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Harold Wayne Nichols v. Stanton Heidle, Warden
Citations: 725 F.3d 516; 2013 WL 3821537; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15103Docket: 06-6495
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 25, 2013; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Harold Wayne Nichols, a Tennessee state prisoner facing execution, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a decision filed on July 25, 2013, affirmed the lower court's ruling, finding no merit in Nichols' claims. The opinion, delivered by Chief Judge Alice M. Batchelder and joined by Judge Cook, included a separate concurring opinion by Judge Martin.
The background details of Nichols' life reveal a troubled childhood marked by severe abuse and neglect. Born on December 31, 1960, in Cleveland, Tennessee, he faced harsh circumstances, including physical abuse from his father, Mac, and his mother’s illness and poverty. Following a family tragedy in June 1961, two of his deceased aunt's children moved into their overcrowded home. Mac's abusive behavior escalated, including potential sexual abuse of a family member, leading to church intervention in 1971. Subsequently, Wayne and his sister Deborah were placed in the Tomlinson Children’s Home, a notoriously harsh orphanage, after an agreement that allowed Mac to evade criminal charges.
Following their removal, Wayne and Deborah remained in the orphanage for several years. Eventually, in 1977, at age 17, Wayne was returned to live with his father, who was then living a dissolute life marked by alcoholism and interactions with prostitutes. The detailed account of abuse and neglect in Nichols' early life is presented as part of the context for his legal challenges, yet the court found these factors insufficient to warrant relief from the habeas petition.
Mac was verbally and physically abusive to Wayne, but there was only one reported incident of sexual advance, which Wayne rejected. After high school graduation in August 1979, Wayne struggled to find work, eventually enlisting in the Army on November 30, 1981. While stationed at Ft. Riley, Kansas, he entered a relationship with a married woman, resulting in the birth of their daughter in November 1983. Wayne's military service ended prematurely in November 1983, after which he returned to Chattanooga, likely moving back in with Mac and working at a convenience store.
On August 30, 1984, Wayne attempted to rob an apartment shared by two women but ended up trying to assault one of them. He was arrested on September 4, 1984, and pled guilty to burglary and assault with an attempt to rape on December 13, 1984, receiving a five-year sentence, of which he served 18 months. While incarcerated, a psychological evaluation found no significant issues. After being released on parole on April 29, 1986, Wayne violated his parole by missing an appointment and was jailed for a month.
Wayne married Joanne on November 1, 1986, and they initially lived with Mac, who was verbally abusive. Despite this, their marriage was reportedly happy. Joanne had surgery in April 1987, and Wayne settled a paternity suit in June 1987 regarding his daughter in Kansas. On June 29, 1987, Wayne was arrested for prowling and carrying a knife near a woman’s home, leading to a year in jail for this and a parole violation. He was released on June 1, 1988, and returned to work, with Joanne welcoming him home. However, from July or August 1988, Wayne began staying out all night, claiming restlessness, while Joanne remained unaware of any infidelity. By September 1988, he was promoted at work, indicating his professional life was stable.
Wayne Nichols was prosecuted and convicted for the rapes or attempted rapes of 12 women during a spree from September 30, 1988, to January 3, 1989, with indications of additional unreported victims based on his confessions and psychological evaluations.
**Victim 1: Karen Elise Pulley** - On September 30, 1988, Nichols attacked 21-year-old Karen Pulley in her home, where he gained entry through a bathroom window. He assaulted her with a two-by-four, raped her, and severely injured her head, leading to her death later that day in the hospital after being discovered by her housemate. Despite extensive police investigation, including forensic testing and interviewing over 100 individuals, no suspects were identified initially. Nichols later confessed to the crime, which was corroborated by DNA evidence collected from the crime scene that matched him in 2005, after earlier tests had been inconclusive. He pled guilty and was sentenced to death after a jury recommendation.
**Victim 2** - Shortly after midnight on October 20, 1988, Nichols attacked a 23-year-old woman in her home in the Tiftonia neighborhood. He entered through an unlocked door, struck her with a candlestick, threatened her life, and raped her. The assault left her injured, necessitating stitches, and she remained immobilized until her husband returned home and contacted the police.
Nichols initially denied his involvement but later provided a detailed confession after being identified as a suspect in multiple rapes. His claims of coerced confessions were abandoned, although remnants of those accusations persisted in his appeal regarding his death sentence, which is the focus of the current legal proceedings.
Nichols made a phone call to the victim while police were present; she recognized his voice but was too frightened to listen to him. The victim handed the phone to a police officer, yet no police report regarding the call exists. After the Pulley murder trial, Nichols pled guilty to six additional rapes or attempted rapes, which were significant parts of his criminal activity but not formally included in the murder trial. These convictions were referenced by the state trial court in denying Nichols's post-conviction petition and were noted for potential resentencing. The Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged Nichols's numerous charges from various incidents.
In detail, on November 1, 1988, Nichols raped a woman in Chattanooga, threatening her with a knife and later forcing her to bathe while he watched. He confessed to this crime, which was part of the six guilty pleas he did not appeal.
On November 21, 1988, Nichols attempted to rape another woman in Red Bank, Tennessee. After breaking in, he assaulted her but fled when her dog intervened. The victim reported the incident to the police, providing a description of Nichols, which led to his arrest and subsequent guilty plea to assault with intent to rape, also one of the six convictions he did not appeal.
On December 21, 1988, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Nichols unlawfully entered the home of a single woman in East Ridge, Chattanooga, where he observed her alone. After arming himself with a knife, he woke her and forcibly raped her vaginally, attempted anal rape, and later forced her to shower to wash away evidence. The victim initially failed to identify Nichols from a photo but later recognized him on television and in court. Nichols was convicted of burglary, larceny, and aggravated rape, which were considered violent felonies in the Pulley murder trial.
The next incident occurred on December 22, 1988, at around 1:05 a.m., when Nichols attempted to rape a 35-year-old woman in her Tiftonia home. He broke in, attacked her with a knife after she emerged from the shower, and fled when she fought back, injuring him. Nichols had previously attempted burglary at this residence on December 8, 1988. The victim accurately described him to the police, and following his arrest, she identified him from a photo. Nichols confessed to the attack and pled guilty to attempted rape.
On December 27, 1988, at about 11:15 p.m., Nichols raped another woman in Red Bank, Chattanooga. He entered her home through a back window, assaulted her, and forced her to perform oral sex and then vaginally raped her. After the attack, he fled, and the victim called 911 shortly thereafter. Nichols confessed during police questioning, laughing during his admission. He pled guilty despite serology evidence not matching him at that time, resulting in convictions for burglary and aggravated rape, which were also used as violent felonies in the Pulley murder trial.
Nichols attempted to rape a woman in her home on December 31, 1988, in Chattanooga, but this incident was not prosecuted despite his video confession. On January 2, 1989, after claiming to feel ill, Nichols left home around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. and did not return until 7:00 a.m. the following morning, during which he committed three rapes and attempted another.
The first confirmed rape occurred at 12:15 a.m. on January 3, 1989, when Nichols entered the apartment of a 31-year-old single mother, threatening to harm her four-year-old daughter. He forced the mother to undress and raped her while brandishing a knife, warning her against contacting police. She reported the crime the next evening and identified Nichols based on his cigarette smell and prior suspicious activity at her home. Nichols later confessed and pled guilty to this rape as part of six guilty pleas he did not appeal.
Later that night, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Nichols attempted to break into another apartment but failed and moved to the next residence. Upon receiving a 911 call at 3:34 a.m., police discovered evidence of his attempted burglary. Nichols then broke into an apartment where a 28-year-old single mother lived with her children around 1:30 a.m. He threatened her, forcibly raped her, and fled when police arrived shortly after.
A woman initially identified Fred Joseph Coats as her rapist from a photo array but later determined he was not the assailant. She subsequently identified Nichols in another photo array and later in court. Nichols was tried and convicted of burglary and two counts of aggravated rape. In the Pulley murder trial, these convictions were presented as prior violent felonies for death-penalty qualification.
On January 3, 1989, Nichols broke into a 26-year-old woman’s home in East Ridge, Chattanooga, around 4:00 a.m. after she had returned home and fallen asleep. He attacked her with a knife, forced her to dress in a chosen outfit, and then violently raped her, despite her attempts to resist. After the assault, he threatened her with her own gun before leaving. The victim called 911 shortly after the attack. Following his arrest, Nichols was identified by the victim in a photo array. He later confessed to the crime, leading police to recover the victim's gun and knife from his vehicle, as well as her stolen purse.
Nichols pleaded guilty to burglary, larceny, and aggravated rape. A record incorrectly stated that the state dismissed the rape charges; however, the attempted murder charge was dropped due to evidence that Nichols knew the gun was empty. After receiving an anonymous tip, police linked Nichols to multiple rapes, leading to his arrest on January 5, 1989. He waived his rights and confessed on videotape to several rapes and attempted rapes during extensive questioning. Police suspected he may have committed additional rapes beyond those recorded.
Victim identifications of Nichols occurred sequentially, with Victim 11 identifying him at 5:20 p.m., followed by Victim 3 and others within the next few hours. At 8:00 p.m., Nichols confessed on video to the rape and murder of Karen Pulley, a case where he had not previously been a suspect. Later that night, he directed police to recover the murder weapon, a two-by-four. On January 8, 1989, his wife, Joanna Nichols, reported that he had confessed to her regarding the Pulley murder and other rapes. The State indicted Nichols for the Pulley case on February 1, 1989, and he requested that the prosecution be conducted in chronological order, which the court denied. A competency report deemed him fit for trial. Nichols was represented by the same counsel throughout the proceedings. The first significant hearing on September 6, 1989, involved a motion to suppress his confessions, which was denied. The State secured convictions on five rape charges before the Pulley trial. Forensic evidence regarding the two-by-four used in Pulley’s murder was questioned, as it showed no physical evidence despite its alleged use in the crime. Nichols's counsel sought to delay sentencing for earlier convictions until after the Pulley trial, which the court granted. The Pulley trial commenced on May 7, 1990, where Nichols's request for a change of venue was denied, but jurors were selected from another county. Following jury selection, the court denied a motion to suppress his confession, leading Nichols to change his plea to guilty for first-degree felony murder, aggravated rape, and first-degree burglary.
The trial court conducted a colloquy, accepted Nichols's guilty pleas, and convicted him, leading to the sentencing phase where the State sought the death penalty based on two statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder occurred during the commission of a felony (rape) and (2) Nichols's prior convictions for violent felonies. Nichols had previously petitioned for post-conviction relief regarding five non-capital sentences, arguing the trial court failed to follow state-common-law sentencing principles. The post-conviction court granted this petition between 1997 and 2002, entitling Nichols to new sentencing proceedings. However, the state trial court delayed re-sentencing until approximately December 17, 2007, ultimately imposing the minimum concurrent sentences totaling 25 years for these non-capital convictions. In contrast, Nichols's aggregate sentence for six other non-capital offenses, which he did not appeal, amounted to 225 years. During the trial, several witnesses, including police officers and paramedics, testified about the crime scene and the condition of the victim, Karen Pulley. Detective Richard Heck introduced Nichols's videotaped confession, which included maps and a reenactment of the crime, while the medical examiner detailed the victim's injuries. The Tennessee Supreme Court later identified an error in using the felony murder aggravating circumstance for the death penalty determination but deemed it harmless on appeal.
Craig testified that Pulley’s head was so severely crushed that he could not identify her gender, mistakenly believing her to be a small child due to her small stature. He described the brutality of the scene, noting that he had witnessed violent events in Vietnam but had never seen anything as horrific. Nichols's defense counsel objected to the testimonies of several witnesses, arguing their irrelevance to sentencing; however, the trial court allowed their testimonies in front of the jury after hearing them outside the jury's presence. Dr. King provided evidence that Pulley had likely not experienced vaginal intercourse before and that significant force was required for penetration, indicating traumatic tearing. He presented evidence of the violence she suffered, suggesting a two-by-four was the murder weapon, and authenticated the autopsy report and related diagrams.
The Hamilton County Court Clerk introduced records of Nichols’s five previous rape convictions as aggravating circumstances for the death penalty. The defense sought mitigation based on Nichols's admission of guilt, cooperation with law enforcement, and his troubled childhood. Witnesses, including Nichols's wife Joanne, a friend Larry Kilgore, and three preachers, testified to his good character and passive nature. Joanne described her marriage to Nichols as perfect and expressed shock at his crimes, pleading against the death penalty while acknowledging his confession. Kilgore regarded Nichols as a cherished friend despite the offenses. Rev. Butler, who had known Nichols since childhood, claimed he had shown remorse and attributed his actions to “demon possession," although he admitted Nichols had not sought help for this belief. Rev. Gonia maintained that Nichols was a good child despite his crimes, while Rev. Hawkins remembered him as a fine young man and noted his remorseful demeanor in jail.
Nichols provided testimony about his background, including his childhood experiences, time at an orphanage, and relationships. He acknowledged committing rapes, specifically admitting to the rape and murder of Karen Pulley, while expressing remorse and claiming he did not intend to kill her. Despite recognizing the wrongness of his actions, Nichols described a compulsion he could not control. On cross-examination, he admitted that without arrest, he would have continued his criminal behavior and stated his confession was partly to correct false accusations against him.
Dr. Eric Engum, a psychologist and lawyer, testified for the defense, diagnosing Nichols with "intermittent explosive disorder," a type of impulse control disorder. Engum attributed this condition to psychosocial factors rather than organic brain injury, citing a punitive and hostile upbringing. He detailed Nichols's experiences of abandonment and loss, including the death of significant caregivers and instability in early relationships, which contributed to a profound sense of isolation and anger. Dr. Engum emphasized that Nichols was aware of his actions' wrongfulness but struggled to control his impulses, leading to remorse following his offenses.
During cross-examination, Dr. Engum revealed that he faced difficulties in gathering testimonies for his investigation, as Nichols’s sister and other family members declined to communicate with him. The State used Dr. Engum’s notes to challenge his credibility, highlighting a procedural issue where defense counsel failed to provide an expert report as required under Tennessee rules, leading the trial court to order the defense to submit Dr. Engum’s notes. Defense counsel contended the notes were privileged work product, but the court disagreed and conducted an in camera review before sharing the documents with the State. These notes indicated Dr. Engum’s alignment with the defense team, suggesting strategies and expressing opinions on witnesses, which portrayed him as biased rather than as an independent psychologist. Notably, his correspondence included references to the defense's strategy involving Rev. L. E. Butler, suggesting that Butler’s testimony could enhance the argument for an irresistible impulse defense, while cautioning against portraying the defense in a way that might imply Nichols made a conscious choice to embrace evil.
Concerns were raised regarding the potential testimony and influence of Dr. Engum on the jury, with the State arguing that his role was more about creating a mitigating factor than providing an objective psychological assessment of Nichols. The court instructed the jury on the verdict process, emphasizing that a unanimous agreement on all required elements was necessary for a death penalty decision. The jury was tasked with determining whether the State proved statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether those factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances.
Ultimately, Dr. Engum diagnosed Nichols with "intermittent explosive disorder" rather than "irresistible impulse." After deliberation, the jury returned a death sentence, initially listing four non-statutory aggravating factors related to the murder of Karen E. Pulley. The defense objected, claiming these factors were improper as they were not statutory. Following a denial of a mistrial and re-instruction by the court, the jury revised its verdict to include two statutory aggravating factors: Nichols' previous violent felony convictions and the murder committed during a rape. The jury unanimously concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court inquired of the jury foreperson whether the jury had established the two statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt prior to their initial verdict. The foreperson confirmed this, indicating the jurors believed they did not need to include these factors on the verdict form because they had already found both. The court then polled each juror individually, confirming their agreement that they had found the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and that these factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances. All jurors affirmed this, and both the State and defense counsel opted not to conduct further polling. Following this, the court dismissed the jury and announced the death sentence.
Nichols subsequently moved for a new trial on June 11, 1990, and amended the motion on November 30, 1990. The court consistently questioned the jurors about their findings, though there were slight variations in how the questions were posed, specifically regarding the "beyond a reasonable doubt" condition. The jury foreperson reiterated that the verdict reflected their conclusions about the aggravating circumstances.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court denied Nichols's motions for a new trial. Nichols appealed, continuing to be represented by his trial counsel. On May 2, 1994, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the death sentence, stating that Nichols was among the worst offenders eligible for the death penalty, citing his extensive criminal history, including multiple aggravated rapes and his dangerous behavior of seeking vulnerable victims. The court noted that evidence did not support the notion that his violent actions were isolated incidents. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied a rehearing on June 20, 1994, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 17, 1995. Finally, on December 19, 1995, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Nichols's five supporting rape convictions.
Nichols's legal proceedings began with a petition for post-conviction relief regarding his murder conviction for Pulley, which was filed on April 25, 1995. His new attorneys—Mary Ann Green, Paul Buchanan, and Don Dawson—conducted an evidentiary hearing involving over 20 witnesses, excluding Nichols himself. The state trial court denied the post-conviction relief on March 18, 1998, which Nichols appealed, raising eleven issues, primarily focused on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial, and the Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently granted leave to appeal, particularly addressing Nichols's Fifth Amendment rights concerning psychologist notes, but ultimately affirmed the lower court's ruling.
On May 23, 2003, Nichols filed a federal habeas corpus petition with new attorney Stephen Kissenger. The initial petition was returned for exceeding the page limit, leading to a revised submission on August 18, 2003, which included 34 claims. Psychiatric evaluations conducted by David Lisak and Faye Sultan highlighted Nichols's significant psychological impairments, including intermittent explosive disorder and personality disorder, suggesting that these conditions influenced his mental state at the time of the crimes. Nichols's refusal to testify during the post-conviction hearing was addressed in the appeals, with the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately affirming that his invocation of the Fifth Amendment was valid, although it did not impact the trial court's decision. Additionally, DNA testing in October 2005 confirmed Nichols as the source of spermatozoa from the victim’s gown.
In November 2005, Nichols's counsel dismissed several claims related to his assertion of actual innocence. By July 25, 2006, the district court dismissed his petition without a hearing but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on seven issues. Nichols appealed on November 28, 2006, and the court later granted a COA on an additional issue, resulting in eight total issues to address. Judge Martin criticized the lengthy judicial proceedings, noting the case had been unresolved for over 20 years since Nichols's 1994 execution date, causing distress for the victims' families. Despite this, it was noted that Judge Martin, as the lead judge, had not advanced the appeal for nearly seven years after it was assigned to him and contributed significantly to a three-year period of inactivity. After multiple motions for extensions and delays, the case finally had oral arguments on January 24, 2013. The court expressed that the duration of the appeal, particularly the seven years in this court, was unreasonable, attributing much of the delay to Judge Martin's inaction. The court found his public criticism of the delay to be inappropriate given his role in the proceedings.
Nichols' habeas petition, filed in May 2003, is evaluated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which mandates that federal courts review the last state court decision that addressed the merits of the case. Under AEDPA, a federal court must determine if the state court's decision was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of established federal law as defined by the Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable factual determination. An unreasonable application occurs when the state court's ruling is devoid of justification, to the point that no fair-minded disagreement could exist regarding the error. This standard is significantly more challenging for petitioners compared to de novo review, as it requires showing that the state court's conclusion was unreasonable rather than simply incorrect.
The evaluation of state court decisions must respect their authority within the federal system, and even strong arguments for relief do not automatically make a state court's decision unreasonable. Federal courts must give state court decisions the benefit of the doubt, even in cases of summary denials where the rationale is not fully articulated. In such cases, the federal court must consider possible arguments that could support the state court’s decision and whether reasonable jurists could disagree about its consistency with prior Supreme Court rulings. Additionally, the specificity of the legal rule under scrutiny is crucial; broader rules allow for more flexibility in state court interpretations. A state court is not unreasonable for declining to apply a legal rule that has not been definitively established by the Supreme Court. The stringent nature of this standard is intentional, reflecting the high threshold required for obtaining relief under AEDPA.
Section 2254(d) emphasizes that habeas corpus serves as a safeguard against severe failures in state criminal justice systems rather than as a mechanism for standard error correction through appeals. Nichols alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that his trial attorney failed to adequately investigate mitigating witnesses, particularly regarding his abusive childhood, which resulted in an insufficient mitigation argument presented to the jury. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome. “Deficient performance” occurs when counsel's representation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, while “prejudice” is shown if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different without the counsel's errors. A habeas petitioner can only receive relief if the state court's rejection of the claim was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington or was based on an unreasonable factual determination. This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel's performance.
Nichols’s trial counsel presented seven witnesses during the sentencing phase, including family and community members, who testified to his positive character traits and expressed remorse. Nichols also testified about his troubling childhood and his compliance with police. A psychologist linked his behavior to an "intermittent explosive disorder." After his conviction and failed appeals, Nichols sought post-conviction relief with new counsel, who presented extensive evidence and over 20 witnesses, arguing that a more robust presentation of mitigating factors, particularly his childhood, could have influenced the jury against imposing the death penalty. However, the state trial court was not convinced by this claim.
Post-conviction counsel for Nichols presented multiple relatives and acquaintances to provide mitigating evidence that had not been submitted during the original sentencing. However, much of this testimony was deemed cumulative, reiterating issues already addressed by trial counsel. A psychologist for the defense acknowledged that while he had more personal insight into Nichols's background, the information was largely similar to what was previously available. The abusive environment of Nichols's upbringing had already been discussed at the sentencing hearing, and the testimony from new witnesses did not significantly alter this understanding.
Allegations of sexual misconduct involving Nichols's sister, which were also mentioned in earlier proceedings, were largely hearsay, and Nichols himself did not recall these events. It was noted that Nichols and his defense team had made diligent efforts to uncover specific evidence of abuse before trial but found none. Nichols described his father's discipline as typical and mentioned having a generally positive experience in an orphanage.
While some witnesses claimed they were not contacted, others indicated they could have been reached but were not approached. The court concluded that, despite the potential for more witnesses, the defense's investigation was adequate, and no prejudice was demonstrated. The significant aggravating factor of prior violent felonies was emphasized, which could weigh even more heavily in any potential resentencing due to subsequent guilty pleas. The state appellate court affirmed the trial court's findings, and the Tennessee Supreme Court also reviewed and agreed with these conclusions.
Trial counsel effectively identified and supported relevant mitigating themes during the trial. While post-conviction evidence did not challenge counsel's performance, it questioned the volume and presentation of the mitigating evidence. However, any additional evidence presented did not significantly alter the jury's perspective, given the strong aggravating circumstances from prior violent felonies. Nichols failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury would have viewed the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors differently. The Tennessee Supreme Court conducted an independent review and determined that trial counsel's performance was adequate, and even if it were not, Nichols could not show prejudice.
Counsel summarized post-conviction evidence, detailing the severe abuse Nichols endured, the impact of family deaths, and subsequent hardships. Despite the vividness of this testimony, it was not new information, as similar facts had been presented during the original sentencing. The lack of newly discovered evidence undermined claims of deficient investigation. Additionally, the post-conviction evidence mirrored experiences of others who suffered similar or worse conditions, none of whom committed serious crimes. The Tennessee Supreme Court found the additional evidence duplicative and not compelling enough to likely change the sentencing outcome.
Reviewing courts must be cautious not to second-guess strategic decisions, as emphasized by the standard set in Strickland. Both trial attorneys testified regarding their performance, affirming their efforts to present as much mitigation evidence as possible.
Moore expressed uncertainty about the effectiveness of presenting extensive evidence to a jury, suggesting that quality matters more than quantity. He did not call any of the witnesses who had previously testified during the post-conviction hearing, believing they added no significant value to the case. Rosemarie Bryan supported this view, stating that the post-conviction witnesses were cumulative and potentially damaging to Nichols’s defense. She felt that emphasizing Nichols’s troubled childhood could have adverse effects. Both attorneys maintained that their decisions were strategic, based on thorough investigation and experience, asserting that such choices are largely unchallengeable under legal standards. Nichols failed to demonstrate that their investigation was inadequate or that their strategic decisions were unreasonable. Consequently, the state court's decision regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was found to be consistent with established Supreme Court precedent, denying him habeas relief. Additionally, Nichols challenged the jury instructions regarding unanimity in finding mitigating factors, arguing that the court did not explicitly state that unanimity was not required, referencing Mills v. Maryland.
The Supreme Court deemed a death sentence unconstitutional due to jurors misunderstanding the requirement for unanimity in finding mitigating factors. In Nichols's case, his counsel incorrectly claimed that jurors were instructed to unanimously agree on mitigating factors. The correct instructions, as outlined in Tennessee law, state that a death penalty can only be imposed if the jury unanimously finds that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt one or more statutory aggravating circumstances, which include prior violent felony convictions and the commission of murder during the perpetration of another crime, such as rape. The court initially misread the instructions, omitting the "beyond a reasonable doubt" phrase multiple times before finally delivering the correct version. The jury was instructed to consider mitigating circumstances, which include extreme duress and impaired judgment, and if the jury unanimously finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating ones beyond a reasonable doubt, they must impose a death sentence. The verdict must be unanimous, with each juror signing the verdict form.
A jury must unanimously determine whether statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury finds no such circumstances, or if they find that any proven aggravating circumstances do not outweigh mitigating circumstances, the sentence is life imprisonment. Two verdict forms are provided: one for death and one for life imprisonment, both requiring unanimous agreement and signatures from all jurors.
Unanimity is required solely for the aggravating factors and the overall sentence; however, it is not required for mitigating factors. Jurors are instructed to consider any mitigating factors, whether listed or not, and are not required to agree on their existence. The absence of a specific instruction regarding the unanimity of mitigating factors does not leave the jury without guidance, as all jurors must weigh any mitigating factors identified against the unanimously agreed-upon aggravating factors.
Mitigating factors in jury instructions do not require unanimity, as indicated by previous rulings. The state court's resolution on this matter was consistent with established Supreme Court precedent, and Nichols is not entitled to habeas relief regarding the jury instructions during his death penalty proceeding. Nichols contends that an error in completing the verdict form invalidated the original verdict and necessitated a mistrial. Although the jury made an error in completing the form, the court's response was not an unreasonable application of constitutional law. The jury was correctly instructed on the sentencing decision and required to unanimously agree on three key questions to impose the death penalty. After deliberating for two hours, the jury reached a unanimous verdict, but failed to note the statutory aggravating factors on the verdict form, instead listing factors not instructed by the court. Despite this error, the jury did not reject the statutory aggravating factors and clarified that they believed those factors were proven but thought they were to provide additional reasons on the form. Ultimately, the jury unanimously found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, justifying the death sentence.
The jury mistakenly listed incorrect aggravating factors on the verdict form and failed to include the correct statutory factors, leading to a defense motion for a mistrial based on the State's failure to prove four new, non-statutory factors. The trial court, after discussions with the jury foreperson, denied the motion and re-instructed the jury. The jury then corrected the form, crossing out the non-statutory factors and reinstating the statutory ones, ultimately finding unanimously that the statutory aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances, resulting in a death penalty verdict.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, determining that the jury had indeed found the statutory aggravating factors had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the initial error in the verdict form. The court emphasized that when a jury submits an incorrect verdict, the trial court is obligated to guide them back to the law for reconsideration. Additionally, the court ruled that the non-statutory factors could be considered by the jury under state law. Citing federal constitutional precedents, the court confirmed that the Constitution does not prohibit juries from considering additional aggravating factors during sentencing, as long as the statutory factors define the class of individuals eligible for capital punishment.
The jury has the discretion to evaluate various factors to determine the appropriateness of the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court's application of legal precedent was deemed reasonable. Nichols’s counsel referenced Stringer v. Black, arguing it prohibits a capital jury from generating its own aggravating factors, claiming the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling contradicted established law. However, the court clarified that in Stringer, the aggravating factors were defined by the legislature and presented to the jury, which did not create any factors independently. The Supreme Court found that while a vague aggravating factor is problematic, the current case involved clear statutory factors. The issue arose from the jury's misunderstanding of the verdict form, not from imprecision in the aggravating factors charged. Therefore, Stringer and the cited cases do not support Nichols's claim against the trial court's decision to send the jury back for a verdict correction.
Nichols also alleged that the trial court improperly directed a death sentence and instructed the jury to disregard mitigating evidence. The court clarified that it had reaffirmed the jury's prior verdict and re-instructed them on the correct application of the law. The jury was reminded that, according to Tennessee law, a unanimous finding of statutory aggravating circumstances was required for a death penalty to be imposed, specifically mentioning two aggravating circumstances related to prior violent felonies and the nature of the murder. The jury was instructed to base their decision solely on these factors.
The document outlines the legal context surrounding jury instructions related to aggravating and mitigating factors in a criminal trial. It emphasizes that the jury must list statutory aggravating circumstances as defined by the court, noting that both Tennessee and federal law allow for additional aggravating factors to be considered. If the jury failed to follow this instruction, such an error would not be grounds for habeas review under federal law.
The trial court's refusal to re-instruct the jury on mitigating factors is justified by the assertion that the jury had already reached a verdict of guilt. The court clarified that its role was to ensure the jury accurately reflected its consideration of the statutory aggravating factors, not to prompt a reconsideration of the verdict. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed that the initial verdict was valid and that the jury was entitled to correct it based on proper guidance.
Nichols argued that the jury should have been instructed to re-evaluate the statutory aggravating factors against mitigating factors as if the initial verdict had not been made. However, the district court highlighted that for a collateral attack on a state court judgment due to erroneous jury instructions, the petitioner must demonstrate significant prejudice affecting the trial's fairness. The court determined that the jury had been adequately instructed on mitigating factors and that the evidence did not show prejudice from the failure to re-instruct. It concluded that Nichols did not experience any disadvantage from the trial court's actions concerning the jury instructions.
The trial court provided written jury instructions during initial deliberations, with no evidence indicating the jury lacked these instructions in subsequent deliberations. Nichols' defense attorneys presented mitigating evidence to advocate for a life sentence, while the State introduced compelling aggravating evidence, evident from the jury's brief deliberation period. Nichols was convicted of raping and murdering a victim and had admitted to multiple rapes. The jury faced the decision between life imprisonment and the death penalty, and the overall jury instructions adequately covered the evaluation of mitigating evidence against aggravating circumstances. No jury confusion regarding mitigating evidence was noted; confusion instead arose concerning the aggravating factors to be included on the verdict form. Nichols failed to demonstrate that the trial court's omission of re-instruction on mitigating factors was prejudicial enough to violate due process or that the state court's decision was contrary to federal law or an unreasonable fact determination.
Regarding jury polling, Nichols argued that the trial court's post-verdict questioning misstated the law by not asking if each juror found decisions "beyond a reasonable doubt" and was coercive, aimed at legitimizing an allegedly illegal verdict. The State countered that there is no Supreme Court precedent mandating a specific polling method. During the correction of the verdict form, the jury foreperson had adjusted the non-statutory factors and confirmed the finding that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors. The court's polling involved verifying whether the jurors had previously concluded that the State proved the statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and whether they understood what to write on the verdict form. All jurors affirmed their agreement with this process. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld that the initial verdict was legal.
The court determined there was no reversible error in failing to include the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" when polling jurors, as the jurors had been instructed that they must find aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdict form confirmed this unanimous finding. The omission did not invalidate the valid verdict. Nichols cited three Supreme Court cases—Brasfield v. United States, Lowenfield v. Phelps, and Maynard v. Cartwright—arguing they provided precedent for his claim, but the court found them inapplicable, as they did not pertain to post-verdict jury polling. The district court referenced an unpublished Sixth Circuit case, emphasizing that post-verdict polling aims to ensure jurors support the verdict without coercion and allows for the possibility of jurors changing their minds. The trial court has discretion over the polling method. Ultimately, considering the jury’s initial verdict, re-instruction, and post-verdict polling, Nichols failed to show that the state court's decision was unreasonable or contrary to established federal law, thus not warranting habeas relief on this claim.
Nichols argues that the State infringed upon his rights to due process, equal protection, and the Eighth Amendment by prosecuting later-occurring crimes before earlier ones, which he claims was intended to establish prior-violent-felony convictions for death penalty qualification. The State counters that there is no Supreme Court precedent mandating chronological prosecution to prevent prior convictions. The Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed the issue under state and federal law, concluding that the trial court's denial of Nichols's request for chronological trials was justified. Nichols faced forty charges stemming from fourteen incidents, with the murder of Karen Pulley being the first. He contends that allowing prosecutorial discretion in trial order leads to arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, contrary to principles established in *Furman v. Georgia*. However, Tennessee law allows the death penalty for defendants with prior felony convictions involving violence, regardless of the order of the crimes, as long as the convictions are established before sentencing. The Supreme Court's rulings indicate that such prosecutorial discretion does not violate the Eighth Amendment if guided by standards that consider the specific circumstances of each case. The district court supported these findings, emphasizing that under Tennessee law, the timing of conviction is paramount, not the timing of the offenses. Consequently, both courts found that Nichols's claims lacked merit.
The order of crimes committed is deemed irrelevant if convictions are established before the sentencing hearing. Tennessee law mandates proof of prior convictions rather than prior criminal acts. Nichols argues that the prosecutor's non-chronological trial of cases was intended to create an aggravating circumstance of prior violent felonies, infringing on his equal protection and due process rights. However, Nichols could not cite a Supreme Court case that deems such prosecutorial strategy unconstitutional. In Tuilaepa v. California, the Supreme Court affirmed that states can direct jurors’ attention to a defendant's criminal history in capital cases, allowing both backward-looking and forward-looking inquiries regarding prior crimes. Nichols’ jury was allowed to review prior convictions for crimes committed after the murder, and he did not identify any Supreme Court precedent against this. He referenced four Supreme Court cases—Gregg v. Georgia, Roberts v. Louisiana, Woodson v. North Carolina, and Furman v. Georgia—arguing they establish the need for careful jury consideration of individual crime characteristics to prevent arbitrary death penalty imposition. However, these cases do not address the prosecution of multiple crimes or the proving of aggravating factors. The aggravating factor of multiple violent rapes is significant to Nichols’ individual character assessment for the death penalty, irrespective of when they occurred relative to the murder. Tennessee law emphasizes the importance of convictions over mere accusations, reinforcing the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court supports that the commission of crimes is what matters, not the sequence, as long as convictions are presented prior to sentencing. The court also noted that the prosecutor has broad discretion in pursuing the death penalty, as established in McCleskey v. Kemp.
The district court referenced Tuilaepa v. California, which allows juries to consider a defendant’s prior criminal activity in death penalty sentencing, supporting both backward-looking and forward-looking inquiries into a defendant's criminal history. This precedent counters Nichols's claim that the State unconstitutionally prioritized his later crimes to establish prior violent felony convictions. The Tennessee statute specifies a prior "conviction" of violent crime, not merely the "commission," indicating the legislature's intent and the courts' reasonable interpretation. Although Tuilaepa was not binding at the time of Nichols's case, it confirmed the Nichols Court's understanding of precedent.
Nichols argued that his prior violent felony convictions were not "prior" since they were not final under Tennessee law at the time of his trial due to unissued sentences. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating-factor statute only requires a "previous conviction," not a final judgment, allowing the admissibility of the relevant indictments and trial records. The district court found that Nichols's challenge was solely a matter of state law and deemed it procedurally defaulted, as he failed to raise a constitutional issue in his habeas petition or state court. Although he made broad claims of constitutional rights violations, Nichols did not specify which rights were infringed, thereby failing to adequately present his claims as constitutional violations in state courts. During his direct appeal, he did not cite federal cases with constitutional analysis.
Nichols has procedurally defaulted his claim regarding the trial court's allowance of prior convictions as aggravating factors for the death penalty, as he failed to present this claim as a federal constitutional issue in state court. The absence of a demonstration of cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice renders the claim unreviewable in the current habeas proceedings. Additionally, Nichols has not substantiated a violation of any constitutional right in his habeas petition. Even if the claim were exhausted, he has not shown that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, leading to dismissal of this claim due to procedural default.
Furthermore, Nichols contends that the state trial court breached his constitutional right to a fair trial by compelling the defense to disclose notes from psychologist Dr. Engum to the prosecution. However, he did not adequately raise this as a constitutional violation in state courts, focusing instead on Tennessee discovery rules and the attorney work-product doctrine, which are not applicable to federal habeas review. Although Nichols vaguely asserted a constitutional violation in his appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, his argument more explicitly revolved around procedural issues rather than a clear constitutional infringement. The invited-error doctrine may also apply to his situation, further complicating his claim.
A party cannot raise issues on appeal that it prompted the court to commit, as established in United States v. Wells. In the case of Nichols, no sentencing occurred on certain convictions because his counsel requested a stay until after other guilt-phase determinations. If there was an error, it was invited by Nichols’s counsel. Nichols later claimed this was due to ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Tennessee Supreme Court previously denied as meritless. He raised an ineffective-assistance claim in his federal habeas petition but withdrew it, leading the district court to deny it based on that withdrawal. Generally, claims not properly presented in the district court are not reviewed, and Nichols did not obtain a Certificate of Appealability (COA) for this issue, limiting the possibility of review. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not rule on a constitutional claim, which the district court deemed procedurally defaulted. Such unadjudicated claims receive a de novo review for legal questions. Nichols preserved a claim regarding prosecutorial misconduct, which requires assessing whether the prosecutor's actions infected the trial's fairness. The Sixth Circuit applies a two-step test for prosecutorial misconduct, examining if the conduct was improper and considering factors such as the strength of evidence against the defendant and whether the misconduct was isolated or extensive. The focus remains on the fairness of the trial rather than the prosecutor's intent.
Nichols asserts that the State prosecutor's comments during the sentencing trial violated his constitutional rights, focusing on claims that the prosecutor suggested the defense misled the jury. The analysis follows a two-step test. Dr. Engum, a psychologist and lawyer, testified for the defense, diagnosing Nichols with "intermittent explosive disorder," an impulse control disorder influenced by a hostile upbringing and social isolation. Although Dr. Engum stated Nichols recognized the wrongfulness of his actions, he noted Nichols expressed remorse afterward. During cross-examination, the State challenged Dr. Engum's independence by highlighting his correspondence with defense counsel, where he used inclusive language ("us" and "we") and suggested strategies to bolster the defense's argument for an irresistible impulse defense. This included a commentary on potential witness Rev. L. E. Butler, indicating Butler's testimony could appeal to jurors' religious beliefs but might also suggest that Nichols made active, voluntary choices leading to his crimes. The State argued that Dr. Engum was acting as a defense attorney rather than an impartial expert. The inquiry begins by assessing whether the State's questions or remarks were improper, concluding that the State's actions were simply a confrontation of Dr. Engum's own statements.
Dr. Engum was accused of misleading the jury by presenting himself as an independent expert while actually being part of the defense team. The court found the State's questions and comments regarding Dr. Engum's credibility to be appropriate and not improper, emphasizing that they aimed to clarify his role and the reliability of his testimony. The strong and undisputed evidence of aggravating factors, including that Nichols committed murder during a rape and had prior convictions for violent rapes, supported this assessment. Although the remarks made were deliberate, they were not deemed sufficiently flagrant to constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Consequently, Nichols is not entitled to habeas relief related to the disclosure of his psychologist’s notes, leading to the affirmation of the district court's judgment.
Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. concurred, expressing his condemnation of the death penalty as arbitrary and ineffective. He reflected on the lengthy duration of the case, highlighting the significant resources it consumed without providing closure for the victims' families. He pointed out the need for a critical examination of the costs of death penalty litigation versus its societal benefits, advocating for the reallocation of resources towards mental health and educational improvements to prevent future crimes.