Jason Wayne Courtney appeals the summary judgment granted to the State of Oklahoma and Trooper Jacob Smith in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Courtney claims that during a traffic stop on the Muskogee Turnpike, Smith unlawfully extended the stop and arrested him without probable cause for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He also alleges false arrest, imprisonment, assault and battery, and conversion against the State. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, determining Smith was entitled to qualified immunity and the State was protected under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.
On the night of October 25, 2010, Smith initiated a traffic stop after observing Courtney speeding at 82 mph in a 75 mph zone and failing to dim his headlights. Although Courtney did not stop immediately, he eventually pulled into a gas station after Smith activated his siren. Upon approaching Courtney's vehicle, Smith informed him of the speeding violation and began preparing a warning. During this process, Smith noted Courtney's extreme nervousness, which led him to suspect potential criminal activity. Despite his suspicions, Smith returned Courtney's documents and wished him a safe journey before concluding the stop.
Courtney, while returning to his vehicle, declined to answer further questions from Officer Smith, who then ordered him to stop and return to the patrol car. Smith expressed suspicion of illegal activity and inquired about drugs, cash, or firearms in the vehicle, to which Courtney admitted he had a gun in the trunk. Smith requested a police canine to inspect the vehicle for drugs; the dog did not alert. During this time, Smith obtained Courtney’s criminal record, revealing a felony conviction for breaking and entering from 1998, which Courtney disputed, claiming he had no felony record. Acknowledging that the offense occurred when Courtney was a minor, Smith arrested him for possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, leading to Courtney's detention for thirty-six hours and the seizure of his vehicle and gun.
Courtney's attorney later informed the district attorney that Courtney did not have a felony conviction, resulting in his release and the absence of charges. Although Courtney retrieved his vehicle after paying impound fees, the gun was not returned until nearly a year later. Courtney subsequently filed a lawsuit against Smith and the State, claiming unconstitutional seizure of his person and property under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law claims for false arrest, imprisonment, assault and battery, and conversion. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that Smith was entitled to qualified immunity and that the State was immune from Courtney's state-law claims under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.
The appellate court reviews summary judgments de novo, determining whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In cases involving qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant violated a constitutional right and that such right was clearly established.
Determining whether a right is clearly established involves assessing if a reasonable officer would recognize their conduct as unlawful in the specific situation encountered. Existing case law must place the constitutional issue beyond debate, though a directly on-point case is not required. Courts have discretion in deciding which prong of qualified immunity to analyze first.
Courtney's Section 1983 claim regarding his detention has two aspects: the lack of reasonable suspicion for the extended detention after a traffic warning and the absence of probable cause for his arrest. Smith argues that the detention and arrest were justified because he could have arrested Courtney for speeding and failing to dim his headlights. Smith cites three Supreme Court cases—Virginia v. Moore, Devenpeck v. Alford, and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista—to support his position that a traffic stop backed by probable cause for a minor offense cannot be deemed unreasonably extended.
However, the interpretation of these cases by Smith is incorrect. Atwater allows for the arrest of individuals for minor traffic offenses, while Moore clarifies that an arrest can be constitutional even if state law would suggest a summons instead. Devenpeck states that the officer’s motivation for an arrest does not need to align closely with the known offense for which probable cause exists. Collectively, these cases do not justify indefinite detention post-warning followed by an arrest for an unrelated offense without probable cause.
Smith’s interpretation of the relevant case law on traffic stops is inconsistent with established Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedents. The Supreme Court's decision in *Illinois v. Caballes* emphasizes that a lawful traffic stop can become unconstitutional if it is unreasonably prolonged beyond the time necessary to address the initial purpose of the stop, such as issuing a warning ticket. Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases have similarly analyzed whether a traffic stop remains valid throughout its duration.
The court rejects Smith's argument that Courtney’s traffic violations justified prolonging the stop without additional reasonable suspicion. Courtney contends that his detention after receiving a warning ticket constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Lawful traffic stops must be related in scope to the circumstances that justified them. Once the officer issues a warning and returns the driver’s documents, the driver should be allowed to leave unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion of further illegal activity.
To establish reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must indicate a particularized basis for suspecting wrongdoing, which is a lower standard than probable cause. In assessing Courtney’s claim and Smith’s qualified immunity defense, the court must determine whether it was clearly established that Smith lacked the authority to extend the stop. The district court identified three reasons for Smith’s suspicion: Courtney’s delayed stop after the lights were activated, his nervous behavior during the encounter, and his stated travel plans.
Courtney's decision to drive to a gas station was presented as a safety measure, which is a reasonable explanation; however, it was also reasonable for Officer Smith to interpret this action as potentially indicative of criminal behavior. Consequently, Courtney’s delay in stopping after being signaled by police supports a conclusion of reasonable suspicion. The court distinguishes between ordinary nervousness and extreme nervousness, the latter being more significant in establishing reasonable suspicion. Smith noted multiple signs of Courtney’s extreme nervousness, including heart palpitations and heavy breathing, which persisted even after informing him he would only receive a warning.
Regarding Courtney's travel plans, the court asserts that inconsistent or implausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion, while unusual plans alone do not suffice. Courtney’s explanation of traveling from one state to another for work after visiting family was straightforward and lacked inconsistencies. Thus, this factor does not support reasonable suspicion. Overall, two out of the three factors—the delay in stopping and extreme nervousness—support reasonable suspicion, though the evidence is minimal. Therefore, Courtney has not demonstrated that his extended detention violated clearly established law, leading the court to affirm that Officer Smith is entitled to qualified immunity regarding the claim of an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop.
Additionally, in evaluating warrantless arrests, the Fourth Amendment allows such actions if there is probable cause based on the known facts at the time of the arrest, with the officer's subjective motivations being irrelevant.
The district court found that Courtney's arrest was justified by probable cause under Oklahoma's felon-in-possession statute or, alternatively, under the obstruction of justice statute. The felon-in-possession statute prohibits individuals with felony convictions from possessing firearms, while juvenile adjudications over ten years old do not count as disqualifying felonies. At the time of the arrest, Officer Smith was aware that the breaking and entering charge referenced in the Triple I report was from when Courtney was a minor and was over ten years old, thus qualifying as a juvenile adjudication.
The district court reasoned that Smith could have mistakenly believed the felony charge was adult-based due to its listing in a national database, arguing that juvenile offenses are generally sealed. However, there was no evidence supporting this reasoning; the relevant regulations state that both serious adult and juvenile offenses are included in the Triple I system. The report clearly indicated that the breaking and entering charge was a juvenile adjudication. Therefore, Smith did not possess probable cause to arrest Courtney for firearm possession as a convicted felon.
The court also ruled that Smith was entitled to qualified immunity, suggesting that his arrest decision stemmed from a mistaken legal interpretation of the statute. This judgment was deemed incorrect as well, since qualified immunity does not apply when a government official lacks probable cause based on the facts known at the time.
Oklahoma's felon-in-possession statute clearly prohibits individuals convicted of a felony as adults from possessing firearms, while those adjudicated delinquent for similar offenses as juveniles face a ten-year prohibition. At the time of Smith's arrest of Courtney, it was established that Courtney fell into the latter category, indicating that Smith lacked probable cause to arrest him for violating this statute. The district court determined Smith had probable cause for arresting Courtney on obstruction of justice charges, which requires a suspect to willfully delay or obstruct a public officer in their duties. Although Smith believed Courtney's denial of having a felony record constituted obstruction, the record showed that Courtney simply did not remember a past arrest or conviction. Consequently, his statements did not impede the investigation, undermining the basis for probable cause for obstruction. Additionally, the district court granted summary judgment to the State on Courtney’s claims of false arrest and imprisonment based on the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, which provides immunity for claims arising from the enforcement of laws when probable cause exists. Since the conclusion that Smith had probable cause was rejected, the court also dismissed the State's claim to governmental immunity. The State argued for immunity under the premise that Smith was enforcing a law, but this argument has no support in Oklahoma law.
The State's immunity claim under 155(4) for false arrest, based on the arresting officers' good faith, was rejected. The court clarified that an arrest lacking probable cause constitutes a false arrest, regardless of the officers' intentions. The State's argument mirrored that previously dismissed in Overall, leading to the conclusion that it is not entitled to immunity from Courtney’s false arrest and imprisonment claims.
Regarding Courtney's conversion claim, even if probable cause existed for the arrest, it did not preclude the claim under Oklahoma law, which defines conversion as wrongful dominion over someone's property. The facts indicated that the State retained Courtney's firearm for nearly a year post-release, warranting the reversal of the summary judgment on this claim.
For the assault and battery claim, Courtney alleged offensive contact during arrest. The State cited statutes suggesting immunity for public officers performing their duties; however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that such statutes do not grant blanket immunity to government entities for employee conduct. The court interpreted the relevant statutes as barring suits against governmental employers only when an external law would prevent action against the employee. Thus, the court declined to affirm the summary judgment for the assault and battery claim on grounds proposed by the State.
In conclusion, the district court's summary judgment in favor of Smith and the State is partially affirmed and partially reversed. The court affirms Smith's qualified immunity related to the traffic stop but reverses it concerning the claims of unlawful arrest without probable cause. The summary judgment for the State on Courtney's claims of false arrest, conversion, and assault and battery is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
