United States v. Price

Citations: 95 F.3d 364; 1996 WL 506485Docket: 95-50467

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; September 9, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Ron Sylvester Price appeals his sentence, arguing that: 1) the Government breached his plea agreement by not filing a motion for downward departure for substantial assistance, which he claims invalidates both the waiver of appeal and his sentence; 2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not inform him that the Government could choose not to allow him to provide substantial assistance; and 3) the trial court incorrectly denied a downward departure based on U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. The appeal follows a plea agreement made on February 6, 1995, where Price pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base in exchange for the dismissal of a conspiracy charge. The agreement required Price to provide truthful information about criminal activities and included a waiver of his right to appeal except for upward departures from sentencing guidelines. The Government retained discretion over whether to file a motion for downward departure based on Price’s assistance, which was to be communicated to the court before sentencing. Price's plea was confirmed during a rearraignment on February 15, 1995, where he affirmed understanding the agreement and the rights he was waiving. His sentencing was scheduled for April 27, 1995. The court affirmed the denial of his appeal.

On April 18, 1995, Price's attorney requested to reset the sentencing hearing, citing that Price had not been given a chance to provide substantial assistance to the Government as per the plea agreement. The court rescheduled the hearing for June 8, 1995. On June 7, 1995, Price's counsel filed a motion for a downward departure under guideline 5K2.0, arguing that the lack of opportunity for substantial assistance, sentencing disparities with co-defendant Washington, and proposed guideline modifications justified this request. During the June 8 hearing, Price's counsel objected to the Government's failure to provide such an opportunity. The Government acknowledged Price's truthfulness but claimed his information was not substantial assistance, as the Killeen Police Department stated their investigation had progressed too far, and Price had delayed nearly five months in offering assistance. Consequently, the Government declined to file for a downward departure under 5K1.1, though they expressed no objection to a sentence at the lower end of the guidelines. Price did not move to withdraw his plea or challenge the plea agreement. The district court also denied the downward departure request, and Price was sentenced to 87 months in confinement, five years of supervised release, a $15,000 fine, and a $50 special assessment, within the guidelines range of 87 to 108 months. Price is now appealing his sentence. The legal standard for reviewing whether the Government breached the plea agreement is de novo, requiring the defendant to show breach by a preponderance of the evidence. Absent a motion from the Government, the court cannot grant a downward departure based on substantial assistance, as the Government has discretion in this matter, and courts can only review refusals for constitutional motives.

The government can waive its discretion in a plea agreement, obligating itself to seek a downward departure in return for the defendant’s substantial assistance. The assessment of whether a defendant's aid qualifies as substantial assistance hinges on the mutual understanding of the term at the time of the agreement. If the plea agreement indicates the government will file a motion for downward departure, discretion is surrendered; if it retains "sole discretion" over the motion, review is limited to unconstitutional motives. In this case, the government debriefed Price and acknowledged his cooperation, resulting in a sentence at the lower end of the guidelines. Price argues the government breached the plea agreement by not further interviewing him for potential assistance, referencing the case of United States v. Laday. However, unlike in Laday, Price's agreement explicitly reserved the government's discretion. As Price did not claim an unconstitutional motive for the government's refusal, precedent dictates that his claim for relief is denied. Additionally, Price contends that the waiver of his right to appeal should be invalidated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his attorney did not inform him of the potential for the government to decline further interviews for assistance. Citing United States v. Henderson, he argues that a waiver based on ineffective counsel should not preclude an appeal.

Henderson is not applicable in Price's case as he did not move to withdraw his plea or claim ineffective assistance of counsel during the proceedings, limiting the opportunity to develop a relevant record. Consequently, his ineffective assistance claim must be dismissed without prejudice, allowing for potential future consideration in a section 2255 proceeding. Furthermore, Price's appeal regarding the district court's refusal to grant a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 is invalid as he waived his right to appeal his sentence, except in cases of upward departures, as stipulated in his plea agreement. The district court confirmed Price understood this waiver, and there is no indication of confusion. Thus, this appeal point is also dismissed. Price’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.