Hayes v. County of San Diego

Citations: 57 Cal. 4th 622; 2013 D.A.R. 10; 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 684; 305 P.3d 252; 2013 WL 4413281; 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6652Docket: S193997

Court: California Supreme Court; August 19, 2013; California; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Sheriff's deputies shot and killed Shane Hayes after he approached them with a large knife during a welfare check prompted by reports of screaming. Shane's girlfriend informed the deputies that he had previously attempted suicide. The deputies, unaware of Shane's heavy drinking and prior suicide attempt with a knife, entered the home with their guns holstered. When Shane approached them with the knife raised, the deputies drew their weapons and shot him, resulting in his death.

Shane's daughter, Chelsey Hayes, filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging federal and state claims against the County of San Diego and the involved deputies. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sought clarification on whether California negligence law imposes a duty of care on deputies regarding suicidal individuals during welfare checks, particularly concerning the tactical decisions made before the use of deadly force. The California Supreme Court affirmed that liability could arise if the deputies' actions leading to the use of deadly force were deemed unreasonable based on the totality of circumstances. 

Chelsey, who did not witness the shooting, claimed violations of her father's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and her own Fourteenth Amendment rights related to the deprivation of her companionship with her father.

Two state claims were made: one against the County of San Diego and Deputies Geer and King for negligence during a confrontation with Shane, and another solely against the County for negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision of employees. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. It affirmed that the plaintiff had standing for her federal claims but could not succeed, noting eyewitness consensus that Shane approached the deputies threateningly with a large knife, within eight feet. The court determined that the deputies' perception of a significant threat justified their use of deadly force, which was deemed reasonable and not a Fourth Amendment violation. The court also rejected the claim that the deputies violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, finding no intent to harm unrelated to law enforcement objectives.

For the state claims, the court ruled the deputies were not negligent due to Shane's threatening behavior and determined they owed no duty of care regarding their preshooting actions based on California appellate precedents, specifically Adams and Munoz. These cases indicated that law enforcement has no duty of care in preventing situations that could lead to justified use of deadly force. The court dismissed the second state claim against the County, stating the plaintiff failed to cite any statute for recovery against a governmental entity. The plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit sought clarification on whether the Adams and Munoz decisions remained valid following a subsequent ruling in Hernandez.

Peace officers in California have a statutory duty to act reasonably when using deadly force, which includes their actions prior to the use of such force. Under California law, public employees are liable for injuries caused by their actions, similar to private individuals, and public entities are liable for the negligence of employees within the scope of their employment. Close relatives of a negligently killed individual can seek damages for their loss. To establish negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the breach caused the injury.

California courts have recognized that the reasonableness of an officer's conduct is evaluated based on the totality of circumstances. The precedent set in *Grudt v. City of Los Angeles* illustrates that even if an officer's actions appear justified in isolation, the overall context—including preshooting conduct—may lead a jury to find negligence. In the case discussed, the federal district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing two California Court of Appeal decisions that concluded the officers owed no duty to the plaintiff regarding their preshooting actions. Consequently, the officers could not be held liable for allegedly provoking the situation that justified the use of deadly force against the victim, Shane.

Plaintiff's appeal to the Ninth Circuit questioned whether sheriff's deputies have a duty of care under California negligence law when performing a welfare check on a suicidal individual. The issue was reframed to determine if liability could arise from law enforcement's tactical decisions prior to using deadly force. The Ninth Circuit's framing separated the encounter into two potential duties: one regarding the welfare check and another concerning the use of deadly force, which California law recognizes. However, the plaintiff only alleged injury from the shooting itself, indicating a single cause of action related to the improper use of deadly force. The court clarified that a cause of action is based on a primary right, corresponding duty, and wrongful act, and emphasized that the plaintiff's claim pertains solely to the shooting, without a separate injury from preceding conduct. As such, any negligence in the preshooting actions is relevant only to assess the negligence of the shooting, not as a standalone claim. The court concluded that determining the shooting's negligence would negate the possibility of pursuing liability based solely on preshooting conduct and did not address any independent duty regarding that conduct. The restated issue focused on whether liability for unreasonable deadly force can be linked to actions taken before the shooting.

The federal district court determined that sheriff's deputies did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff regarding their preshooting conduct, ruling they could not be liable for negligently creating a dangerous situation justifying deadly force. This decision contradicts established California negligence law, which requires assessing a peace officer's conduct based on the totality of circumstances, including preshooting actions. In the context of police use of deadly force, preshooting conduct must be evaluated concerning the ultimate reasonableness of that force. The court emphasized that the determination of "reasonableness" should be made from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with hindsight. Officers are not required to choose the most reasonable action but must act within a reasonable range under the circumstances to avoid negligence liability. While preshooting conduct is part of the overall assessment, specific protocols (e.g., background checks) are not mandatory. Summary judgment is justified if no reasonable juror could find negligence. The court referenced the cases of Adams and Munoz to support its analysis. The Adams case involved a suicidal individual, Patrick Adams, whose threatening behavior prompted police intervention, ultimately leading to a tense standoff where he aimed a gun at himself.

Patrick discharged his gun, leading police officers to believe he was firing at them, prompting them to return fire. However, Patrick shot himself, resulting in several wounds, with a single self-inflicted gunshot wound to his heart and liver being fatal. Patrick's wife and daughter subsequently sued the City of Fremont and several police officers for negligence, wrongful death, and intentional torts. The jury awarded damages, attributing police negligence to their actions prior to the shooting, rather than the shooting itself. 

The California Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, ruling that the officers owed no duty of care concerning their preshooting actions. The court applied a test from Rowland, which weighs various considerations, including foreseeability of harm, certainty of injury, and moral blame. It recognized that while Patrick's death was foreseeable, the connection between the officers' conduct and his suicide was indirect. The court found no moral blame as there was no evidence the officers intended to cause harm or acted recklessly. 

In terms of public policy, the court stated that in suicide situations, the priority is public and officer safety over the individual at risk. It concluded that imposing a duty on officers to prevent a suicide would place an excessive burden on them, especially considering the high social value of protecting officers in dangerous situations. Consequently, the court determined that the defendants had no legal obligation to prevent Patrick's suicide and reversed the prior judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

C. Munoz Munoz, 120 Cal. App.4th 1077, recounts an incident involving Lucilla Amaya, who was threatening her family with knives while hallucinating. Her father, Jessie Amaya, visited her home in Union City, California, after concerns were raised by his wife. Upon arrival, Jessie found Lucilla with a knife in each hand, claiming someone was in the house. After he checked the premises, Lucilla refused to relinquish the knives and prevented him from leaving. Lucilla's daughter, Yvette, was also present but retreated to her room when instructed by Lucilla.

Lucilla's brother, J.J. Amaya, arrived and, after communicating with their father inside, called the police, expressing fears for the safety of their family due to Lucilla's agitation and past psychiatric issues, including drug influence. When police arrived, J.J. informed them of Lucilla's possession of a knife and his concerns for their father's safety. Officers observed Lucilla in the doorway, armed with a knife, and she allegedly claimed to possess a gun. Corporal Tod Woodward, fearing for the family's safety, requested a SWAT team.

As Lucilla advanced toward her family while brandishing the knife, Corporal Woodward, believing she posed an imminent threat, shot and killed her. Following the incident, Jessie, Yvette, and J.J. Amaya filed a lawsuit against Union City, its police department, and Corporal Woodward for negligence and battery. Testimony at trial indicated that Woodward's demeanor became more aggressive during the encounter, and there were conflicting accounts regarding Lucilla's claim of having a gun.

The jury found the defendants liable, leading to an appeal. The California Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part, noting that while law enforcement officers typically have immunity from negligence claims in public safety emergencies, this case involved police conduct that directly caused harm. The court clarified that officers are not insulated from liability for unreasonable use of deadly force in crisis situations.

Munoz identified a critical distinction between suicide cases and use-of-deadly-force cases, affirming that peace officers have a duty to act reasonably in the latter. In Munoz, the court ruled that defendants could not be held liable for preshooting conduct but upheld the jury's verdict against Corporal Woodward for negligence in the use of deadly force. The court noted that the jury's findings, although based on improper considerations, were harmless since they established that Woodward was negligent in his actions during the incident.

The current case parallels Munoz, involving a use-of-deadly-force scenario rather than a suicide case like Adams. The court highlighted that while the existence of a duty of care for officers responding to suicidal individuals is unresolved, officers have a recognized duty to act reasonably when employing deadly force. In this instance, Shane, armed with a knife, threatened deputies who subsequently shot him, distinguishing it from Adams where the death resulted from suicide after police engagement. 

The assertion by plaintiff's counsel that Shane might have intended suicide is unsupported by evidence. Unlike Adams, where the inquiry revolved around the officers' conduct contributing to a suicide, here Shane's death was a direct result of the deputies' actions. Claims regarding the deputies' negligence in preshooting conduct potentially affecting Shane's behavior can be examined in federal court, thereby focusing on the reasonableness of their use of force.

The deputies' preshooting conduct must be evaluated within the totality of circumstances surrounding Shane's fatal shooting rather than in isolation. The court argues against segmenting the plaintiff's claims into distinct decisions made by the deputies, such as not calling for psychiatric assistance, entering the residence, engaging with Shane, and ultimately using deadly force. This fragmented approach would be inefficient, confusing, and inconsistent with previous negligence rulings. 

Citing relevant case law, the court emphasizes that evaluations of police conduct should encompass all actions leading up to the use of deadly force. The California Court of Appeal's decision in Munoz, which determined that no preshooting duty of care existed, is critiqued for potentially misapplying Fourth Amendment standards. The Fourth Amendment's emphasis on "unreasonable seizure" focuses narrowly on the moment force is used, contrasting with state tort law's broader standard of "reasonable care," which includes preshooting conduct.

The court asserts that Munoz's extension of Adams is at odds with established principles that police officers owe a duty to act reasonably in all circumstances leading to the use of deadly force. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on the court's own decision in Hernandez suggests a preference for considering preshooting conduct in liability assessments. Although Hernandez did not definitively rule on the validity of preshooting liability, it found the deputies' actions in that case were not negligent based on the factual record.

The Ninth Circuit interpreted a previous decision in Hernandez to imply that preshooting negligence could be a valid theory of liability, suggesting that the court's detailed review of preshooting evidence indicated this potential approval. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit expressed skepticism toward the views of Adams and Munoz on this matter. The court clarified that California's negligence law, which evaluates the totality of circumstances surrounding the use of deadly force, is broader than the federal Fourth Amendment standard, which focuses on the specific moment of force application. The language in Hernandez might lead to confusion that the standards are equivalent, but the separate analysis of preshooting negligence in that case indicates otherwise. The conclusion drawn is that law enforcement's tactical decisions prior to using deadly force are pertinent under California law for assessing negligence liability, particularly if these actions demonstrate that the use of force was unreasonable. The court emphasized that their role is to address the legal question of duty, while the factual determination of whether there was a breach of that duty remains for federal courts. The court disapproved of any inconsistencies with Munoz v. City of Union City.