Corey Davis appeals his June 7, 2011 conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury under Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 113(a)(6), following a jury trial in the Eastern District of New York. The primary issue on appeal is whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish that the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), where the assault occurred, falls within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" as defined in Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 7(3). The court acknowledges that the evidence was insufficient to prove this jurisdictional element beyond a reasonable doubt. However, it takes judicial notice that the MDC is indeed within this jurisdiction. The court affirms the conviction, citing that the jury found the assault occurred at the MDC. The case stems from an incident on May 8, 2009, where Davis assaulted fellow inmate Robert Wright, resulting in serious injury. The Government needed to prove three elements for a conviction under Section 113(a)(6): intentional assault, serious bodily injury, and the assault's occurrence within the special jurisdiction. The appeal primarily challenges the third element.
The document outlines a legal dispute regarding the jurisdictional status of the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in relation to an assault case. It specifies that lands reserved or acquired for U.S. use fall under exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, which includes facilities like prisons. Testimony from Steven Rivera, a BOP employee, indicated that the MDC is a federal prison on federal land. However, during cross-examination, Rivera admitted his lack of knowledge regarding the specific details of land acquisition and jurisdiction transfer from New York State to the federal government.
After the government concluded its case, defendant Davis moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence to prove the assault occurred within U.S. special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. The government countered that the jury could determine the MDC's federal status based on provided evidence, citing precedent from *United States v. Hernandez-Fundora*. The district court denied Davis's motion and addressed jury instructions. While agreeing to avoid judicial notice of the MDC's jurisdictional status, the court declined Davis's request to instruct the jury explicitly on jurisdiction, believing Rivera's testimony sufficed if credible. The government argued that the evidence satisfied the jurisdictional element, while Davis contended that the government failed to demonstrate the MDC's location on federal land, emphasizing the need for concrete proof beyond employee testimony. In rebuttal, the government acknowledged the absence of maps or official documents but relied on employee assertions of the MDC's status as a federal prison.
In a federal context, the government asserts that locations like post offices, courthouses, and prisons are considered federal land. The district court instructed the jury that to convict Davis, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault occurred within the United States' special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, specifically in a federal prison on federal land. The jury convicted Davis of assault resulting in serious bodily injury under Section 113(a)(6).
Subsequently, Davis, with new counsel, filed a motion for acquittal or a new trial, contesting the sufficiency of evidence regarding jurisdiction. At sentencing, the district court denied this motion, referencing the Hernandez-Fundora case, where testimony about an incident in a federally jurisdictional area sufficed for establishing jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the distinction between concurrent jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction in this context was negligible, as both imply federal jurisdiction over the prison environment.
Davis was sentenced to sixty months in prison, consecutive to his existing sentence, followed by three years of supervised release, with a $100 special assessment. The judgment was entered on June 7, 2011, leading to an appeal. The appeal's first question centers on whether witness testimony identifying the Metropolitan Detention Center as a "federal prison" on "federal land" met the jurisdictional requirements of Davis's conviction. The document discusses the federal government's established power to acquire land within states, primarily through consent or cession, as outlined in the Enclave Clause of the Constitution. Historically, when land is purchased with state consent, federal jurisdiction is typically exclusive of state authority.
In 1937, the Supreme Court clarified that a state can condition its consent to federal jurisdiction by retaining some jurisdiction over lands, leading to concurrent rather than exclusive federal jurisdiction. The case of Fort Leavenworth Railway Co. v. Lowe established that a state could cede jurisdiction to the federal government while reserving certain rights, such as taxing corporations, provided these reservations do not conflict with federal use. The Court confirmed that the Enclave Clause is not the only authority for jurisdiction acquisition, and states must consent to any jurisdiction transfer. Prior to 1940, federal jurisdiction was presumed unless evidence indicated otherwise; however, post-1940 legislation mandated explicit acceptance of jurisdiction by the federal government for lands acquired thereafter. As a result, the federal government does not automatically have jurisdiction over all federally owned lands within states, and without the state's consent or cession of jurisdiction, federal possession is akin to that of a private owner. Courts have ruled that the federal government lacked jurisdiction over certain federal installations despite being on federal land, reinforcing that mere presence on federal property does not equate to federal jurisdiction. The insufficiency of evidence to establish jurisdiction in a specific case involving an assault in a federal prison was highlighted, emphasizing that the location alone does not confer jurisdiction. The court noted that, contrary to the district court's instructions, the government could not prove the jurisdictional element solely by demonstrating the assault occurred in a federal facility. This conclusion aligns with prior rulings, including Hernandez-Fundora, which also addressed jurisdictional issues in a federal correctional context.
The trial's sole evidence regarding Raybrook's status within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States came from an FBI agent who testified that Raybrook was "federal property" under concurrent jurisdiction, held by both the Federal and State Governments. The district court took judicial notice of this status and instructed the jury that if they found the alleged act occurred at Raybrook, the jurisdictional element would be satisfied. On appeal, the defendant contested both the sufficiency of the jurisdictional evidence and the court's decision to remove this element from jury consideration.
The appellate court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the agent’s uncontradicted testimony was adequate, and the government was not obligated to present the actual deed transferring jurisdiction. The court dismissed the defendant’s hearsay objection, clarifying that the agent testified to a conclusion regarding jurisdiction rather than the substance of the deed. The court also maintained that federal prisons typically indicate federal jurisdiction, further supporting the agent's testimony.
Regarding the removal of the jurisdictional question from the jury, the court referenced prior cases, stating that the district court appropriately assigned the factual element (the crime's location) to the jury while retaining the legal question of jurisdiction for itself. The court found that the district court's actions did not violate Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as the jurisdictional status of Raybrook was based on legislative facts, which differ from adjudicative facts and do not require jury acceptance. Ultimately, the district court was entitled to determine Raybrook’s jurisdictional status and exclude it from the jury’s consideration.
Furthermore, the court highlighted two significant distinctions from a related case, Hernandez-Fundora: the district court there improperly took judicial notice of jurisdiction, while in this case, it explicitly chose not to; and the evidence in Hernandez-Fundora included testimony of concurrent jurisdiction over Raybrook, whereas this case relied solely on the designation of the MDC as a "federal prison" on "federal land."
The agent’s testimony in the case of Hernandez-Fundora, which suggested that federal prisons are typically under federal jurisdiction, does not suffice to establish jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt in the current case. Subsequent developments revealed that, despite Raybrook being a federal prison on federal land, the federal government lacked jurisdiction over it, leading to the vacating of the defendant’s conviction and dismissal of the indictment. This emphasizes that federal installations on federal land do not automatically imply federal jurisdiction, a misunderstanding that occurred in this case.
Regarding the appellate process, while typically insufficient evidence leads to a reversal of conviction, the Government contends that judicial notice should be taken on appeal to establish that the MDC falls under special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Precedent from Hernandez-Fundora supports this position, indicating that the jurisdictional status of land is a "legislative fact" that can be judicially noticed without strict adherence to evidentiary rules. The current case does not address whether judicial notice can be first taken on appeal, but past cases have shown that appellate courts often do this for straightforward matters like geography and jurisdiction. Although the defendant, Davis, argues for reevaluation of this ability based on recent Supreme Court rulings related to the Sixth Amendment, he provides no convincing authority to support his position. Other circuits have upheld that such judicial notice does not infringe upon the right to a jury trial, indicating a consistent legal understanding across jurisdictions.
To establish whether a crime occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, two inquiries must be made: determining the "locus of the crime" and assessing the existence of federal jurisdiction. The former is a factual matter for the jury, while the latter involves a fixed legal status evaluated by judges, based on source materials like statutes and treaties. This Circuit adheres to the precedent set by Hernandez-Fundora.
The jurisdictional status of the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) is confirmed through judicial notice on appeal. The United States acquired the land for the MDC from the Bush Terminal Building Company on October 18, 1918, for Navy use, with consent from New York as mandated by Section 50 of the Consolidated Laws of New York. This section allowed the federal government to purchase land for Navy-related purposes, and in 1922, it was expanded to include any necessary buildings. The Navy utilized the land until 1993 when it was transferred to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for the MDC.
Legally, the MDC falls within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. All conditions for federal jurisdiction were satisfied: the land was purchased for Navy purposes with New York's consent, and since the acquisition was before 1940, jurisdiction is presumed accepted. Changes in land use by the federal government in 1993 do not alter this conclusion, as New York's consent had already been broadened to include other necessary buildings, which the MDC qualifies as. Davis's argument against this jurisdiction references two other provisions of New York law.
Section 52 of the Consolidated Laws of New York, enacted in 1918, stipulates that the United States may acquire jurisdiction over land in New York by filing certified copies of the transfer record, maps, descriptions, and a certificate from the U.S. Attorney General confirming possession under clear title. The governor may then execute a deed ceding jurisdiction to the federal government, which becomes valid only upon recording with the New York Secretary of State, as outlined in Section 55. Davis contends that while New York consented to the land purchase under Section 50, the conditions in Sections 52 and 55 were not satisfied, meaning jurisdiction was not ceded. However, the sections are interpreted to govern cession rather than the acquisition of jurisdiction through purchase with state consent. When the federal government buys land for specific purposes (e.g., military use), no further action is required for jurisdiction to transfer, although a state may retain concurrent jurisdiction if it conditions its consent. The assertion that New York did not cede jurisdiction would not negate federal jurisdiction for specific federal purposes. The inquiry also involves establishing whether the jury found that the crime occurred at the MDC, as the locus of the crime must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury.
A court may infer certain subsidiary factual findings from a jury's general verdict by examining the record, including the indictment, trial evidence, jury instructions, and summations. This process has been supported by precedent, such as *United States v. Zillgitt* and *United States v. Barnes*, which clarified that courts can determine what a jury must have necessarily decided in its verdict. In this case, the jury’s conviction of Davis implied that they found the assault occurred at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), given the district court's instructions and the uncontroverted evidence that Davis was incarcerated there during the incident. The court took judicial notice that the MDC is part of the United States' special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
The conclusion drawn indicates that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the MDC fell within this jurisdiction as defined by Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 7(3). The district court mistakenly instructed the jury that proof of the assault occurring in a federal prison sufficed for establishing jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, noting that while they found the government’s handling of the jurisdictional element lacking, the jury's general verdict nonetheless encompassed the necessary finding that the assault took place at the MDC. This affirmation does not imply approval of the district court's management of the case, emphasizing the critical importance of properly proving jurisdictional elements in criminal cases. The government’s failure to adequately establish this element complicated the appellate review process but did not ultimately undermine the conviction.
