The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Christine Blantz's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, which claimed she was wrongfully terminated from her independent contractor nurse position with the California prison medical care system. The court agreed with the district court that Blantz lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in her contractor role, stating that a state agency does not create such interests merely by implementing performance review procedures. Furthermore, the court dismissed Blantz's federal deprivation of liberty claim, noting she failed to demonstrate an inability to find nursing work overall, only within the CDCR, which did not invoke due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the court found the allegations against Terry Hill, the former Chief Medical Officer, to be conclusory and implausible, leading to their dismissal.
Blantz, after her position as a nurse practitioner with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) was terminated, filed a lawsuit against several CDCR employees and the CDCR itself. The district court dismissed her federal claims, which argued that her property and liberty were deprived without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that she did not possess a constitutionally protected property interest in her independent contractor role. Additionally, her claims against Dr. Terry Hill were dismissed due to their conclusory and implausible nature. Blantz's complaint detailed her agreement with Newport Oncology and Healthcare, Inc. (NOAH) to work as an independent contractor for the CDCR, where she was paid by NOAH and not subject to its control. She alleged that a negative performance assessment by CDCR auditor James Ruddy was unwarranted and that she had not received notice of any adverse actions prior to her termination in December 2007. Despite attempts to identify the reasons for her dismissal and to seek other employment within the CDCR, she encountered barriers due to poor recommendations, the origins of which she could not determine. Ultimately, the lawsuit was filed in California state court against the CDCR and several individuals, including Ruddy and his supervisors.
Dr. Hill removed the case to the federal District Court for the Southern District of California, where the second amended complaint presented 11 causes of action, including two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that defendants deprived Blantz of property and liberty without due process while acting under state law. The district court dismissed these federal claims against all defendants and all claims against Hill without leave to amend, subsequently remanding the state law claims back to San Diego Superior Court. Blantz appealed this decision.
The standard of review for the dismissal is de novo, meaning the appellate court reviews the order independently, accepting the factual allegations as true and construing them favorably to the non-moving party, unless the allegations lack plausibility. The denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
The discussion focuses on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, which prohibits the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A property interest must stem from a legitimate claim of entitlement, rather than an abstract need or unilateral expectation. Such interests are defined by independent sources, such as state law. The Supreme Court has established that government employees can possess a protected property interest in continued employment if they have a legitimate claim to tenure or if termination requires cause.
In the case of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the Court ruled that the assistant professor lacked a property interest in continued employment after his one-year contract because there were no entitlements established for re-employment, thus he was not entitled to a hearing upon non-renewal of his contract.
Sindermann involved a state college teacher whose year-to-year contract was terminated without an official reason or a hearing, despite his long tenure. The Supreme Court indicated that even without formal tenure, Sindermann could potentially demonstrate a de facto tenure due to the college's practices and policies, particularly referencing a faculty guide suggesting a sense of permanent tenure contingent on satisfactory performance and cooperation. This implied that long-term employees might claim an entitlement to job tenure based on the circumstances of their employment, despite the absence of an explicit tenure system.
In contrast, Blantz, an independent contractor with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), argued for a constitutionally protected property interest in her position. It was noted, however, that merely being an independent contractor does not automatically confer such rights. For Blantz to establish an entitlement, she would need a recognized source under state law, not just an expectation of continued employment. Her contract explicitly allowed for termination with notice, undermining her claim. Furthermore, the orientation documents she referenced did not establish a tenure-like protection or guarantee that termination required cause. Instead, while they outlined performance review procedures, they did not mandate a specific process for termination, leading to the conclusion that performance reviews alone do not create constitutionally protected property interests for independent contractors. Ultimately, there must be an affirmative grant of tenure or a clear assurance that termination can only occur for cause to establish such interests.
An independent contractor cannot claim a constitutionally protected entitlement to continued employment without assurances in her orientation documents. The court upheld the dismissal of Blantz's federal claim for deprivation of property based on this lack of assurances. Blantz also alleged that the CDCR and Ruddy infringed on her liberty interest, specifically her ability to work as a nurse, by providing negative job references that hindered her employment opportunities. Legal precedent indicates that a public employer can violate employee rights by making damaging statements that seriously affect the employee’s standing in the community or impose stigmas that limit future opportunities. However, liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment are only implicated when such statements effectively exclude the employee from their profession entirely. Statements causing reduced economic returns or prestige, without complete exclusion, do not constitute a deprivation of liberty. The court noted that individuals do not possess liberty interests in specific employers or in civil service careers broadly. Blantz's argument that exclusion from government employment suffices for a deprivation of liberty was rejected because she was not barred from all government employment, only from working for the CDCR. Therefore, her claim of an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty was unfounded, as she remains eligible for nursing positions elsewhere in the state.
Blantz's claim regarding her inability to work with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) does not meet the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, as her liberty interest pertains to her profession as a nurse rather than employment with a specific employer. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of her federal deprivation of liberty claim is upheld.
Further, the federal district court had placed the CDCR's medical care system under receivership in 2006, granting the Receiver authority over employment matters. Dr. Hill was appointed as Chief Medical Officer and became part of the CDCR's Governing Body. Hill removed Blantz's lawsuit to federal court, citing federal question jurisdiction. However, the allegations against him are vague, primarily asserting that he directed other defendants without providing specific factual support. Such conclusory allegations do not satisfy the pleading standards established in Iqbal and Twombly, as they lack sufficient detail to establish plausible involvement by Hill in the actions leading to Blantz's negative performance review and termination.
Blantz's request for leave to amend her complaint to include additional allegations about other terminations within the CDCR was denied, as her proposed amendments would likely consist of similar conclusory statements lacking the necessary factual enhancement. The district court's decision to dismiss the lawsuit against Hill and deny leave to amend is affirmed.
