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The Pocket Veto Case
Citations: 279 U.S. 655; 49 S. Ct. 463; 73 L. Ed. 894; 1929 U.S. LEXIS 364; 64 A.L.R. 1434Docket: 565
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 27, 1929; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves the interpretation of Article 1, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution regarding the legislative process and the President's role in signing bills. Specifically, it addresses whether a bill that is passed by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President within ten days before adjournment, but not signed or returned by him, automatically becomes law. Senate Bill No. 3185, which authorized certain Indian tribes in Washington to present claims to the Court of Claims, was passed and presented to the President on June 24, 1926. The Congress adjourned on July 3, 1926, and the President did not sign or return the bill by July 6, the tenth day post-presentation. The Indian tribes asserted that the bill became law without the President's signature and filed a petition in the Court of Claims in March 1927. However, the United States government demurred, and the court dismissed the petition, ruling that the bill had not become law under the Constitution. Due to the significance of the constitutional question, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and allowed Mr. Sumners, from the House Judiciary Committee, to participate as amicus curiae. The Constitution's relevant clause outlines the process for a bill becoming law and specifies the conditions under which a bill may not be enacted if not returned by the President before Congress adjourns. The central issue is whether Congress's adjournment on July 3 prevented the President from returning a bill within the ten-day period prescribed by law. If the adjournment did not hinder the President, the bill would automatically become law without his signature; if it did, the bill would not become law. Counsel for the petitioners argue that only a final adjournment terminating Congress's legislative existence prevents the President from returning a bill. They assert that during the first session's adjournment, the President can return the bill to the originating House’s agent, allowing for legislative reconsideration when Congress resumes. They also contend that the "ten days" should be interpreted as "legislative days," meaning only days when Congress is in session, thus extending the return period until Congress reconvenes. Conversely, the Attorney General argues that "adjournment" includes interim adjournments and that "ten days" refers to calendar days. He maintains that the President must return the bill while the House is in session; if the House is not in session on the last day of the return period due to adjournment, the President is effectively prevented from returning the bill. This interpretation aligns with established practice and historical acquiescence by Congress. The excerpt notes that the Constitutional Convention’s discussions provide no clarity on this issue, and existing state court decisions on similar provisions are inconsistent and unhelpful for resolving the matter at hand. Only a few relevant cases will be cited for their persuasive reasoning. Counsel for the petitioners and amicus curiae argue that the President's qualified veto requires him to return a disapproved bill with objections, allowing Congress to reconsider it. They contend that the provision for returning the bill within a specified time should prevent a silent "pocket veto," which would deny Congress the chance to respond to the President's concerns. This view misinterprets the reciprocal obligations of the President and Congress, particularly regarding what occurs when Congress is adjourned, which prevents timely return of bills. The term "pocket veto" is misleading, suggesting that the President's inaction is a deliberate attempt to block legislation. The Constitution grants the President a qualified veto, obligating him to either sign or return bills with objections, thus allowing Congress to reconsider. This duty necessitates sufficient time for the President to review and deliberate on a bill before making a decision. The time allowed for this process cannot be reduced by Congress, as it is essential for preventing hasty legislation and ensuring thorough consideration of the President's objections. When Congress adjourns before the President has had the full time allowed by the Constitution to consider and act on bills, it can hinder his ability to approve or disapprove them. Consequently, if a bill fails to become law due to this adjournment, the failure is attributed to Congress, not the President, as he would have returned the bill if given sufficient time. This principle was affirmed in La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, stating that if Congress's actions prevent the President from returning a bill within the constitutional timeframe, the bill does not become law. Moreover, the interpretation of "within ten Days (Sundays excepted)" as "legislative days" is rejected. The Constitution's wording should be understood in its natural sense, meaning calendar days, as supported by historical usage and the absence of any indication suggesting a different interpretation. No precedent exists that suggests the President has ten "legislative days" for bill consideration. Lastly, the term "adjournment" in the constitutional context is not limited to the final adjournment of Congress. The text and structure of the Constitution indicate that "adjournment" can refer to any adjournment, not just the final one. This is supported by various provisions within Article 1 that discuss adjournment procedures. The constitutional provision regarding an "adjournment" raises the crucial question of whether such an adjournment prevents the President from returning a bill to the originating House within the designated timeframe. It is established that a final adjournment does prevent the President from returning a bill, as it ends the legislative existence of Congress. The key issue is whether an interim adjournment, specifically at the end of the first session, similarly impedes the President's ability to return a bill if the House is not in session on the last day of the return period. The Attorney General argues that the bill must be returned to the House while it is in session, whereas petitioners' counsel contends it can be returned to an officer of the House when not in session, to be held until the House reconvenes. Clause 2 of the relevant provision mandates that if the President disapproves a bill, he must return it with objections to the originating House, which must then enter those objections in their journal and reconsider the bill. The interpretation of "House" within this clause indicates it refers to the House that is in session. The court previously ruled that the requirement for a two-thirds vote to override a presidential veto pertains to a quorum of each House, reinforcing that legislative actions are valid only when the House is organized and capable of exercising its legislative powers. This interpretation aligns with historical practices that define a "House" as a quorum of members present, necessary for conducting legislative business, including reconsidering vetoed bills. The bill must be returned to the same House in an organized capacity for it to enter the President's objections on its journal and to proceed with reconsideration. A return cannot occur when the House is not in session as a collective body. This interpretation aligns with the constitutional language referring to a quorum capable of conducting business, as noted in Curtis' Constitutional History. The established practice of Congress supports that messages from the President are received when the Houses are in session. There is no valid basis for the argument that a bill could be returned to an officer or agent of the House during adjournment for later delivery to the House. No statute or rule allows such a procedure, and any attempt to do so would not fulfill the constitutional requirement. The Constitution does not provide for a nunc pro tunc record of a bill's return, and allowing the President to deliver the bill to an unauthorized individual would create uncertainty regarding the timing and status of the bill, undermining the intended promptness of legislative reconsideration. The constitutional provision mandates a timely return of a bill to the House, ensuring that this action is officially recorded in the House journal, thereby providing public and immediate knowledge of the bill's status and allowing Congress to reconsider it promptly. The return must occur publicly to the House as an organized entity, not to an individual, to prevent retroactive claims after the return period has expired. Attorney General Devens asserted that for the President to return a bill, both Houses must be in session. If Congress adjourns and the President cannot return the bill with his objections, the bill cannot become law unless ten days pass, during which the President has the opportunity to return it. Historically, only one attempt was made to allow the President to return a bill when the originating House was not in session, which failed in 1868 due to constitutional concerns, despite passing the Senate. This proposal would have allowed the President to return a bill to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House, but it was never reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. The interpretation of the constitutional provision is further supported by long-standing practices observed by Presidents, which Congress has accepted over the years. This established practice carries significant weight in interpreting constitutional language that may be ambiguous. A memorandum from the Attorney General, sent to Congress in December 1928, details an extensive review of governmental archives regarding the interpretation of the constitutional provision related to "pocket vetoes." This document, deemed accurate, references over 400 congressional bills and resolutions submitted to the President within ten days of Congress's adjournment, none of which were signed or disapproved. Among these, 119 instances involved adjournments at the end of a session, rather than final adjournments, and none were enacted into law or enforced until the current suit was initiated. The majority of these instances occurred under various presidential administrations, with a classification of the bills including private relief, pension, and obsolete purpose bills. Notably, there was no official challenge to the President's inaction on these bills from either House of Congress until 1927; instead, new bills were often introduced. This historical context indicates that from President Madison's time up to 1927, Presidents consistently interpreted the constitutional provision to mean they could not return bills due to congressional adjournment, a view that Congress acquiesced to until then. Consequently, it was concluded that the adjournment of the first session of the 69th Congress on July 3, 1926, prevented the President from returning Senate Bill No. 3185 within the required ten-day period, and thus, it did not become law. The Court of Claims' judgment is affirmed. The House of Representatives adjourned sine die, while the Senate adjourned to November 10, aligning with its prior schedule for impeachment proceedings. The July 3 adjournment is acknowledged as concluding the first session of Congress. The document references Article I, Section 4, Clause 2 of the Constitution, affirming that any Order, Resolution, or Vote requiring both Houses' concurrence (except adjournment) needs the President's approval or a two-thirds majority to override a veto. Historical cases are cited to illustrate the Constitution's intent to prevent hasty legislation by empowering the governor to review bills thoroughly. Congress may reintroduce and pass bills in subsequent sessions after presidential review. A 1927 Judiciary Committee report suggested that the constitutional "adjournment" refers to final adjournment rather than interim. Each House must maintain a journal of its proceedings, as mandated by the Constitution. Constitutional objections were raised regarding a provision that would allow the President to return a bill to an officer of either the Senate or House when Congress is not in session. Senator Davis articulated that the Constitution mandates the President to return a bill with objections to the originating House, emphasizing that this provision undermines that requirement by allowing a return to an officer rather than to the House itself. He asserted that a House is not in session when it is not convened, and thus the President’s duty is to communicate directly with an active legislature, not with a ministerial officer. Davis highlighted the established practice since the government's inception, noting that no President has filed messages with clerks or secretaries, but rather has always communicated directly with the Houses while they are in session. He argued that the constitutional intent is for immediate congressional action on the President's objections, which requires the House to be in session, thereby reinforcing the notion that the provision in question is unconstitutional. The language of the Constitution requires that a bill be returned to the originating House, not merely filed with a Secretary or Clerk when the House is not in session. Senator Buckalew argued that the Secretary cannot properly maintain a Journal of Senate proceedings without the Senate being in session, as the Journal should record actions taken by the Senate itself. The Constitution mandates that the receipt of a presidential message, including objections to a bill, must occur during an actual session of the Senate, emphasizing that such responsibilities cannot be delegated to any officer or citizen. Historical practice confirms that if both Houses adjourn before ten days have elapsed following a bill's presentation to the President, the bill fails. The bill under discussion proposes allowing the return of a bill to a Secretary rather than the originating House, which contradicts established procedure and common sense. Senators argue that treating the Secretary or Clerk as equivalent to the Senate or House undermines the constitutional process, as it blurs the lines of accountability and proper procedure in legislative actions. Senator Morton further contended that the Constitution does not allow for alternative arrangements that would permit a bill to be retained by anyone other than the chamber where it originated.