Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 18, 1931; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the Court's opinion regarding the conviction of the appellant, who was found guilty in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, California, for violating Penal Code § 403-a. This statute criminalizes the display of flags or symbols that oppose organized government or promote anarchistic actions. The appellant was charged with willfully displaying a red flag and banner in a public setting as a sign of opposition to government and as an invitation to anarchistic action. Although there was a conspiracy charge, it was not considered as the conviction on that count was overturned by the state court.
The appellant, a nineteen-year-old woman and member of the Young Communist League, served as a supervisor at a summer camp for children, where she taught lessons on history, economics, and class consciousness. The camp included a daily ceremony where children raised a camp-made red flag resembling the Soviet flag, saluted it, and recited a pledge to the working class's freedom. The camp maintained a library with radical communist literature that incited violence and armed uprising, which the appellant acknowledged owning. Following her conviction and the denial of motions for a new trial, the California District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. A petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court of California was denied, prompting an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which allowed the appellant to proceed in forma pauperis and accepted a stipulation of facts agreed upon by both parties.
None of the books or pamphlets at the camp were utilized in teaching. The appellant testified that no literature, particularly any containing radical communist propaganda, was presented to children, and her teaching did not involve language related to violence, anarchism, or sedition, with no evidence to contradict her claims. The charges concerning the flag's display were initially presented conjunctively but were treated disjunctively during jury instructions, allowing for conviction if the flag was displayed for any of the three prohibited purposes outlined in the statute. The jury was instructed that proof of the flag's display for any one or more of these purposes sufficed for a guilty verdict. The appellant accepted the jury instruction without contesting its correctness but maintained her challenge against the statute's constitutionality, which the appellate court ultimately rejected. In the District Court of Appeal, two out of three justices affirmed the appellant's conviction on the first count, while dissent arose only regarding the second count related to conspiracy, which is not relevant to this case.
The appellant argued that the statute in question was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment due to its undue restriction on free speech. The trial court's interpretation of the statute's three purposes was accepted by the appellant, suggesting her challenge was not only against the statute as a whole but also against each of the three clauses individually used by the State for conviction. The two concurring justices noted that the appellant specifically focused her argument on the clause concerning opposition to organized government. They acknowledged that if this clause were the sole basis for her conviction, they might align with her viewpoint. The term "opposition" was defined broadly, allowing for interpretations that include both peaceful dissent against governmental authority and lawful political opposition. The justices recognized that change and progress often stem from such opposition, which is constitutionally protected as long as it remains within legal bounds.
Regarding the second clause of the statute, which addresses displays of flags as invitations to anarchistic action, the justices cited established definitions indicating that such actions refer to violent and unlawful efforts to overthrow the government. They concluded that the statute's prohibition against using a red flag in this context relates to well-defined legal concepts of revolution. Furthermore, the justices provided their interpretation of the third clause concerning the display of flags in support of seditious propaganda, indicating that this too falls under scrutiny for potential violation of constitutional protections.
Two legal opinions address the interpretation of a specific clause related to sedition laws. One opinion acknowledges that sedition laws prohibiting the use of force or violence are upheld by courts, with sedition defined as inciting disorder that could lead to treason without an overt act. Advocacy for violent governmental overthrow fits this definition. The second opinion similarly interprets the local statute as concerning advocacy of force or violence against the government but does not delve into the historical debates surrounding sedition laws or the broadness of the statute without judicial limits.
The state court, questioning the constitutionality of the first clause, based its decision on the remaining clauses. It concluded that the phrase opposing organized government could be removed without altering the statute's intent, allowing the other clauses to stand as constitutional. However, the court could not agree with this resolution because the jury's general verdict did not specify which clause supported the conviction. Since the jury was instructed they could convict based on any clause, it was unclear if the conviction was under an invalid clause. Notably, the prosecution emphasized the first clause during the trial, complicating the determination of the validity of the conviction.
This leads to an examination of whether any clause, as interpreted by the state court, violates the Federal Constitution, particularly regarding free speech protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. While free speech is not absolute, the state can penalize speech that incites violence or threatens the government’s stability through unlawful means.
Constitutional immunity does not protect conduct that is fundamentally opposed to institutional values. The validity of the second and third clauses of the statute, concerning incitements to violence, is affirmed based on state court interpretation. However, the focus is on the first clause regarding the display of a flag as an emblem against organized government. The state court acknowledged the clause's vagueness, indicating it could encompass peaceful political opposition, which the state cannot constitutionally prohibit. The opportunity for free political discourse is essential for a responsive government and is a core principle of the constitutional framework. A statute that allows punishment for lawful political expression violates the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee. Consequently, the first clause is deemed invalid, leading to the reversal of the appellant's conviction, which likely relied solely on that clause. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while the validity of the second and third clauses remains unaddressed for this case. Judgment is reversed.
