Earl Cannedy, Jr. v. Darrel Adams

Citations: 733 F.3d 794; 2013 WL 3744048; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14352Docket: 09-56902

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 16, 2013; Federal Appellate Court

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied both a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc regarding Earl Eugene Cannedy Jr.'s case, which involved a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The panel's decision affirmed the district court's prior ruling after an evidentiary hearing. Judge Kleinfeld supported granting the rehearing petitions, while Judge Lucero did not make a recommendation on the matter. Dissenting opinions from Judge O’Scannlain and other judges criticized the majority for not adhering to Supreme Court guidelines, particularly regarding how to interpret the California Supreme Court's summary denial of post-conviction relief. O’Scannlain noted that the court should have considered whether any reasonable argument could have supported the California Supreme Court's summary ruling, suggesting that the denial of rehearing en banc was a misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. The case originated from Cannedy's conviction for multiple counts of lewd acts against his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter, with substantial corroboration from witnesses during the trial. The opinion filed on February 7, 2013, was amended for accuracy regarding a date from 2003 to 2004. No further petitions for rehearing will be accepted.

Witnesses confirmed that the stepdaughter disclosed molestation by Cannedy, with her trial account consistent with these disclosures. Evidence was presented showing Cannedy had previously molested his stepdaughter’s aunt and his sister-in-law. The defense argued the stepdaughter fabricated allegations out of anger over the family planning to move. Cannedy was the sole defense witness, denying the allegations and suggesting his stepdaughter lied due to her resentment about the move. After a week of testimony, the jury convicted him.

Post-conviction, Cannedy claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his trial lawyer failed to present witnesses who could corroborate the stepdaughter's motives. He submitted a handwritten statement from a friend of the stepdaughter, claiming she made up the allegations to escape family issues. The state trial court denied Cannedy's motion for a new trial.

In a subsequent habeas corpus petition, Cannedy included a declaration from the friend, stating she would have testified about the stepdaughter’s message but was not contacted by Cannedy’s trial attorney. The attorney's email indicated he had discussed potential witnesses with Cannedy and decided against calling them, believing it was not advantageous. The California Court of Appeal denied the habeas petition, concluding that Cannedy’s trial counsel was not deficient because there was no evidence that he knew about the friend or the relevant information, and therefore, Cannedy could not demonstrate ineffective assistance or prejudice.

Cannedy filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. He included a declaration asserting that he provided his lawyer, Mark Sullivan, with potential witness information that could yield favorable testimony. Initially, Cannedy argued his counsel was ineffective for failing to discover a specific friend who could testify about a motive for false accusations against him. After the California Court of Appeal rejected his claims, he shifted his argument to assert that Sullivan was ineffective for not interviewing the witnesses he had already identified. The California Supreme Court denied his habeas petition without comment. Cannedy then pursued a federal habeas petition in district court, which granted him relief after an evidentiary hearing. The majority opinion affirms this decision but contends that the Supreme Court's decision in *Cullen v. Pinholster* prevents considering evidence from the federal hearing. However, the majority incorrectly applies the *Ylst v. Nunnemaker* look-through presumption, arguing that the California Court of Appeal's evaluation of Cannedy’s ineffective assistance claim was unreasonable based on new evidence presented to the California Supreme Court. The dissent suggests that the majority misinterprets the relationship between the rulings in *Ylst* and *Harrington v. Richter*, arguing that the Supreme Court's guidance should have led to a different conclusion about the California Supreme Court's summary decision. The dissent highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of how to assess the validity of the California Supreme Court’s decision in light of evidence it did not consider.

The petitioner in Ylst challenged the admission of testimony on the grounds that it violated his Miranda rights. The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim due to procedural bar, as it was not raised at trial. The California Supreme Court later denied the petitioner’s state habeas petition without explanation. In federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth Circuit granted relief, arguing that the state procedural default did not preclude federal review because the California Supreme Court did not clearly state reliance on the procedural default. The Supreme Court reversed, asserting that courts must refer to the last reasoned state court opinion to determine if an unexplained order rejected a claim on the merits or due to procedural default. A presumption was established that subsequent unexplained orders uphold the rationale of earlier reasoned judgments. However, this presumption could be rebutted by strong evidence indicating otherwise.

In Richter, after being convicted of murder, the petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present blood evidence. The California Supreme Court denied his habeas petition in a brief summary order. The Ninth Circuit, skeptical about applying the deferential standard of review due to the lack of reasoning, nonetheless found the state court's decision unreasonable and granted relief. The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying that a state court decision does not require a statement of reasons to receive deference under § 2254(d). The Court emphasized that requiring such statements could hinder state judicial efficiency, allowing courts to focus on more complex cases. It established a presumption that the state court adjudicated claims on the merits unless evidence suggests otherwise. Ultimately, the Court found the California Supreme Court's decision reasonable, denying the habeas petition.

In the same term, the Court also addressed Pinholster, who similarly alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in a California habeas petition but was denied relief in state court.

In Pinholster, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's grant of habeas relief, asserting that state court decisions must be evaluated based solely on the record available to the state court at the time of adjudication, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's method of considering new evidence not presented in state court. The Court found that the California Supreme Court's rejection of Pinholster's ineffective assistance claims was reasonable.

In Johnson v. Williams, the Supreme Court similarly reversed the Ninth Circuit's grant of habeas relief, which had concluded that the California Court of Appeal overlooked Williams's Sixth Amendment claim regarding juror bias. The Supreme Court emphasized that the California courts' silence should not be interpreted as oversight, noting that state courts do not have to address every claim explicitly and may choose not to acknowledge a federal claim if it is deemed insubstantial or already encompassed by state law. The Court underlined that federal courts cannot impose specific opinion-writing requirements on state courts, and the absence of discussion on a claim does not imply it was not adjudicated on the merits.

These decisions establish four guiding principles for federal courts reviewing state court decisions that lack full explanations. Had these principles been properly applied, the majority would have recognized the California Supreme Court's silent denial of Cannedy’s petition as an indication that it found no merit in the claims, rather than assuming it adopted outdated reasoning.

The first principle in interpreting state court decisions emphasizes the use of common sense, guiding the Supreme Court to adopt logical explanations for state courts' silence on federal claims. The Supreme Court has established that unexplained decisions could indicate either agreement with lower court reasoning or a finding of meritlessness in the claims. The majority's assumption that the California Supreme Court ignored new evidence and thus provided an "objectively unreasonable" rationale for denying Cannedy’s habeas petition contradicts more plausible explanations, such as the court having considered the new evidence and still found it lacking merit. The California Supreme Court's summary denial indicates that the claims did not present a prima facie case for relief, consistent with established practices of dismissing meritless claims. The second principle warns against declaring a state court's analysis unreasonable based on evidence not presented to it, highlighting an illogical consequence of the majority's interpretation that conflicts with this guideline.

Pinholster's reasoning, originally focused on new evidence in federal court, is applicable to this case, highlighting the majority's flawed approach of analyzing state court decisions based on evidence not presented during those proceedings. The majority evaluated the California Court of Appeal’s ruling against newly introduced evidence to the California Supreme Court, which contradicts the principles established in Pinholster. The majority argues that this is a mischaracterization by claiming it reviewed the California Supreme Court's decision based on what the court of appeal had considered, presuming the Supreme Court adopted that reasoning. This assumption misapplies the look-through presumption, which the Supreme Court in Ylst recognized should not always be used, particularly when a subsequent change in facts alters the basis for the lower court's decision. 

The principle of judicial comity is also at stake; the majority's insistence that the California Supreme Court could have clarified its reasoning if different evidence were considered undermines the established notion that federal courts cannot impose requirements on state courts regarding the format or content of their opinions. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that it is the responsibility of federal courts to ascertain the scope of state court decisions without demanding specific language or reasoning. This principle was reiterated in cases such as Coleman, Richter, and Johnson, where the Court asserted that state courts should not be compelled to adhere to particular opinion-writing standards. The majority's actions in this case directly contradict these established directives, suggesting an improper expectation of state court reasoning. Additionally, the discussion emphasizes the importance of allowing state courts to operate without the imposition of federal standards, reinforcing the need to give them the benefit of the doubt in their decisions.

The three previously discussed guidelines emphasize a broader principle of deference to state courts, which hold primary responsibility for addressing state prisoner constitutional claims. Under the highly deferential standard of § 2254(d), state court decisions are presumed correct, and in this case, the California Supreme Court's summary denial of Cannedy’s habeas petition suggests a belief that his claim lacked merit rather than an oversight of new evidence. The majority erred by limiting its review to the California Court of Appeal’s stated reasons instead of considering broader arguments that could support the state court’s decision. If the correct inquiry had been made, it would have shown that habeas relief was unwarranted, as reasonable arguments could support the denial. For instance, Cannedy’s vague declaration about a potential witness did not provide sufficient detail to suggest ineffective assistance from his lawyer. It was reasonable for fair-minded jurists to conclude that the failure to present this testimony was not prejudicial and unlikely to alter the trial's outcome. The majority’s opinion is criticized for not adhering to binding Supreme Court precedent, leading to an interpretation of the California Supreme Court’s decision that undermines common sense and comity in habeas analysis, prompting a respectful dissent against the decision not to rehear the case en banc.