You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

United States v. Stewart

Citations: 595 F.3d 197; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3076; 2010 WL 546492Docket: 08-6575

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; February 17, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
Maurice Anthony Stewart was initially convicted in 2002 for conspiracy to possess cocaine base, receiving a 235-month sentence. This was later reduced by 48 months to 187 months due to his substantial assistance to the government. On February 20, 2008, Stewart filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to further reduce his sentence in accordance with Amendment 706, which adjusted cocaine base sentencing guidelines. The district court denied this request, stating that his current sentence was already one month below the new guidelines range. On appeal, Stewart contended that the court failed to consider his prior sentence reduction for cooperation when evaluating his motion. The Fourth Circuit agreed, stating that this prior reduction should have been factored into the decision, leading to a vacate and remand for further consideration. Stewart had originally pled guilty to conspiracy charges and received a sentence aligned with the low end of the guidelines, with the government later acknowledging his assistance in serious criminal cases.

The district court denied the defendant's motion to reduce his sentence of 187 months, which was originally imposed in response to a substantial assistance motion by the United States. The court's order stated that this sentence remains appropriate under the new guidelines. Following this decision, the defendant appealed after a timely motion for an extension to file the notice of appeal was granted. The appellate court reviews district court sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, particularly regarding reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows for sentence reductions based on an amended sentencing range issued by the Sentencing Commission.

A motion for reduction can be initiated by the defendant, the Bureau of Prisons director, or by the court itself. The district court can reduce a sentence only if the defendant's original sentence was based on a now-lowered guideline range and must consider relevant factors from section 3553(a). The decision to reduce a sentence is discretionary; the court is not obligated to do so even if the original sentence exceeds the amended guidelines range. 

The pertinent policy statement, section 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, instructs the court to determine the applicable amended guideline range for the defendant. If the amended range differs from the original sentence, a reduction is possible, but the court's action is not a full resentencing. The court must maintain all other guideline applications, such as enhancements or offense-level reductions. Generally, a court cannot impose a sentence below the amended guidelines range, except when the original sentence was below the guidelines range at the time of sentencing. An example illustrates that a reduction below the amended guidelines may be appropriate if it reflects a comparable reduction from the original below-guidelines sentence. Recent rulings support the district court's ability to reduce a sentence below amended guidelines when the original sentence was a result of a downward departure for substantial assistance to the government.

Reduction of a below-guidelines sentence is improper only if the original term of imprisonment was a non-guideline sentence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United States v. Booker. The key issue is defining the "original term of imprisonment" for motions seeking sentence reductions, particularly when a sentence has been amended via Rule 35 rather than through guideline departures. Rule 35 allows for sentence reduction based on substantial assistance provided by the defendant post-sentencing, and such motions are at the discretion of the district court.

Both the government and Stewart assert that "original sentence" refers to the sentence the defendant is serving at the time of filing a section 3582(c)(2) motion. They argue that since reductions under sections 5K1.1 and Rule 35 are not explicitly excluded in the guidelines, it implies that such reductions are permissible under the canon of expresio unius est exclusio alterius. The court agrees with this interpretation, noting that the guidelines do not require the "original sentence" to be the first sentence imposed. The intent behind allowing sentence reductions is to accommodate retroactive amendments to the guidelines and assess whether a defendant can benefit from such changes.

The guidelines outline specific instances where reductions are not allowed, focusing on non-guideline sentences based on Booker and section 3553(a) factors. The government has affirmed its interpretation of "original sentence," which is supported by the Department of Justice. Additionally, since Rule 35 reductions are not listed among the scenarios where reductions are prohibited, it suggests that such reductions fall within the district court's discretion.

The commentary on the guidelines recognizes situations where a defendant's current sentence is below the amended guidelines range as eligible for further reduction, indicating Congressional intent to allow reductions in these circumstances. Importantly, "original sentence" should not be limited to the initial sentence, especially in cases where that sentence has been vacated, as illustrated by procedural or substantive unreasonableness appeals.

A defendant who has been resentenced as a result of a government Rule 35 motion does not have the original unlawful sentence considered if they later file a motion under section 3582(c)(2). Instead, the district court must regard the sentence the defendant is currently serving as the "original sentence." In Stewart's case, his original sentence of 235 months is no longer valid following a Rule 35 motion that reduced it to 187 months. The court holds that defendants receiving a below-guidelines sentence via Rule 35 motions may seek further reductions under section 3582(c)(2), similar to those granted for departures at sentencing under section 5K1.1. Consistency in treatment of motions under these provisions is emphasized, as both involve substantial assistance to the government. Stewart, who received a 48-month reduction, is eligible for further consideration under the current cocaine base guidelines, which suggest a range of 235 to 188 months. The district court had previously denied his reduction motion without properly evaluating the current sentence as the 'original sentence.' Consequently, the court vacates the district court's decision and remands the case for reconsideration of Stewart’s motion in light of the earlier Rule 35 reduction.