial harm to the victim's property.
Washington's reforms were influenced by Michigan's 1974 legislation, which replaced "rape" with "criminal sexual conduct" and removed requirements for corroboration and resistance. Michigan’s law also includes a stringent rape shield law and does not reference the alleged victim's consent in its definitions of criminal sexual conduct. Despite this omission, Michigan courts maintain that the prosecution must prove nonconsent, establishing that consensual acts between individuals not deemed "mentally defective," "mentally incapacitated," or "physically helpless" do not constitute criminal sexual conduct.
Consent can be used as a defense to negate claims of force or coercion in criminal sexual conduct cases, and the prosecution must disprove consent beyond a reasonable doubt if the defendant presents sufficient evidence to place it in controversy. Michigan's reform statute suggests that nonconsent is redundant when force is clearly implied by the circumstances of the crime, such as the use of a weapon or commission of the crime alongside another felony. The courts have emphasized that where force or coercion is an element of the crime charged, the prosecution retains the burden of disproving a legitimate claim of consent. However, consent is not a defense when force or coercion is not an element of the charge and the statute does not allow for it. The Washington reform laws aim to focus on the perpetrator's actions rather than the victim's, yet this does not eliminate consent as an essential element in cases of forcible compulsion. Legislative history supports that nonconsent remains central to the definition of rape, and reforms have not diminished the prosecution's obligation to prove nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt. Overturning established precedents related to these principles is only justified if they are found to be incorrect and harmful.
To establish force or coercion under the statute, it must be shown that the victim did not consent. The cases of Camara and Gregory are criticized for allowing lower courts to require defendants charged with sexual offenses to prove the victim's lack of consent by a preponderance of the evidence, which effectively creates a presumption of guilt and undermines due process rights. Over the past decade, at least nine appellate decisions have referenced Camara or Gregory in this context. The current case offers a chance to rectify these precedents, particularly concerning the defendant's due process argument. The court has previously overturned harmful precedent that threatens fundamental constitutional principles, as seen in State v. Barber. Several other cases have similarly been noted, indicating a trend toward reassessing the legal standards applied in such circumstances.
