Ng Fung Ho v. White

Citations: 259 U.S. 276; 42 S. Ct. 492; 66 L. Ed. 938; 1922 U.S. LEXIS 2482Docket: 176

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 29, 1922; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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Five individuals of Chinese descent, including four petitioners, sought a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court in California on January 27, 1919, after being detained by immigration authorities under deportation warrants from the Secretary of Labor, based on the General Immigration Act of 1917. Each petitioner had entered the U.S. before the act's effective date and faced allegations of fraudulently securing admission and not possessing a certificate of residence, violating the Chinese Exclusion Act. The District Court quashed the writ and upheld the deportation, a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for all but one petitioner.

The petitioners argued that they were not given a fair hearing and that their deportation was not warranted under the General Immigration Act since any violations occurred before its enactment, thus requiring judicial proceedings under the Chinese Exclusion Acts. The case of Ng Fung Ho and his son presented a distinct issue of statutory interpretation regarding whether the 1917 act preserved the right to a judicial hearing for Chinese individuals, as previous precedents indicated that deportation under the Chinese Exclusion Acts required judicial proceedings rather than executive orders. The court noted the importance of determining if the 1917 act maintained this right for Chinese nationals.

Petitioners acknowledge that Chinese individuals who entered the U.S. after April 30, 1917, are subject to deportation under section 19, but argue that those who entered before this date are governed by the Chinese Exclusion Acts and are entitled to a judicial hearing. They contend that their previous inability to be deported without judicial proceedings does not prevent their expulsion by executive order now. Neither petitioner claims U.S. citizenship. Congress has the authority to deport aliens deemed harmful, which can be executed through appropriate executive action. 

The petitioners assert that applying section 19 retroactively contradicts Congress's intent, citing section 38, which maintains the laws in effect prior to the 1917 act. The government counters that section 19 was intended to be retroactive, covering actions prior to its enactment, particularly because the deportation is based on the unlawful presence of the petitioners after May 1, 1917, not just unlawful entry.

The specific charge against each petitioner is based on their unlawful remaining in the U.S. after the specified date, an offense distinct from unlawful entry. Legal precedent affirms that individuals can lawfully enter but remain unlawfully. The government’s argument that the deportation orders were valid stands, as the petitioners were unlawfully in the country at that time, eliminating the need to address the government's broader retroactivity claim.

Additionally, a constitutional issue arises concerning Gin Sang Get and Gin Sang Mo, who claim to be foreign-born sons of a native-born citizen and therefore U.S. citizens under section 1993 of the Revised Statutes. They argue that their citizenship claims prevent Congress from authorizing their deportation by executive order. However, if they were considered to be outside U.S. borders at the time of arrest, their claims to citizenship would not necessitate a judicial hearing.

In the case concerning two individuals who arrived at the San Francisco immigration station and were later arrested in Arizona under a deportation warrant, the legal question arises whether a resident asserting citizenship may be arrested and deported by executive order. The individuals, having undergone thorough examinations and received certificates of identity, claimed citizenship supported by evidence. The central issue is whether this claim, backed by evidence, warrants a judicial trial of their citizenship status. 

The document distinguishes between executive and judicial proceedings regarding deportation, noting that while deportation is generally an executive action, jurisdiction to order deportation exists only if the person is an alien. The claim of citizenship serves as a denial of this jurisdictional fact. The text draws parallels to military law proceedings, where a writ of habeas corpus can be issued to resolve status disputes. 

Additionally, the excerpt references various precedents related to the burden of proof in deportation cases and the legislative authority to set rules for evidence and proof in judicial processes, highlighting the complexities of citizenship claims in the context of deportation under the Chinese Exclusion Law.

The excerpt emphasizes the limitations of judicial intervention in deportation cases where the Department of Labor asserts jurisdiction based on executive orders. It highlights that if a deportee claims citizenship and presents a non-frivolous argument, the courts cannot challenge the executive's findings unless there has been a denial of fair hearing, lack of evidentiary support, or misapplication of law. The excerpt also underscores the severe consequences of deportation for individuals asserting citizenship, including loss of liberty, property, and quality of life, which the Fifth Amendment's due process clause aims to protect against. 

In the specific cases of Gin Sang Get and Gin Sang Mo, the court mandates a judicial review of their citizenship claims but does not order their immediate release. The Circuit Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for a trial on citizenship issues. In contrast, the judgment for Ng Fung Ho and Ng Yuen Shew is affirmed. A writ of habeas corpus is to be issued for Gin Sang Get and Gin Sang Mo. The excerpt references several legislative acts concerning immigration and deportation.

Section 19 allows for the arrest and deportation of any alien in the U.S. found in violation of immigration laws, as mandated by a warrant from the Secretary of Labor. It specifies that these provisions apply to the identified classes of aliens regardless of their entry time into the U.S. Section 38 repeals prior laws effective upon the enactment of this act, but maintains existing laws regarding the immigration and exclusion of Chinese individuals, except as stated in Section 19. It clarifies that ongoing prosecutions or legal actions at the time this act takes effect remain governed by the previously existing laws that are not affected by this act.

In the case of Moy Suey v. United States, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a deportation order against a Chinese individual claiming U.S. citizenship, ruling that an individual asserting citizenship cannot be deported without a judicial determination of the government's right to do so. This principle was affirmed in subsequent cases, while other cases established that the burden of proving citizenship lies with the Chinese individuals involved, as seen in rulings such as Yee King v. United States and others.