Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 2, 1945; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the Court's opinion concerning a case involving Mitsuye Endo, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry. She was evacuated from Sacramento, California, in 1942 due to military orders and relocated to the Tule Lake War Relocation Center. In July 1942, Endo filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Northern District of California, seeking her release, which was denied in July 1943. She appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals in August 1943 and was later transferred to the Central Utah Relocation Center.
The Court received a certificate of questions of law from the Ninth Circuit on April 22, 1944, and ordered the entire record to be certified on May 8, 1944. The proceedings lacked formal service of process to any respondent, although the U.S. Attorney contested the petition's validity in the District Court. The Solicitor General subsequently argued the case before the Supreme Court.
The background of the evacuation of Japanese individuals followed the attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. declaration of war against Japan. Executive Order No. 9066, issued on February 19, 1942, authorized military commanders to designate exclusionary areas for national security, allowing the Secretary of War to provide necessary support for those relocated. This order reflects the government's justification for the evacuation based on wartime security concerns.
Lt. General J. L. De Witt, as the Military Commander of the Western Defense Command, was tasked with implementing duties outlined in an Executive Order. On March 2, 1942, he issued Public Proclamation No. 1, which stated that the Pacific Coast was particularly vulnerable to attacks and espionage, necessitating military safeguards. This proclamation established specific Military Areas and Zones, with the possibility of excluding certain individuals from these regions. Subsequently, on March 16, 1942, he issued Public Proclamation No. 2, further designating additional Military Areas and Zones.
On March 18, 1942, President Roosevelt enacted Executive Order No. 9102, creating the War Relocation Authority within the Office for Emergency Management. This order aimed to facilitate the removal of individuals deemed a national security risk from designated areas and authorized the Director of the Authority to develop a program for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision. Congress later ratified Executive Order No. 9066 through legislation on March 21, 1942, establishing penalties for violating military area restrictions.
Beginning March 24, 1942, General De Witt issued 108 Civilian Exclusion Orders. The appellant's exclusion was enacted through Civilian Exclusion Order No. 52 on May 7, 1942, which mandated the exclusion of all individuals of Japanese ancestry from Sacramento, California, starting May 16, 1942. The appellant was evacuated to the Sacramento Assembly Center on May 15, 1942, and later transferred to the Tule Lake Relocation Center on June 19, 1942. Additional orders, including Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 on May 19, 1942, and Public Proclamation No. 8 on June 27, 1942, were also issued by General De Witt.
Evacuees from Assembly Centers or Relocation Centers were prohibited from leaving without authorization from General De Witt’s headquarters, as stated in Public Proclamation No. 8. This proclamation emphasized the military necessity for relocating evacuees to designated War Relocation Project Areas, imposing restrictions on their rights to enter, remain in, or leave these areas. The restrictions applied specifically to the Tule Lake Relocation Center in California and the Central Utah Relocation Center in Topaz, Utah. Non-compliance with these provisions could lead to penalties under the Act of March 21, 1942.
On August 11, 1942, General De Witt authorized the War Relocation Authority (WRA) to issue permits for evacuees to leave these centers, thereby granting the WRA control over their entry and exit. The WRA's program had three main features: maintaining Relocation Centers as temporary residences, segregating loyal from disloyal evacuees, and detaining the disloyal while facilitating the relocation of the loyal.
For leave from the Relocation Centers, the WRA established a procedure that required applications for indefinite leave clearance, including an investigation into the applicant’s impact on the war effort and public safety. Indefinite leave could be granted under 14 specified conditions, such as securing employment or having adequate financial resources, but not if the destination was deemed unfavorable by community sentiment or was otherwise restricted by the WRA. The applicant was also required to notify the WRA of any changes in employment or residence. Importantly, granted leave did not allow entry into prohibited military areas from which the evacuees had been removed.
Mitsuye Endo applied for leave clearance on February 19, 1943, which was granted on August 16, 1943. However, she did not seek indefinite leave. In her habeas corpus petition, she claims to be a loyal U.S. citizen, unlawfully detained without charges in a Relocation Center under armed guard. The Department of Justice and the War Relocation Authority acknowledge her loyalty and do not allege any disloyalty or charge against her, agreeing that she cannot be held longer than necessary for the separation of loyal and disloyal citizens. They assert, nonetheless, that additional detention after leave clearance is crucial for the evacuation program. This stance is supported by historical context: when the evacuation from the West Coast was decided, there was significant opposition from state officials to unsupervised relocation. Military necessity dictated the removal of the Japanese population from coastal areas to prevent coordinated actions during potential enemy attacks. As a result, plans for private colonization were abandoned in favor of government-operated centers to manage evacuee needs and facilitate resettlement while ensuring federal oversight to prevent disorder and hardship. The War Relocation Authority emphasized that continued control over the relocation process is vital for the program's success, despite a decrease in community hostility towards evacuees.
Supervised relocation is viewed as the final step in the evacuation process, stemming from initial actions taken. While it's acknowledged that the appellant's detention under leave regulations is not directly linked to current espionage prevention, it is argued that Executive Order No. 9102 grants the authority to regulate situations arising from powers aimed at protecting against espionage and sabotage. The leave regulations are positioned within this regulatory scope. The conclusion reached is that Mitsuye Endo should be granted her liberty, without delving into broader constitutional issues. It is emphasized that the War Relocation Authority lacks the authority to impose leave procedures on citizens who are recognized as loyal.
The case differs from prior cases involving military tribunals, as Endo's detention is by a civilian agency, not the military, and the evacuation program involved responsibilities shared with civilian enforcement subject to civil penalties under the Act of March 21, 1942. The authority for detention derives from Executive Order No. 9066, and the War Relocation Authority was created under Executive Order No. 9102 to implement this order. The construction of these orders is treated similarly to legislative interpretation, considering both the Executive Order and the confirming Act of March 21, 1942, as a basis for civilian agency involvement in the evacuation. While broad powers are often granted to the Executive to address wartime issues, the Constitution also safeguards civil rights, mandating procedural protections for arrest and detention, as outlined in the Sixth and Fifth Amendments. Additionally, the suspension of habeas corpus is limited to circumstances of rebellion or invasion, further protecting individual rights.
Constitutional provisions are referenced to guide the interpretation of a congressional act or executive order that affects constitutionally guaranteed rights. The court emphasizes a limited application of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears to contravene specific constitutional prohibitions. It is assumed that lawmakers and the executive branch respect citizens' liberties and aim for a balance between these liberties and wartime exigencies. The Act of March 21, 1942, and related executive orders were enacted to safeguard national defense from espionage and sabotage. Specifically, Executive Order No. 9066 justified the exclusion of individuals from military areas for national security purposes, while Executive Order No. 9102 established the War Relocation Authority to manage the removal and relocation of these individuals. Both the Act and the orders do not explicitly mention detention; rather, they impose restrictions on entering or remaining in military areas. The Act provides for the Secretary of War to offer necessary accommodations to evacuees, and the legislative history does not indicate an intention for detention, suggesting that such measures evolved later in response to community resistance to evacuees.
Detention related to the evacuation program is not inherently lawful, as the Act and Executive Orders do not explicitly authorize such power. While some authority to detain may be implied for the program's operation, it must be narrowly confined to the purpose of addressing espionage and sabotage. Loyalty, independent of race or ancestry, negates concerns of espionage for loyal citizens, meaning any detention of loyal individuals is unauthorized if it does not serve the war effort. The original evacuation's justification stemmed from espionage concerns, not community hostility. The authority to detain ends once loyalty is established, and any continued detention without relation to espionage fundamentally alters the nature of the measure. Legislative and executive mandates do not support detention based solely on community hostility or ancestry. The loyal citizens, including those of Japanese ancestry, are recognized for their contributions and deserve fair treatment. Mitsuye Endo is entitled to unconditional release from the War Relocation Authority. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the District Court to grant a writ of habeas corpus is questioned due to the appellant's transfer between relocation centers while the case was pending, but there is no indication of evasion of habeas corpus proceedings in this transfer.
Appellant's removal to Utah is part of a broader segregation program and unrelated to the current case. There is no indication that no one within the District Court's jurisdiction is responsible for the appellant's detention. The Acting Secretary of the Interior has confirmed that if a writ is issued, it will be directed to the Secretary of the Interior or an official from the War Relocation Authority, ensuring compliance with the court's order. Therefore, the case is not moot. A precedent from *United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal* illustrates that the case can become moot when the sole respondent is outside the District Court's jurisdiction. However, this situation differs, as the absence of a served respondent does not affect the case's viability, and the United States opposes the writ's issuance. The District Court retains jurisdiction unless the appellant's physical presence within the district is essential for filing a habeas corpus petition. While some cases suggest that confinement must be within the court's jurisdiction for the writ to be issued, the court may act if a respondent with custody of the petitioner is accessible. The essence of the writ is that it compels the custodian, not the detainee, to act.
The excerpt outlines several legal precedents and statutory authorities regarding the jurisdiction of the District Court in habeas corpus proceedings, emphasizing that the court retains jurisdiction even if the prisoner is removed from its territorial jurisdiction, provided that the custodian remains within the court's reach. It cites various cases and statutes, particularly Rev. Stat. 752, granting the court power to issue writs of habeas corpus to examine the legality of a person's detention.
The text also addresses the historical context of Civilian Exclusion Orders issued during World War II, specifically by General De Witt. Public Proclamation No. 4 mandated that individuals of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1 (including Sacramento) were prohibited from leaving without authorization. This followed a voluntary migration system that had allowed some individuals to leave military areas. The rationale for terminating this system was twofold: to prevent tensions and violence and to ensure a controlled evacuation process that protected evacuees and their property.
Additionally, the establishment of War Relocation Centers and the requirement for individuals of Japanese ancestry to remain there unless authorized to leave were outlined. Public Proclamation No. WD1 mandated that failure to comply could result in penalties under the Act of March 21, 1942. General De Witt later indicated that the purpose of such measures was to ensure the security of the Pacific Coast through organized evacuation and relocation of individuals considered a potential risk during wartime.
The Commanding General was tasked with overseeing a phase of the War Relocation Authority's program, which was broader than just an Army mission. The War Relocation Authority, created to address social-economic issues, was transferred to the Department of the Interior by Executive Order No. 9423 on February 16, 1944. Following this transfer, the Secretary of the Interior permitted the Director to manage the functions assigned by the Executive Order. Although the Commanding General maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the release of evacuees for employment and resettlement within specific military areas, he delegated the responsibility for entry and departure from Relocation Centers to the War Relocation Authority, which was essential for managing the Centers effectively.
The Commanding General controlled travel conditions in the evacuated zones but recognized the Authority's role in regulating access to the Centers, understanding that military oversight would equate to direct administration of these Centers. Procedures for leave from the Centers included group-leave and short-term leave up to 60 days, with initial leave guidelines outlined in Administrative Instruction No. 22, allowing Japanese Americans without ties to Japan to apply for permits for specific job opportunities outside the Center. However, permit holders remained under military jurisdiction, and permits could be revoked if deemed necessary for public interest. Further regulations and revisions over the years detailed the leave process and outlined factors that could justify denying leave clearance.
Key points include the requirements for individuals regarding allegiance to the United States and restrictions on affiliations with foreign powers, particularly the Japanese Emperor. Specific actions that may lead to scrutiny include requests for repatriation, military training in Japan, employment on Japanese naval vessels, and multiple trips to Japan after age six, unless limited to port visits by seamen. There are also implications for involvement with organizations deemed subversive by intelligence agencies.
The War Relocation Authority facilitates the relocation of evacuees by recommending communities for acceptance, assisting with job searches, and providing financial aid for relocation. It operates through eight area offices and twenty-six district offices.
Indefinite leave from relocation centers is contingent upon acquiring written authorization from military authorities, with stipulations regarding travel in prohibited military areas. The leave does not permit departure from the relocation center without fulfilling specific conditions, including compliance with Administrative Instruction No. 22, Rev.
The Provost Marshal General has determined that certain individuals, such as Endo Mitsuye, are not eligible for employment in critical wartime facilities. The documentation for indefinite leave outlines the necessary proof of citizenship and adherence to regulations set forth by the War Relocation Authority and military restrictions.
A District Court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, though the Solicitor General and the War Relocation Authority do not raise this issue in connection with the validity of the regulations governing administrative remedies. Notably, 108,503 evacuees were transferred to Relocation Centers.
As of July 29, 1944, there were 28,911 individuals on indefinite leave and 61,002 in Relocation Centers, excluding Tule Lake. The intention was to consolidate disloyal individuals at Tule Lake, specifically those who had not expressed willingness to serve in combat for the U.S. and who refused to renounce allegiance to Japan. This targeted group, including minors, numbered 18,684. Public Proclamation No. WD1 from August 13, 1942, was deemed irrelevant as the concerned Relocation Centers fell within the Western Defense Command. The document references several Supreme Court cases regarding the authority of the government in this context. It argues that there has been Congressional ratification of the detention of loyal evacuees through appropriations, citing specific statutes from 1943 and 1944. Reports and hearings provided transparency regarding the Authority’s regulations and procedures. While Congress can ratify actions it could have authorized, the appropriations made were general and did not specifically earmark funds for the contested aspect of the program. A letter dated October 13, 1944, to the Solicitor General discusses the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction, noting that Supreme Court justices and circuit judges have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus for inquiries into the cause of restraint, but the added clause from a 1925 Act does not alter the jurisdictional scope.
