Hashmel C. Turner, Jr. appealed against the City Council of Fredericksburg, Virginia, and Mayor Thomas J. Tomzak, claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights due to a 2005 policy mandating nondenominational legislative prayers. The Fourth Circuit Court, with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor writing the opinion, affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Council. The court determined that the prayers constituted government speech, thus the nondenominational requirement did not infringe upon Turner’s Free Speech or Free Exercise rights, nor did it breach the Establishment Clause.
Prior to the policy change, Council members, including Turner, could offer sectarian prayers. Turner, an ordained minister, typically concluded his prayers in Jesus Christ’s name. After the ACLU threatened legal action over sectarian prayers, the City Attorney recommended adopting a nondenominational prayer policy to mitigate legal risks. Turner abstained from voting on this policy and, when his turn to pray arose, he insisted on closing his prayer in Jesus Christ’s name. The Mayor then bypassed Turner, allowing another member to pray instead, prompting Turner to file suit. The court's ruling upheld the Council's approach as constitutional.
Determining whether the legislative prayer in question is government speech or private speech involves applying a four-factor test established by the Fourth Circuit. The factors include: (1) the central purpose of the program, (2) the degree of editorial control by the government, (3) the identity of the literal speaker, and (4) who bears ultimate responsibility for the content. In this case, the prayer is deemed governmental speech due to its official presence in Council meetings, its agenda listing, and its role in facilitating government business. The Mayor calls on the speaker, and the prayers are focused on seeking guidance for governmental decision-making.
The Council exerts editorial control by prohibiting sectarian prayers, and while Council members, like Turner, deliver the prayers, they do so in their official capacity. The primary debate centers around who has ultimate responsibility for the prayer's content. Despite Turner’s personal responsibility for earlier prayers, the context of the prayers as part of official meetings leads to the conclusion that they reflect government speech, supported by precedent that classifies similar situations as governmental.
Turner argues that under the Establishment Clause, the government cannot dictate prayer content, referencing Lee v. Weisman, which prohibits government-composed prayers. He contends that mandating nonsectarian prayers also violates this principle.
Turner's argument is flawed as it fails to address the core issue regarding the legitimacy of the school's attempt to conduct a nonsectarian prayer at a graduation ceremony, which aims to eliminate sectarianism that can lead to religious animosity. The Establishment Clause does not prohibit schools from requiring nonsectarian prayers, but it does prevent compelling students to participate in religious exercises at school events. The Supreme Court distinguishes between legislative prayers, which have been accepted as part of societal norms, and school prayers. In previous cases, such as Marsh v. Chambers, legislative prayers were deemed constitutional as they do not promote a specific religion and acknowledge widely held beliefs. The Council's policy of employing nonsectarian prayers at legislative meetings aligns with established legal precedents, including Marsh and Simpson, as it aims to be inclusive rather than exclusive. Furthermore, the issue of whether the prayer policy violates Free Exercise and First Amendment rights hinges on the characterization of the invocation as government speech, which is not intended for personal religious expression. Turner was not compelled to pray in conflict with his beliefs; he retains the freedom to express his faith outside of government settings. Thus, the district court's decision is upheld.
