Steven Phillips v. Debra Herndon

Citations: 730 F.3d 773; 2013 WL 5184270; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19178Docket: 09-56079

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 17, 2013; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Steven Wayne Phillips's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition, which contested the exclusion of an accomplice's confession that exculpated him as the shooter in a murder case. The panel found the state court's decision to exclude the confession reasonable, noting that other statements from the accomplice, Robert Cress, identified Phillips as the shooter and rendered Cress's exculpatory statement unreliable. The California Court of Appeal deemed the exclusion proper under state evidence law, citing a lack of trustworthiness due to contradictions between Cress's multiple statements and the physical evidence. Phillips had been convicted of murder and received consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for both the murder and firearm enhancement. The trial judge's findings regarding Cress's inconsistent statements were pivotal in upholding the exclusion of the confession.

The trial court deemed certain statements untrustworthy, leading to the conclusion that a jury would likely have rejected them as exonerating evidence for Phillips if admitted. Phillips subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied, prompting an appeal focused on whether the exclusion of Cress’s statement infringed his right to present a complete defense. This issue raised questions regarding the deference owed to the California Court of Appeal's ruling, which did not reference federal law despite Phillips's constitutional claims. Citing Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court established that federal courts must presume state court decisions adjudicated all claims on the merits under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) unless the state court fails to address federal law. The Johnson v. Williams case identified an exception to this presumption when state courts deny relief without addressing federal law and the defendant's claim involves both federal and state law violations. However, the Richter presumption remains if the state law is at least as protective as federal standards. The AEDPA deference does not require citation of Supreme Court cases as long as the state court's reasoning or outcome does not contradict them. The defendant's case hinges on the constitutional guarantee of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, as established in Crane v. Kentucky, but this right is subject to states' authority to exclude evidence for valid reasons. Previous rulings, including Rhoades v. Henry, confirmed that excluding unreliable confessions does not necessarily violate due process. The Supreme Court has noted that violations of the right to present a complete defense due to evidence exclusion are rare. Under California law, specifically Evidence Code 1230, hearsay statements are admissible if made under circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe they were true due to the risk of criminal liability.

California's Evidence Code differs from the Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) by not requiring corroboration for third-party confessions used to implicate someone else in a crime. Instead, the California Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of assessing the trustworthiness of such confessions based on the specific facts of each case, allowing for judicial discretion. Under Evidence Code 1230, a trial judge may admit a third-party confession if it is deemed "probably true," and excluding it solely on hearsay grounds would constitute an abuse of discretion. 

In People v. Cudjo, the court illustrated this principle when a defendant sought to introduce a confession made by his brother, who was also a suspect in a murder case. The court noted that the confession, made while the brother was in custody, should be considered trustworthy given the circumstances. It ruled that the trial court improperly excluded the confession based on the perceived lack of credibility of the witness, emphasizing that the evidence must only raise reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt to be admissible. The confession was made shortly after the crime and under conditions suggesting its reliability, thereby creating the necessary reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's culpability.

The Cudjo Court determined that the exclusion of Gregory’s confession was a harmless error under California law, noting that the confession was inconsistent with physical evidence and Gregory’s previous accounts, including sworn testimony. Despite earlier findings that the confession was trustworthy, this inconsistency did not invalidate the conclusion that California law is as protective as federal standards. On habeas review, the court found the error was not harmless according to the Brecht standard. The California Court of Appeal's ruling to exclude Cress’s confession was granted deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) because Cress provided three conflicting accounts of the murder, which reasonably led the court to determine his statements were unreliable. Even if a different outcome might be reached on direct appeal, AEDPA emphasizes that habeas corpus is a safeguard against significant failures in state criminal justice, not a tool for routine error correction. Federal courts have supported the exclusion of statements under Rule 804(b)(3) when contradictions undermine trustworthiness. The document cites various cases illustrating that inconsistencies in statements can render confessions untrustworthy. Ultimately, the California Court of Appeal's decision to exclude Cress's admission was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law or a misinterpretation of the facts, leading to an affirmation of the lower court's ruling.