United States v. Miller

Citations: 307 U.S. 174; 59 S. Ct. 816; 83 L. Ed. 1206; 1939 U.S. LEXIS 1162; 1 C.B. 373; 22 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 331Docket: 696

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 15, 1939; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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The case United States v. Miller concerns an indictment against Jack Miller and Frank Layton for unlawfully transporting a double-barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun with a barrel length under 18 inches across state lines without proper registration and documentation as mandated by the National Firearms Act of 1934. The defendants argued that the Act was unconstitutional, claiming it infringed upon states' police powers and violated the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.

The District Court upheld this argument, ruling that the Act, specifically section 11, infringed upon the Second Amendment and quashed the indictment. The case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which reviewed previous rulings, including Sonzinsky v. United States and others related to the Harrison Narcotic Act, to address the claim regarding state police power. 

The Supreme Court concluded that the objection regarding the Act’s encroachment on state powers was unfounded. Furthermore, the Court determined that the shotgun in question did not have a reasonable connection to the preservation of a well-regulated militia, and thus, the Second Amendment did not guarantee the right to possess such a weapon. The Court emphasized that the constitutional framework allows Congress to regulate the militia and that the Second Amendment should be interpreted to support this purpose.

The excerpt contrasts the concept of the Militia, which states were expected to maintain and train, with Troops that required Congressional approval for maintenance. The prevailing sentiment of the era was against standing armies, emphasizing that adequate national defense could be achieved through a Militia composed primarily of civilians who could be called to military service. Historical debates, colonial practices, and writings from notable commentators reveal that the Militia included all able-bodied males ready for collective defense, requiring them to bear arms they provided themselves. 

Notably, Blackstone's Commentaries highlight the establishment of a national militia by King Alfred, while Adam Smith's writings point out the republican aversion to standing armies, favoring a militia where civilian identities prevail over military roles. The historical context in New England's colonies mandated that adult males possess arms and participate in defense, with legislation requiring the supply of both arms and ammunition. Penalties for failing to comply were imposed. The Massachusetts laws specified the equipment for infantry, delineating roles for pikemen and musketeers, and outlined a structured Militia organization that included all able-bodied men aged sixteen to sixty, mandating that individuals equip themselves with firearms.

An Act enacted on April 4, 1786, by the New York Legislature mandates that all able-bodied male citizens aged 16 to 45, residing in the state, be enrolled in their local militia companies within four months. Enrolled citizens must procure, at their own expense, specified military equipment including a musket or firelock, bayonet, ammunition, and other supplies within three months of enrollment. Similarly, a Virginia law from October 1785 outlines that free males aged 18 to 50 must also be enrolled in militia companies and participate in bimonthly musters, equipped with specified arms and ammunition. Special provisions allow for the use of rifles in certain counties rather than muskets. The law emphasizes the necessity for militia members to maintain their arms and be ready for service. If a private is financially unable to acquire the required arms, a court may order them purchased from delinquent funds. While many states have adopted similar provisions regarding the right to bear arms, variations in language have led to different interpretations of this right. Ultimately, the court finds that the previous ruling is not supported by these provisions, and the judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. The legal framework established by the Act of June 26, 1934, defines the term 'firearm' to include shotguns and rifles with barrels under eighteen inches, concealable weapons (excluding pistols and revolvers), and machine guns, along with associated silencers. An amendment from April 10, 1936, excludes certain rifles from this definition if they have a caliber of .22 or smaller and a barrel of sixteen inches or longer.

The Act imposes a $200 tax on firearms transferred within the continental United States, payable by the transferor, and requires stamps to be affixed to the transfer order. Transfers must be accompanied by a written order from the buyer, which must include identification, including fingerprints and a photograph if the applicant is an individual. The transferor must provide the manufacturer's number or another identifying mark and send a copy of the order to the Commissioner.

Furthermore, any person transferring a firearm previously transferred after June 26, 1934, must comply with additional regulations to prove tax payment. Individuals possessing firearms must register them within sixty days of the Act's effective date, providing identifying details and their personal information. However, those acquiring firearms after this date and in compliance with the Act are exempt from registration. Lastly, it is unlawful for any person to receive or possess a firearm that has been transferred in violation of the Act's provisions.

It is unlawful for individuals required to register under section 1132d and those lacking a stamp-affixed order per section 1132c to ship, carry, or deliver firearms in interstate commerce. The Commissioner, with the Secretary's approval, is authorized to establish necessary rules and regulations for implementing sections 1132 to 1132q of this Act. Violations of these provisions can result in a fine of up to $2,000, imprisonment for up to five years, or both, at the court's discretion. If any part of sections 1132 to 1132q is deemed invalid, the remaining provisions and their applicability remain unaffected. This Act may be cited as the 'National Firearms Act.' Historical references to related cases and legal texts are also provided.