Kathryn Scrivener, Apellant V Clark College

Citation: Not availableDocket: 43051-7

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; September 4, 2013; Washington; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Kathryn Scrivener, a nonpermanent faculty member at Clark College, filed a lawsuit against the college for age discrimination after being passed over for two tenure track positions in favor of younger candidates. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, concluding that Scrivener failed to prove that the college's stated reasons for hiring the other candidates were a pretext for discrimination. 

Scrivener, who was 42 when hired in 1994, applied for the tenure track positions in 2005 among 156 candidates, of whom 50 were over 40. The screening committee, composed of five tenured faculty, interviewed 13 candidates, including Scrivener, who was ultimately ranked last among the finalists. Clark College's President R. Wayne Branch and Vice President of Instruction Sylvia Thornburg reviewed the finalists and chose to hire Geneva Chao and Jill Darley-Vanis, both under 40, based on recommendations from the screening committee and the needs of the English department. 

In their declarations, both Branch and Thornburg asserted that age was not a factor in their decision-making process. Additionally, the college's Human Resources Associate Director, Sue Williams, highlighted that a significant portion of the college's workforce was over 40 years old, indicating that the hiring practices were not discriminatory. The college’s employment applications do not request applicants' ages, further supporting the claim of non-discriminatory practices in hiring.

Scrivener opposed Clark College's motion for summary judgment, alleging age discrimination in her hiring process. She argued that despite her superior qualifications, the college favored younger applicants, referencing a statement from Branch emphasizing the need for "younger talent" and statistics indicating that of 16 tenure track positions filled, only 4 went to candidates over 40. Scrivener contended that the trial court should deny the motion due to questions of material fact regarding whether her age influenced the hiring decision, thereby violating the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). She detailed her qualifications and described Branch’s unprofessional behavior during her interview as "clowning," suggesting a lack of seriousness. Additionally, she claimed Branch advised a hiring committee member to prioritize candidates with "funk," indicating a preference for youthfulness.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Clark College, determining there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the college was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scrivener appealed, asserting that the court erred in ruling that she did not sufficiently demonstrate that the college's reasons for hiring other candidates were pretextual for age discrimination. The standard of review for summary judgment involves assessing if reasonable minds could only reach one conclusion based on the evidence presented. Under WLAD, an age discrimination claim requires the employee to first establish a prima facie case, after which the employer must provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions. If the employer meets this burden, the employee must then prove that these reasons were merely pretexts for discrimination, which can be shown through various means, including lack of factual basis or inconsistent application of reasons across similar employment decisions.

An employee is not required to provide evidence beyond what is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. A court may grant summary judgment if clear evidence shows a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's actions, or if the employee presents only weak evidence against the employer's justification, supported by strong independent evidence of no discrimination. The trial court should only allow a case to proceed to a jury if all three parts of the burden-shifting framework are satisfied, with sufficient evidence for reasonable competing inferences of discrimination and nondiscrimination.

In this instance, the parties agree that the employee, Scrivener, established a prima facie case of age discrimination, while Clark College provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring other candidates. The college's reasons included recommendations from a screening committee, interviews, reference checks, and alignment with the department's needs, with age not being a factor in the decision-making process. Scrivener, however, contests these explanations, citing comments made by Branch that suggested a preference for "younger talent" and his demeanor during her interview as indicative of age bias. She posits that establishing pretext requires merely showing that age discrimination was a substantial factor in the hiring process. The document critiques a previous case, Rice v. Offshore Systems, Inc., for conflating the burdens of persuasion and production, indicating a preference for a clearer standard in this context.

The court evaluated whether the plaintiff could provide sufficient evidence indicating that a discriminatory retaliatory motive was a substantial factor in his discharge, referencing the "substantial factor" test from Mackay. However, the court clarified that this test pertains to the burden of persuasion at trial and not to the pretrial burden of production. Scrivener's reliance on this test was deemed inappropriate, as he needed to demonstrate pretext during the pretrial phase.

Scrivener cited a statement by Branch regarding the college's need for "younger talent" as evidence of pretext. The court contextualized this remark within Branch's broader goal of increasing diversity at Clark College, highlighting that 74% of the workforce was over 40 and that his hiring practices still favored older candidates. During the 2005 academic year, a significant proportion of new hires were over 40, contradicting the implication of age discrimination. Branch asserted that his comment did not influence the hiring decisions for Chao and Vanis.

The court concluded that Branch's statement was a "stray" comment, lacking a direct connection to Scrivener or the hiring decisions in question. Referencing precedent from Kirby v. City of Tacoma, the court noted that isolated comments do not suffice to establish pretext or illegitimate criteria for employment decisions. Thus, Scrivener failed to demonstrate that Branch's remark indicated discriminatory intent relevant to his case.

In the case referenced, the court analyzed the remarks made by Branch, concluding that his comment about wanting "younger talent" was an isolated incident that did not imply discriminatory intent toward Scrivener. The court compared this situation to the case of Domingo, where a similar remark was deemed too weak to establish a causal link between age and termination. Furthermore, Scrivener's argument that Branch preferred candidates with minimal experience was countered by evidence of the substantial teaching experience of the hired candidates, Chao and Darley-Vanis, who had extensive teaching backgrounds. The court also noted that Scrivener's claims of being taken less seriously during her interview did not substantiate her age discrimination claims, especially since Branch had previously hired her. Statistical data showed that Branch had actively considered older candidates for faculty positions. To succeed in her claims, Scrivener needed to prove that Branch's reasons for hiring the other candidates were pretextual, which she failed to do. Consequently, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Clark College was affirmed.