Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 17, 1938; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Senate Bill 713, passed by both Houses of Congress, was presented to the President on April 24, 1936. The President returned the bill with objections on May 5, 1936. The Senate, which had recessed until May 7, 1936, was informed of the bill's return upon reconvening, but no further action was taken. The bill aimed to grant jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to rehear the petitioner’s claim against the United States. When the petitioner subsequently filed a claim, the Government contended that the bill had not become law, leading the Court of Claims to deny the petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to the significance of the issue.
The court examined Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which outlines the legislative process, including presidential approval and the conditions under which a bill becomes law. A key question was whether Congress' adjournment prevented the bill's return by the President within the ten-day window. The Court clarified that only the Senate was in recess; thus, Congress had not adjourned. The Constitution defines "the Congress" as comprising both the Senate and the House of Representatives, establishing that the Senate alone cannot constitute "the Congress." Therefore, the Court concluded that the bill did not become law due to the lack of necessary action following its return from the President.
The concluding clause specifically references the adjournment of "the Congress," indicating that it pertains to both Houses collectively, not to an individual House. This choice of terms was deliberate, and the Constitution does not use "the Congress" to refer to a single House. Such a distinction is critical to constitutional interpretation, as emphasized by Chief Justice Taney, who stated that every word in the Constitution is intentionally chosen and carries significant meaning.
The argument regarding the use of the plural "their" in "the Congress by their adjournment" is deemed irrelevant; the plural is appropriate when referencing the combined legislative body. The phrasing of the clause is clear and unambiguous, requiring no judicial reinterpretation.
The counterargument posits that a bill cannot be returned to a House in recess, suggesting a need for a rephrasing of the clause. However, this premise is considered flawed, as a short recess does not equate to an adjournment of Congress, and the session remains ongoing. The Senate's recess from May 4 to May 7 did not violate any constitutional requirements regarding bill returns, and the return process was effectively managed even during the recess, affirming that the Senate's organization and operations were intact.
The Secretary of the Senate was operational and successfully received a bill. According to the Constitution, the Senate must reconvene within three days to promptly address the President's objections. It is established practice to present bills to the President via messenger, even during his temporary absence, which parallels the return of bills by the President when the originating House is in recess.
Arguing against the notion that the President cannot return a bill if the originating House is not in session, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, as amicus curiae in the Pocket Veto Case, highlighted that the Constitution does not impose such restrictions. He noted that allowing bills to be received through an appropriate agent, even in the absence of the House, is essential to avoid unnecessary delays. Sumners questioned the rationale of requiring both the President and the House to be in session simultaneously for the return of bills, suggesting that it would undermine the legislative process and could lead to a bill's unintended demise. He emphasized that the Houses of Congress have capable officers who can act on their behalf, and nothing in the Constitution prohibits using such agents for the return of bills objected to by the President.
Constructive delivery is essential to ensure legislative efficiency, limit presidential power, and prevent Congress from enacting bills without reconsideration. An adjournment of one House for three days without the other House's consent does not constitute a full adjournment of Congress. In cases where the Senate is in executive session on significant matters, it remains in session, and the President's messenger can deliver bills to the Secretary of the Senate if direct delivery is impossible. An example illustrates this: the President delivered a bill to the Secretary of the Senate during the Senate's recess, and the bill was later presented to the Senate upon its return.
The excerpt critiques the Pocket Veto Case, arguing that its reasoning does not apply here, as it dealt with a full adjournment rather than a temporary recess. The Court's decision in that case did not address situations where only one House is in recess during a legislative session. Chief Justice Marshall’s principle regarding the relevance of judicial expressions to specific cases is emphasized, asserting that broader interpretations should not control future judgments when a distinct issue arises. The Pocket Veto Case indicated that bills must be returned to a House that is in session, as opposed to one that is not collectively assembled.
The text clarifies the interpretation of the President's obligation regarding the return of bills during congressional recesses. It argues against a narrow view that would require the President to time the return of bills precisely when Congress is in session, stating that such a requirement would undermine the constitutional intent for timely legislative action. The excerpt references the Pocket Veto Case, highlighting the Court's concern over the potential issues caused by delivering bills to unauthorized individuals during adjournments. It emphasizes that during temporary recesses, the legislative process remains operational, minimizing risks of delayed action or uncertainty regarding bill status. The text asserts that brief recesses do not disrupt the functioning of Congress and that the public's awareness of bill returns remains intact. Finally, it identifies two key constitutional purposes: allowing the President to consider bills appropriately and enabling Congress to address any presidential objections effectively.
In Edwards v. United States, the court addresses the relationship between the President's approval of bills and Congress's adjournment. The ruling emphasizes that the President has the authority to approve bills within a designated timeframe, even if Congress is adjourned, as established in previous cases. The Constitution's Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2, safeguards the President's ability to return disapproved bills; if he does not return a bill due to Congress's adjournment, it cannot become law. The court notes the importance of allowing Congress to consider the President's objections to legislation. If the President's ability to return a bill is hindered by a temporary recess, it creates a potential scenario where a bill could become law despite presidential disapproval, which raises technical complications. The court dismisses reliance on past precedents as insufficient for resolving the current issue, advocating for a clear interpretation of constitutional principles rather than engaging in speculative scenarios regarding Congress's adjournment practices.
A bill does not become law if the President returns it with objections and Congress does not override the veto within the prescribed ten days, provided Congress is in session and the originating House is in recess for no more than three days. The President's return of the bill was proper, allowing for congressional reconsideration, thus preventing the bill from becoming law. The judgment is affirmed. Justice Cardozo did not participate in the decision. Justice Stone partially dissents, agreeing that the bill did not become law, but arguing that the Senate's adjournment prevented the bill's return as required by the Constitution. He critiques the majority's interpretation of the veto provisions, asserting that clarity and certainty in their application are critical. Stone references the precedent set in The Pocket Veto Case, emphasizing that the House receiving a bill must be in session. He notes that no authority has been established for Senate officers to receive bills from the President, and historically, both Houses have only acted on such returns when in session. The Secretary of the Senate's role does not include receiving bills returned by the President, as established by Senate rules and past practices, which have explicitly denied such authority.
The Senate and House of Representatives have not exercised any constitutional power to designate an officer to receive bills returned by the President, as the Constitution specifies that bills must be returned to the originating House without designating an individual to act on its behalf. Delivering a bill to the Secretary of the Senate during adjournment does not fulfill this constitutional requirement, nor does it differ from giving it to any other unofficial person who might bring it to the Senate's attention later. The court's ruling raises doubts, particularly regarding the distinction in handling bills during short versus long adjournments between the two Houses. The current decision seems to conflict with prior rulings, such as in The Pocket Veto Case, where the Senate's adjournment prevented the return of a bill. The argument that the Secretary has different authority depending on the length of adjournment lacks constitutional, legal, or logical support, suggesting that the Secretary cannot receive bills on behalf of the Senate simply due to their title.
The excerpt examines the implications of the President's ability to return a bill to the Senate after adjournment, referencing The Pocket Veto Case. It argues that if the Secretary of the Senate had the authority to receive a bill post-adjournment, the President's failure to sign or return it would allow the bill to become law, similar to other bills previously deemed inactive. The author suggests that should the court have erred in its interpretation, it should be overruled to ensure clarity in constitutional procedures, which is crucial in this area of law.
If the President is assumed to have been unable to return the bill due to adjournment, the critical issue arises whether the President loses veto power merely because of adjournment. The framers of the Constitution aimed to protect the veto power, knowing the originating House might have motives to avoid a veto. They mandated public delivery of bills to ensure accountability and recognized adjournment could prevent returns, thus stipulating that bills would not become law in such cases.
The text warns against the potential for an originating House to manipulate the veto process through adjournment, suggesting that granting authority to receive returned bills to a secretary does not eliminate the risk. It concludes that allowing such interpretations could undermine the veto power, enabling a House to curtail or eliminate the exercise of that power simply through adjournment.
The Court underscores the significance of the presidential veto power as enshrined in the Constitution, emphasizing that it should not be diminished or constrained, particularly regarding the ten-day period for its exercise. The only adjournment that can hinder the return of a vetoed bill is that of the originating House; the adjournment of the other House does not affect this process. The framers of the Constitution were primarily concerned with the adjournment of the originating House, and there is no indication that they intended to leave the President powerless regarding the veto due to the adjournment of the non-originating House.
Additionally, the interpretation of the Constitution is distinct from that of municipal codes or penal statutes. Its provisions should be understood as part of an interconnected framework that reflects the overall purpose of the document. The Court has consistently rejected a literal interpretation that undermines the evident intent of the Constitution, noting that terms like "due process" and "contract" have evolved beyond their strict definitions. The principle of not compelling a person to be a witness against themselves and the understanding of "from whatever source derived" have also been interpreted with broader meanings than their literal wording suggests.
The excerpt examines the interpretation of the term "Adjournment" in the context of Congress and the President's veto power. It argues against a strictly grammatical interpretation of the phrase "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return," suggesting that it should encompass adjournment by either or both Houses of Congress. The text emphasizes that the framers' intent was to allow for any congressional action that effectively prevents the President from returning a bill, not just the adjournment of a single House. The analogy is drawn to the constitutional requirement for journals, which recognizes the authority of the majority of members to make decisions. The opinion stresses that both clauses in question—regarding adjournment and journal publication—should be understood in light of their purpose, ensuring that the veto power is protected against any adjournment that obstructs bill return. Justice Brandeis concurs with this interpretation. Additionally, the excerpt includes a communication from the Senate regarding the presentation of enrolled bills to the President and a subsequent recess of the Senate.
The excerpt outlines the procedures and implications concerning the President's veto of bills when Congress is not in session, referencing the Constitution's requirements for bill presentation and vetoes. It highlights that when the Senate was not in session on the last day for the President to return bills, the Secretary of the Senate, Edwin A. Halsey, accepted the veto messages to allow the Senate the opportunity to reconsider them. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 2 of the Constitution mandates that a bill must be presented to the President, who can either sign it or return it with objections. If the President does not return a bill within ten days, it becomes law unless Congress adjourns, preventing its return.
The document cites historical instances, such as President Cleveland's 1888 attempt to return a bill during adjournment, which was rejected by Senate officers, establishing that delivery of veto messages is only valid when the Senate is in session. A failed 1868 bill attempted to allow for the return of a bill to a non-sitting House but faced strong opposition. The excerpt further notes that the Senate has conferred authority for bill reception through formal resolutions and rules, indicating that such powers are not implicitly granted.
Additionally, a 1927 memorandum from the Attorney General lists over 400 bills submitted to the President shortly before Congress adjourned, none of which became law due to lack of signature or disapproval. Since then, numerous bills have been pocketed without action by either House, demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement regarding these bills. This information is supported by references to the Pocket Veto Case and various congressional records.
