United States v. Hawkins

Citations: 589 F.3d 694; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 27835; 2009 WL 4906678Docket: 08-4576

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; December 18, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Collin Hawkins was indicted on multiple charges, including carjacking and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to his trial, he requested to sever the carjacking counts from the firearm possession charge, arguing they were improperly joined. The district court denied this motion, and Hawkins was convicted on all counts by a jury.

Testimony from Reuben King, a cab driver, detailed events on November 22, 2006, when he was called to pick up a regular customer named Warren, along with Hawkins and an unidentified female. During the ride, King recognized Hawkins from prior neighborhood interactions. After several stops, the situation escalated when Hawkins brandished a .357 caliber revolver close to King's head, while Warren held a shotgun at King's back. They threatened King and stole two cell phones and approximately $400 in cash before pushing him out of the vehicle.

King later reported the incident to the police, identifying Hawkins as one of the assailants in a photo array. Subsequent police investigations linked Hawkins to another incident in the same area shortly thereafter. The appellate court affirmed part of the district court's judgment while vacating and remanding other aspects of the case.

Officers observed Hawkins at a convenience store, where he appeared to be armed. When approached, Hawkins resisted commands to show his hands and attempted to reach under his waistband, prompting officers to subdue him. A 9mm pistol was found in his waistband upon arrest. On March 7, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Hawkins on four counts: Count I for carjacking King’s vehicle (18 U.S.C. § 2119), Count II for possessing and brandishing a firearm during the carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)), Count III for unlawful possession of a firearm due to a prior felony conviction (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), and Count IV for another firearm possession charge related to a shotgun found in his home. Hawkins sought to sever Counts I and II from Counts III and IV, claiming improper joinder and potential prejudice from a combined trial. The district court denied these motions, citing the jury's ability to fairly evaluate the evidence. The government chose not to pursue Count IV, and Hawkins pleaded not guilty to the remaining counts, conceding his prior conviction and possession of the handgun related to Count III. During the trial, Hawkins sought to redact his admissions regarding his income from gambling and drug sales, arguing irrelevance and prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), but the court denied this request. Hawkins renewed his severance motion during the trial, which was also denied. An exhibit with Hawkins’ stipulations regarding Count III, including his prior felony and lack of pardon, was admitted as evidence.

The court addressed the relevance of Mr. Hawkins' potential drug dealing and presence in a vehicle on November 22, 2006, linking it to the charges against him. The court concluded that if Mr. Hawkins was indeed selling drugs, it supports the likelihood that he was in the vehicle, making his potential guilt stronger. The district court emphasized the probative value of Hawkins' admission about selling drugs, asserting that this information was crucial to the case and outweighed any claims of undue prejudice.

Hawkins objected to another statement made during his police interview regarding a stolen 9 millimeter pistol, arguing it was irrelevant since he admitted to possessing the gun and claimed it belonged to a friend. The court disagreed, suggesting that his willingness to steal from his cousin indicated a propensity to commit other thefts, thereby making the statement relevant. Hawkins' defense counsel argued that this characterization painted him as a "bad guy," but the court denied the request to redact the statement from the evidence presented to the jury.

During the trial, Hawkins testified to deny his involvement in the carjacking, and his attorney sought to highlight inconsistencies in testimony from other witnesses. The prosecution referenced Hawkins' admission about the stolen gun in their closing arguments, reinforcing the narrative of his criminal behavior.

Hawkins admitted guilt regarding the felon-in-possession charge, but the Government asserted this was a tactical admission, highlighting a prior robbery of his cousin involving a gun. Hawkins moved for a mistrial, claiming the Government's argument improperly suggested he committed carjacking due to this robbery, but the district court denied the motion. During rebuttal, the Government reiterated Hawkins' admission about the gun theft, prompting another mistrial motion from Hawkins based on the violation of Rule 404(b) concerning propensity evidence, which the court again denied. The jury ultimately found Hawkins guilty on all counts, resulting in a 360-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Hawkins appealed, raising two main issues: the district court's denial of his motion to sever Counts I and II from Count III, arguing improper joinder under Rule 8, and, alternatively, that the joinder was unduly prejudicial under Rule 14. He also contested the admission of statements made during his post-arrest interview. The appellate court will review the joinder's legality de novo, while any misjoinder will be assessed for harmlessness, with the Government required to prove no actual prejudice resulted. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) allows for broad joinder of offenses that are similar in character or part of a common scheme, emphasizing judicial efficiency by reducing redundant testimony and juror requirements.

Joinder of offenses is generally favored for efficiency in trials, as established in United States v. Mir and supported by other cases. However, Rule 8(a) has limitations and cannot apply to offenses that are discrete and dissimilar, as noted in Mackins. Joinder of unrelated charges risks convictions based on irrelevant factors rather than the evidence of the offenses themselves. In this case, the Government argues that the carjacking counts and possession of a firearm by a felon (Count III) are of the same or similar character. The Government failed to establish a connection between the charges as stemming from the same act or part of a common scheme; thus, the critical issue is whether Counts I and II share similar characteristics with Count III.

While Hawkins acknowledges that Counts I and II pertain to the same carjacking incident, he contends that Count III is unrelated, occurring 17 days later and involving a different firearm. The Government argues for joinder based on the offenses being firearms-related and occurring within three weeks. However, prior cases cited do not support the Government's position in this instance, as the charges lack a sufficient nexus to justify their joinder under the same or similar character standard.

Joinder of drug charges related to a cocaine distribution ring and alien smuggling charges was deemed proper in *Cole*, where smuggled aliens participated in drug distribution upon arrival, creating a strong connection between the offenses. The court emphasized that this connection was more than minimal; the drug profits financed the smuggling operation and further drug profits were generated through the aliens’ involvement. In contrast, the current case lacks a similar logical connection between the alleged carjacking and firearm possession incidents, which occurred weeks apart and involved different firearms. The Government's reliance on *Rousseau* is misplaced, as that case involved two counts of the same statute despite the time gap and different firearms, whereas Hawkins faces three distinct charges without a cohesive link. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in *Holloway* supports the notion that joinder was improper in similar circumstances, where the offenses were not sufficiently connected.

The Fifth Circuit determined that the indictment lacked any indication of a connection between the defendant's possession of a weapon and the alleged robbery conspiracy. There were no allegations that the defendant planned to use the weapon during a robbery, used it, or that it was connected to any robbery. Consequently, the joinder of the robbery charges and the unrelated felon-in-possession charge was deemed improper under Rule 8, as the prosecution seemed to include the weapons charge to present potentially inadmissible evidence of the defendant's felon status. The government did not argue that the weapon was used in the robberies, and the arrest occurred nearly two months post-robbery, failing to establish a connection between the charges.

In a similar vein, the case against Hawkins was found unconvincing, as the only link between the carjacking counts and the felon-in-possession charge was the defendant himself, which is insufficient for joinder. The indictment did not allege a connection between the carjacking charges and the unrelated arrest for possession, nor did trial testimony provide a basis for joining the counts as offenses of the same or similar character. Despite all offenses involving firearms, the connection was solely the defendant, with no additional factors indicating they were identical or strikingly similar. The government’s argument based on the temporal proximity of the offenses was rejected, as previous rulings indicated that mere temporal relationships do not justify joinder.

The court concluded that the district court erred in allowing the joinder of the counts, necessitating an evaluation of whether this misjoinder required reversal. Misjoinder affects substantial rights and requires reversal only if it results in actual prejudice affecting the jury's verdict. Factors to assess this include the strength of the evidence of guilt, steps taken to mitigate the error's effects, and the admissibility of the improperly admitted evidence on the other counts.

Hawkins contends that if separate trials had occurred for Counts I, II, and III, evidence from one trial would not have been admissible in the others, arguing that the jury's exposure to evidence regarding his prior felony conviction and gun possession prejudiced the outcome of the carjacking case. Specifically, he claims that the inclusion of this evidence increased the likelihood of conviction across all counts. The Government counters that Hawkins experienced no undue prejudice due to the overwhelming evidence of his guilt and that the evidence from Count III was mutually admissible under Rule 404(b). Moreover, the Government asserts that the district court took measures to mitigate any potential spillover effects, including providing a limiting instruction to the jury.

However, it is concluded that the misjoinder of charges adversely impacted Hawkins’ rights and had a significant effect on the jury's verdict. The district court instructed the jury to consider each count separately and limited the jury's consideration of the prior conviction only to its existence, not its implications. Despite these instructions, the evidence related to Count III was deemed only marginally relevant to Counts I and II, and a proper analysis under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b) indicated that the potential for unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value. The ruling highlights that evidence of "other crimes" that solely demonstrates criminal disposition is generally inadmissible.

Had Count III been tried separately from Counts I and II, Hawkins' status as a felon and the possession of the 9mm gun would likely not have been presented to the jury, nor would the fact that he had stolen the gun from his cousin have been admissible in a separate trial for carjacking. The district court’s remarks during Hawkins' motion to exclude the stolen gun admission indicated that linking his willingness to steal the gun to a generalized propensity for theft could unfairly influence the jury's perception. This exchange highlighted concerns about the prejudicial impact of introducing unrelated bad conduct in the context of other charges. The court referenced previous cases, noting that failing to sever the felon-in-possession count from the robbery counts unfairly painted the defendant as a dangerous person, potentially swaying the jury's verdict. Unlike other cases where overwhelming evidence supported convictions across misjoined counts, the evidence against Hawkins for the carjacking charges was not compelling. The only testimony against him came from a single witness, King, whose account contained multiple inconsistencies raised by Hawkins' counsel during the trial.

King's accounts regarding his relationship with Hawkins, descriptions of clothing, and statements during the carjacking were inconsistent across his statements to prosecutors, grand jury testimony, and trial testimony. The Government's evidence primarily relied on King’s testimony, with no additional corroborating evidence to support Hawkins' guilt on Counts I and II. The firearms purportedly used in the carjacking were never recovered, and Hawkins' alleged accomplices were also untraceable. The case against Hawkins hinged on King's claims and Hawkins' denial of involvement, leading to concerns that the jury may have convicted him based on the overall context rather than solid evidence. The misjoinder of charges was significant, as it likely influenced the jury's decision due to prejudicial evidence from Count III affecting Counts I and II. Consequently, Hawkins' convictions for Counts I and II were vacated, while his conviction for Count III as a felon in possession of a firearm was affirmed, but his sentence on that count was vacated for retrial on Counts I and II and resentencing on Count III. Additionally, Hawkins’ request for a jury instruction on reasonable doubt was denied, which was found to be appropriate since the jury did not specifically ask for such clarification.

The court affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands the convictions of Hawkins on Counts I and II due to joinder error. Judge Motz expresses concern that the circuit's interpretation of Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 may have contributed to this error. The circuit has historically allowed the admission of prior bad acts evidence, even when such evidence could imply criminal propensity. Under Rule 404(b), only evidence that solely proves criminal disposition is excluded, while Rule 403 permits exclusion of prejudicial evidence only in rare cases where the jury's emotional response may be irrational and disproportionate to the evidence's probative value. This standard has led to the consistent admission of highly prejudicial evidence in various cases, suggesting that a district judge, focused on judicial efficiency, might mistakenly allow joinder if evidence from one count seems to indicate a likelihood of committing another charge. However, as emphasized by the majority opinion, the law does not allow such joinder.