Hannon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Citations: 562 F.3d 1146; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5824; 2009 WL 722557Docket: 07-15991

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; March 19, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the appeal case Patrick Charles Hannon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether Florida state courts unreasonably applied federal law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during Hannon's penalty phase trial. The district court agreed with the state courts' determination that Hannon did not demonstrate inadequate representation. The court affirmed the denial of Hannon's federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The background details the facts of the crime, where Hannon, along with Ron Richardson and Jim Acker, attacked Brandon Snider and subsequently murdered Robert Carter. Hannon was found guilty, with the jury recommending the death penalty after the trial court identified multiple aggravating circumstances, including prior violent felony convictions and the heinous nature of the murders. No statutory mitigating factors were found, although Hannon's family and Acker testified to his non-violent character. The trial court imposed death sentences based on the jury's recommendation and the weighing of aggravating versus mitigating factors.

The Supreme Court of Florida upheld Hannon’s convictions and death sentences, which were subsequently confirmed by the United States Supreme Court's denial of his writ of certiorari. Hannon initiated a post-conviction relief motion in March 1997, presenting 34 claims, later amending it to 21 claims. A preliminary hearing led the trial court to schedule an evidentiary hearing on seven claims, including ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel. Following this hearing, the court denied Hannon's post-conviction relief, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida.

Hannon then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which denied all relief and rejected his motions to alter the judgment and for a certificate of appealability (COA). The COA was granted solely on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The key issue for review was whether the district court erred in its assessment of the state courts' handling of Hannon’s claim regarding the failure to present adequate mitigation and mental health evidence. 

The standard of review for a § 2254 habeas petition involves de novo examination of legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact, with factual findings reviewed for clear error. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes a framework that requires substantial deference to state court decisions. A federal court can only grant habeas relief if the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable factual determination. AEDPA presumes state court factual findings as correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel require a demonstration of both deficient performance and resultant prejudice to the defense.

In Wiggins v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that when assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the standard is based on the actions of a reasonable attorney, not an idealized one. There exists a strong presumption that counsel's performance is reasonable, which must be rebutted by demonstrating that no competent attorney would have acted similarly. To establish prejudice, a claimant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed but for the attorney's errors—this probability must be sufficient to undermine confidence in the result.

On appeal, Hannon argues that the district court incorrectly upheld the state courts' finding that his claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase was reasonable. He asserts that his trial counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation into mitigation evidence, contrary to the standards set in Wiggins and Williams v. Taylor. Hannon contends that his counsel's failure to investigate was due to a misunderstanding of the law rather than a strategic decision and that this deficiency prejudiced his penalty proceedings. Evidence presented during the post-conviction hearing included testimony about Hannon's domination by Ron Richardson, his history of drug and alcohol abuse, his intoxication during the crimes, parental neglect, and neurological impairments. Hannon claims that had this evidence been known to the jury, it is likely that the sentencing outcome would have changed.

Both the state trial court and the Supreme Court of Florida examined Hannon's claim. The trial court noted that his counsel, Joe Episcopo, testified that his strategy was to avoid presenting mitigating evidence that could detract from Hannon's assertion of innocence. Episcopo did not investigate drug or alcohol issues, believing they were irrelevant to Hannon’s alibi. The Supreme Court of Florida, referencing the Strickland standard, found that Episcopo's decisions were based on specific tactical considerations. The court highlighted that both Hannon and his parents consistently maintained his innocence throughout the trial phases.

Trial counsel aimed for Hannon's acquittal during the guilt phase by asserting his innocence and absence from the crime scene, while planning to argue Hannon's character during the penalty phase if necessary. Hannon actively participated in his defense, including testifying, and agreed to maintain the innocence theme even post-conviction. Counsel informed Hannon about the possibility of admitting involvement during the penalty phase but Hannon declined. Discussions with Hannon's family reinforced the strategy of focusing on character rather than a shift to admitting guilt, as they all believed in his innocence. Trial counsel recognized that lingering doubt is not a statutory mitigator; however, he posited that emphasizing Hannon's character could favorably influence the jury's decision on sentencing. Expert testimony later supported the effectiveness of this consistent approach on the jurors' votes for life imprisonment. During the trial, character witnesses testified to Hannon's nonviolent nature, and counsel decided against recalling them in the penalty phase, believing their earlier testimonies sufficed.

Trial counsel presented evidence during both the guilt and penalty phases to mitigate Hannon's culpability for the murders. Testimony highlighted Hannon's work ethic, character, and family ties, suggesting he lacked the disposition to commit such crimes. The Supreme Court of Florida noted that trial counsel aimed to persuade the jury of Hannon's innocence and good character, emphasizing that there were no significant reports or indicators in Hannon's background that would necessitate a deeper investigation into his life history. Unlike precedents set in Wiggins and Rompilla, the court found no evidence of trauma, abuse, or drug issues disclosed by Hannon or his family, and Hannon expressed a desire to maintain an innocence defense. The court concluded that trial counsel's limited investigation was reasonable under the circumstances, consistent with the standards established by Strickland and Wiggins. The district court upheld this conclusion, affirming that Hannon could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel or clear error in the state courts' findings regarding strategic decisions made by his counsel. Hannon's family denied any childhood issues when questioned, and Hannon himself showed no signs of mental deficiencies, actively participating in his defense.

Episcopo had no indication that a mental health evaluation or investigation into potential drug abuse would aid in Hannon's defense, which centered on maintaining Hannon's innocence during the guilt and penalty phases. Presenting evidence of Hannon's possible substance abuse or mental health issues would contradict their strategy of portraying him as a non-violent individual. At sentencing, Episcopo emphasized evidence supporting Hannon's innocence, including his work history, positive character references, and testimony from various witnesses asserting Hannon's non-involvement in the crimes. The strategy of creating lingering doubt about Hannon’s guilt was deemed effective and reasonable, as supported by precedents in the circuit. The record indicated that Episcopo made a strategic choice to limit mitigation investigation and focus on lingering doubt, consistent with legal standards that do not mandate exhaustive investigation into every potential mitigation area. Hannon's reliance on the Rompilla case was found inapplicable, as it pertains to specific known aggravation evidence rather than a blanket requirement for investigation. Consequently, the district court affirmed that the state courts' determination of Episcopo's performance as non-deficient was consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, even if there were deficiencies in counsel’s performance, Hannon failed to demonstrate that these errors would have altered the sentencing outcome, failing to meet the prejudice standard established by Strickland.

In sentencing Hannon to death, the trial court established three aggravating circumstances related to the murders of Snider and Carter: Hannon's prior conviction for a violent felony, the murders occurring during a burglary, and their heinous nature. An additional aggravating factor for Carter's murder was that it was committed to evade a lawful arrest. In mitigation, Hannon's testimony highlighted his hard work and absence during the crimes, supported by family and roommate testimonies portraying him as non-violent. The trial court also acknowledged that co-defendant Richardson was no longer facing a death sentence. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case, concluding that additional mitigation evidence would not have altered the sentencing outcome. They applied a presumption of correctness to the state court's factual findings and assessed whether the balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors was reasonable. 

During an evidentiary hearing, Hannon presented expert testimony from Dr. Barry Crown, Dr. Faye Sulton, and Dr. Jonathan Lipman. Dr. Crown's evaluations indicated Hannon's cognitive abilities were generally normal, although he struggled with retrieving information. He noted possible brain damage but could not definitively link it to Hannon's behavior during the crime. Dr. Sulton found no major mental illness affecting Hannon's thinking but highlighted his personal and professional failures, substance abuse, and compromised daily functioning. Her interviews revealed nonstatutory mitigation factors, including childhood neglect, health issues affecting schooling, dependency on others, impulsivity, lack of concentration, and challenges in adult living skills.

Dr. Sulton testified that Hannon exhibited personality changes, impulsivity, irritability, concentration difficulties, and paranoid thinking, but maintained that Hannon was competent to stand trial and sane at the time of the incident, displaying average intelligence with only minor deficits. Dr. Lipman, a neuropharmacologist, indicated that Hannon's level of intoxication did not impair his ability to remember or understand his actions during the crime, although he acknowledged underestimating Hannon's drug use because he was unaware of Hannon's cocaine consumption that night. Dr. Lipman concurred with the State's expert, Dr. Merin, who reviewed prior assessments and conducted additional intelligence testing. Dr. Merin found no significant brain injury or thought disorders in Hannon, though he suggested some neuronal damage due to substance abuse, which did not affect Hannon's reasoning or decision-making abilities.

The district court upheld the state court's conclusion that Hannon did not demonstrate prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the investigation of mental health evidence. No expert established a significant mental health impairment or a link between any impairment and Hannon's criminal behavior. Dr. Crown, one of the evaluators, confirmed he was not tasked with assessing Hannon's competency or the impact of any brain damage on his conduct during the crimes. Dr. Sulton reiterated that Hannon was neither incompetent nor insane during the murders. The court emphasized the brutal nature of the crimes, which included a gruesome murder and a near-fatal attack on another victim, supporting the conclusion that additional mental health testimony would not likely have changed the trial outcome. As a result, the district court affirmed the state courts' denial of Hannon's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding no unreasonable application of federal law.