All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the Official Reports. Errors should be reported to the Reporter of Decisions at the Supreme Judicial Court. The case, Richard L. Desautels vs. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (No. 23-P-227, Suffolk), involves whether a Vermont DUI charge resolved through a "deferred sentence" constitutes a "conviction" under Massachusetts law (G. L. c. 90, § 22 (c)). If deemed a conviction, it would be Desautels' sixth, mandating lifetime revocation of his driver's license per G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (3 3/4). The Registrar of Motor Vehicles revoked his license based on this determination, leading Desautels to appeal to the Board, which upheld the revocation. He subsequently sought judicial review in the Superior Court, where his motion for judgment was denied, and the Board's was granted, resulting in the dismissal of his complaint. Desautels, a Massachusetts resident licensed since 1992, has a history of multiple DUI convictions in Vermont and a prior OUI charge in Massachusetts in 1998, which was continued without a finding. The relevant Vermont statutes concerning DUI and deferred sentencing, though amended, have not materially changed since Desautels' 2014 arrest. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
On March 2, 2015, the plaintiff entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to grossly negligent operation while a DUI charge was deferred under Vermont's statute, 13 Vt. Stat. Ann. 7041. This statute allows for deferring sentencing and placing the respondent on probation following a guilty adjudication, contingent upon a written agreement between the State's Attorney and the respondent. The plaintiff's Vermont charges were not promptly reported to the Massachusetts registry as required by the interstate compact, which both Massachusetts and Vermont are part of. This led to the Vermont DUI convictions from the 1970s and the 2014 grossly negligent operation conviction being posted to the plaintiff's Massachusetts driving history only in 2020. Consequently, the registry suspended the plaintiff's Massachusetts driver's license for sixty days due to the 2014 conviction but lacked information about the 2014 DUI charge until the plaintiff provided relevant documentation while seeking reinstatement. Upon reviewing these documents, the registrar determined that the 2014 DUI necessitated a lifetime license revocation under G. L. c. 90. 24 (1. c. 3 3/4) due to the plaintiff's prior DUI convictions. The statute mandates a lifetime revocation for individuals with multiple previous convictions for operating under the influence, clarifying that prior assignments to treatment programs relate to the predicate offenses rather than the triggering offense itself.
The plaintiff has been convicted five times for DUI-related offenses or assigned to treatment programs, with the last conviction prior to the 2014 Vermont DUI occurring in 1998. Under Massachusetts law prior to 2002, a lifetime license revocation required four previous convictions within a ten-year span, which did not apply to the plaintiff due to his earlier convictions being in the 1970s. The current law mandates lifetime revocation for four prior convictions without any time limitation.
Regarding out-of-state convictions, G. L. c. 90. 22 (c) mandates that the Massachusetts registrar treat out-of-state motor vehicle violations the same as if they occurred in Massachusetts. The Supreme Judicial Court clarified in Commonwealth v. Lee that all OUI convictions, regardless of jurisdiction, must be uniformly applied. Both parties concur that the 2014 Vermont DUI should be treated as an OUI in Massachusetts.
The legal debate revolves around whether the Vermont DUI, disposed of under a deferred sentencing regime, qualifies as a conviction under Massachusetts law. Despite various interpretations proposed by the parties regarding the comparison of offenses, the court need not resolve this issue as the plaintiff has not contested the treatment of the Vermont DUI as a Massachusetts OUI. The primary concern is whether there exists substantial evidence supporting the registry's decision regarding the plaintiff's DUI charge. G. L. c. 30A. 14 (7. e. establishes that agency decisions must be backed by substantial evidence.
The legal interpretation of "conviction" under G. L. c. 90. 22 (c) is reviewed de novo, confirming that it encompasses an adjudication of guilt by a U.S. court. The Legislature's historical definition of "conviction" for OUI cases, which includes guilty pleas and adjudications, has been consistent since 1936. A new argument raised by the plaintiff during oral argument regarding the lack of "official notice" of a Vermont DUI charge is deemed waived due to not being included in the brief. The court asserts that the definition of conviction under G. L. c. 90. 24 does not apply to G. L. c. 90. 22. Despite the plaintiff's contention regarding the interstate compact's definition, the court does not resolve this issue, noting that no Vermont agency informed the Massachusetts registry about the DUI charge. The registry became aware of the conviction through the plaintiff during a hearing to reinstate his driver's license, where he provided relevant documents. G. L. c. 90. 22 (c) allows the registrar to act upon "official notice" received in any form deemed appropriate. The court supports the registrar's discretion in considering documents presented by the plaintiff as official notice of the DUI charge's disposition, emphasizing the importance of public safety and the legislative intent not to require ignoring actual knowledge of a conviction due to bureaucratic failures.
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the plaintiff's 2014 Vermont DUI charge, which was resolved through "deferred sentencing," constitutes a "conviction" under G. L. c. 90. 22 (c). Vermont's deferred sentencing statute requires an adjudication of guilt, thus aligning with the definition of "conviction." The board's determination that the disposition is a conviction is valid. The plaintiff provided a "Notice of Plea Agreement," indicating guilt for a separate charge, and a "Deferred Sentence Probation Order," which confirmed a conviction and sentencing. Although the plaintiff claims the adjudication of guilt was "reversed," the expungement order only states it was "stricken." Under G. L. c. 90. 22 (c), the registrar must treat this out-of-state conviction as a valid conviction despite its expungement for the purposes of motor vehicle operation rights. The judgment is affirmed.
