Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 20, 1940; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Newton Cantwell and his sons, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, were arrested in New Haven, Connecticut, and charged with multiple offenses, including violating a state statute and inciting a breach of the peace. After trial, their convictions were affirmed for one count but reversed for two of them on the incitement charge, leading to a new trial. The appellants argued that the statute violated their rights to free speech and free exercise of religion under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeal concerning the statute's validity. On the day of their arrest, the Cantwells were distributing religious materials in a predominantly Roman Catholic neighborhood, soliciting both the purchase of books and contributions for pamphlets. The statute in question prohibited soliciting funds for religious causes from non-members without prior approval from the state's public welfare council, which could revoke that approval at any time. Violations could result in fines or imprisonment.
Appellants argued that their activities involved only the distribution of literature, which they claimed fell outside the statute's scope. However, the State Supreme Court interpreted the trial court's findings to indicate that the appellants were also soliciting donations for a religious cause, thereby bringing them under the statute's jurisdiction. The court dismissed the argument that the statute violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting that it was the solicitation, not the distribution of literature, that triggered the statute's application. It upheld the constitutionality of the legislation, stating it served to protect the public from fraud in the solicitation of funds for purportedly religious or charitable purposes.
In the case of Jesse Cantwell, he was convicted for inciting a breach of the peace after playing a record that criticized the Catholic Church to two men who found the content offensive. The court distinguished Cantwell's actions from assault, ruling that he did not engage in personal threats but rather incited others' anger. The court emphasized that while the First Amendment protects religious beliefs, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from enacting laws that infringe upon these freedoms. It recognized two aspects of religious freedom: the right to believe and the right to act, noting that while belief is absolute, actions can be regulated to protect societal interests. The court concluded that while states can regulate solicitation activities, the specific statute in question excessively restricted solicitation without a certificate, effectively prohibiting it altogether, which was unconstitutional.
Appellants contend that requiring a certificate to solicit support for their religious views constitutes a prior restraint on their constitutional right to exercise religion. The State argues that the Act, as interpreted by the Connecticut Supreme Court, does not impose prior restraint but aims to prevent fraud disguised as religious solicitation. However, the legitimacy of Connecticut's method in achieving this goal is questioned regarding its compatibility with constitutional liberties.
The regulation of solicitation for religious purposes is deemed acceptable as long as it does not impose unreasonable obstacles or involve a religious test. The Act mandates an application to the secretary of the public welfare council, who determines if the cause is religious. If deemed non-religious, solicitation becomes a crime. This process entails subjective judgment, raising concerns about censorship of religion, which is a violation of First Amendment rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the State argues that arbitrary actions by the licensing officer can be corrected judicially, this does not alleviate the issue of prior restraint. The distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties is complex, and the statute does not clearly assign a mere ministerial role to the secretary. The reliance on judicial remedies does not negate the prior restraint nature of the licensing system, which is unconstitutional in matters of free speech.
The document clarifies that while the State may take steps to prevent fraud under the guise of religion, it cannot impose undue burdens on the exercise of religious freedoms. Reasonable regulations on solicitation for the public's safety are permissible, but any system that requires prior approval to exercise constitutional rights is fundamentally problematic.
Conditioning the solicitation of aid for religious practices on state-licensed approval violates constitutional protections of liberty. The conviction of Jesse Cantwell must be overturned, as it involves balancing the U.S. interest in free exercise of religion and free speech against Connecticut's interest in maintaining public order. The court noted that the conviction was not based on a specific statute that clearly regulated street discussions of religious matters or the use of a phonograph, which would carry legislative judgment. Instead, it was based on a vague common law definition of "breach of the peace," which encompasses a wide range of conduct that may threaten public order. While the state has the authority to prevent clear and present dangers, it cannot unduly suppress free expression under the pretext of preserving public conditions. On the date in question, Cantwell was lawfully on a public street, peacefully engaging pedestrians by requesting permission to play a phonograph record, which did not disrupt public peace or traffic, nor was there any intent to offend. Thus, there was no infringement on public rights or interests.
Cantwell's record criticized organized religion as harmful, specifically targeting the Roman Catholic Church, which offended listeners, leading to reactions of anger. One individual felt violent but refrained from acting on it, while another warned Cantwell to leave before trouble occurred. The lower court concluded that Cantwell's actions did not breach the peace, noting that provocation to violence could occur even without intent. However, historical legal precedents indicate that provocative language typically involves personal abuse, which is not constitutionally protected. In this case, there was no personal attack or threat; rather, Cantwell sought to persuade others about his religious views. The court emphasized that the liberties of expression are vital in a diverse society, despite potential for excess. While there are limits to these liberties, Cantwell's communication did not pose a clear and present danger warranting punishment under the law. Consequently, the court reversed the convictions on specific counts and remanded the case for further proceedings.
