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Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities
Citation: Not availableDocket: 20-1163
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; April 7, 2022; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Johnny and Sandra Timpson, the appellants, are appealing decisions made by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina regarding their case against multiple defendants, including various state and local disabilities and special needs boards, as well as individual officials. The appeal includes challenges to preliminary orders and directed verdicts that dismissed several of their claims. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, after hearing arguments, issued a published opinion on April 7, 2022, affirming some aspects of the district court's judgment while vacating others. The case is remanded for further proceedings in line with the appellate court's findings. Circuit Judges Motz, Agee, and Wynn participated in the decision, with Judge Agee authoring the opinion. Various legal representatives were involved for both appellants and appellees throughout the proceedings. Medicaid, created under the Social Security Act in 1965, is a federal-state program that provides medical services to impoverished individuals, administered in South Carolina by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS contracts with the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs (DDSN) to manage treatment programs for individuals with intellectual disabilities. DDSN, funded by DHHS, collaborates with local boards like the Anderson County Disabilities and Special Needs Board to provide services to Medicaid-eligible clients. While many Medicaid benefits are limited to intermediate care facilities (ICF), Congress allows states to offer home- and community-based services through a waiver program, requiring states to inform eligible individuals of these alternatives. Johnny Timpson, who has severe intellectual disabilities and cerebral palsy, was placed in the Whitten Center ICF at age ten and remained there for nearly thirty years. Following a 1997 investigation highlighting abuse at the facility, he was moved to Board-operated group homes, including Tiny Greer. During his time there, Johnny displayed concerning behaviors and was hospitalized after starting a fire. Despite regular family visits, the Board failed to inform his family about incidents involving Johnny, including injuries he sustained in 2013. When Sandra Timpson, Johnny's sister, was notified of burns on his wrists, she suspected they were serious, but the Board claimed they were minor. Johnny initially stated that staff had injured him but later changed his account to suggest self-infliction. After obtaining a health care power of attorney, Sandra took charge of Johnny's care, but the Board did not inform her of potential services from non-DDSN providers or alternatives for in-home support, nor that she could be compensated for providing care. The Timpsons initiated a lawsuit in South Carolina state court in February 2016, which was later moved to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. They filed an amended complaint against fourteen Defendants—ten individuals and four agencies—asserting five causes of action: 1) negligence and gross negligence under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA); 2) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); 3) violations of the Rehabilitation Act (RA); 4) violations of the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act; and 5) violations of Medicaid rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged collective misconduct without specifying individual actions. Confusion arose regarding whether then-Governor Haley was sued in her official or individual capacity. After leaving office to join the United Nations, she sought a protective order, claiming that Governor McMaster was automatically substituted as a party. The Timpsons agreed to this substitution but insisted on deposing Haley to explore her individual liability. The district court required the Timpsons to submit written interrogatories before the deposition, leading to the discovery that the questions posed did not pertain to Haley’s involvement in Johnny’s care, but rather to her general knowledge of Medicaid issues. Consequently, the court ruled there was no evidence of her personal involvement, granting her summary judgment. The remaining Defendants sought summary judgment, while the Timpsons moved for partial summary judgment. The district court requested supplemental briefing from the Timpsons regarding the viability of their § 1983 claims, which was found lacking. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for most Defendants on nearly all claims, specifically dismissing all RA claims. Ultimately, the court retained ADA and SCTCA claims against specific entities and Section 1983 claims against two individuals, Thompson and Buscemi. At a pretrial hearing, the court restricted testimony to matters directly related to Johnny and the facilities he was placed in, barring any evidence of wider state violations. The court emphasized that this case was not a class action and would not put the system on trial. The remaining Defendants contested Johnny's competence to testify. After evaluating his responses to basic questions, the court concluded that his testimony would be prejudicial and confusing to the jury due to his limited communication abilities. During the trial, Johnny was permitted to answer only very basic questions. The Timpsons had designated three witnesses as hybrid witnesses, but none provided written reports, leading to their exclusion from offering expert testimony. While McPherson and Thomas could testify as fact witnesses, neither was familiar with Johnny. Following the Timpsons' presentation, the court directed verdicts in favor of most Defendants on nearly all claims, leaving only the ADA claim against the Board and SCTCA claims against the Board and DDSN, which the jury ultimately ruled in favor of the Defendants. The Timpsons' motion for reconsideration was denied, and they subsequently filed a timely appeal. The Timpsons' appeal, though lacking clarity and detailed citations, appears to raise five main issues: challenges to the statute of limitations applied to their RA and ADA claims, alleged abuses of discretion in excluding testimonies, improper jury instructions regarding SCTCA duties, wrongful dismissal of their RA claims, and errors related to their § 1983 claims. The document notes that the district court applied the one-year statute of limitations from the South Carolina Human Affairs Law to the Timpsons' ADA and RA claims while extending limitations for Johnny's claims by five years due to his intellectual disability. The Timpsons filed a suit in February 2016, allowing Johnny to assert ADA and RA claims from February 2010 and Sandra from February 2015. They contest two rulings regarding the statute of limitations: the district court's identification of the South Carolina Human Affairs Law as the most analogous law to their claims and its failure to apply the state's discovery rule to toll the limitations periods. The court erred in applying the one-year statute of limitations under the South Carolina Human Affairs Law for discrimination in public services, as this law does not encompass such claims. Instead, the appropriate statute is the three-year period for general civil actions, as established in previous rulings, notably Semenova v. Maryland Transit Administration. The South Carolina Human Affairs Law addresses disability discrimination in employment, not public services, while the public accommodations statute does not address disability discrimination. Consequently, the jury could not award damages for retaliatory acts against Sandra prior to February 23, 2015, due to limited specificity in the Timpsons' claims regarding her injuries. The court emphasized that it is not its role to sift through the record to substantiate vague claims made by counsel. Sandra has raised a potential claim for retaliation under the ADA and RA due to the Defendants' failure to inform her of feasible alternatives related to a waiver, although the specific Defendants involved remain unclear. The amended complaint alleges that the Defendants did not provide sufficient services to enable Sandra to return to work and prevent her brother Johnny's institutionalization. Sandra had previously complained about the Defendants' treatment of Johnny, and in retaliation, services were withheld or delayed after she took Johnny into her home in August 2013. The amended complaint asserts that the Defendants retaliated against individuals advocating for waiver participants, resulting in harm to both Sandra and Johnny. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of Sandra's retaliation claims for the period from February 23, 2013, to February 23, 2015, instructing her to clarify which Defendants retaliated against her and to specify how such retaliation occurred. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Johnny's claims due to a lack of demonstrated prejudice from the ruling, noting the Timpsons failed to provide specific details about Johnny's pre-2010 claims or establish any connection to the ruling. The court also found the Timpsons did not effectively argue their position regarding the discovery rule and did not specify the injuries for which they sought recovery. Consequently, the court upheld the district court's decisions on these matters. The court addressed three claims by the Timpsons regarding limitations on testimony: 1) restrictions on Johnny’s testimony, 2) limitations on hybrid witnesses’ testimonies, and 3) the denial of taking Ambassador Haley’s deposition. The court emphasized that evidentiary rulings are generally given substantial deference and can only be overturned if the trial court acted arbitrarily or irrationally. Regarding Johnny's testimony, the trial court has exclusive discretion over a witness's competency. Although a formal hearing wasn't mandatory, one was held. During this hearing, Johnny demonstrated minimal understanding of important concepts such as truthfulness and identification of the current President. However, he failed to provide crucial information like his state of residence and birth year, leading the court to question his reliability as a witness. Despite finding him competent to a basic extent, the court concluded that his testimony's probative value was significantly outweighed by potential jury confusion. Consequently, the court allowed Johnny to testify only about very basic information, such as his name and living situation. The court’s decision to limit his testimony was deemed not to be an abuse of discretion, as it considered Johnny's demeanor, ability to recall facts, and narrative skills. Johnny's trial testimony revealed significant inconsistencies regarding his age and ability to read and write, leading the court to restrict his testimony. At 61 years old, he inaccurately stated he was both 50 and 58. Additionally, the courtroom reporter noted that his speech was often "undiscernible." His responses included contradictory statements about his literacy, indicating confusion. The district court's decision to limit his testimony was upheld, as the Timpsons failed to demonstrate any prejudice from this ruling or provide specifics on additional facts Johnny could have contributed that were not already in evidence. The district court also appropriately excluded and limited the testimony of the Timpsons' hybrid witnesses. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), a written report is required for experts retained for testimony, which does not apply to hybrid witnesses. These hybrid witnesses must base their testimony on personal knowledge gained from their roles, and the court can restrict testimony to this scope. The Timpsons did not provide a summary of the expected facts and opinions for their witnesses, nor did they prove they met the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(C). Even if they had, the court would likely have ruled that the witnesses failed to qualify as hybrid witnesses, as none had relevant factual evidence supporting the Timpsons' claims, with two never having met Johnny and the third having minimal interaction years prior. The Timpsons were required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) to produce expert reports for their hired experts, the Timpsons, but failed to do so, leading the district court to exclude these witnesses from providing expert opinions at trial. Additionally, the court denied their request to depose then-Ambassador Nikki Haley, upholding the precedent that government decision-makers are generally not compelled to testify regarding their mental processes unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Haley, in her former role as Governor, had no authority over decisions affecting specific patient services or their funding, and the Timpsons did not present a viable theory for holding her individually liable. Furthermore, they misused their interrogatories on irrelevant matters, failing to establish a need for her deposition. Regarding the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), the Timpsons contested jury instructions stating that the Board and DDSN could only be liable for gross negligence. They argued that the standard should be based on a reasonable care requirement as outlined in *Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center, Inc.* The court found no error in the instructions and affirmed them. The SCTCA serves as the exclusive civil remedy for tort claims against governmental entities and their employees, as stated in *Shirley’s Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union.* The statute delineates exceptions to liability for governmental entities, specifying that they are not liable for losses related to their duties, such as supervision or custody of individuals, unless gross negligence is proven. This standard of gross negligence involves a conscious failure to fulfill an obligation or acting in a manner that one should not. The South Carolina Supreme Court has confirmed this standard in prior cases, clarifying that the determination of gross negligence is a factual matter for the jury. In the context of the Timpsons' claims regarding Johnny's care in group homes, the district court accurately instructed the jury on the gross negligence standard. The Timpsons' argument that liability could be imposed without proving that Tiny Greer’s employees were also employees of the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs (DDSN) was rejected. The Supreme Court has established that DDSN and the Board are separate entities, with the Board possessing independent authority to hire staff. Consequently, DDSN is not liable for the actions of the Board or its employees, including those at Tiny Greer. The district court's instruction on the Timpsons' ADA and RA claims was deemed appropriate, as the court did not abuse its discretion in its framing. The Timpsons argued that the court wrongly dismissed their claims and excluded evidence regarding South Carolina’s financial resources. Under the ADA and RA, the availability of state resources and the needs of individuals with mental disabilities are relevant when assessing if requested services would result in a fundamental alteration of state programs. The RA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in federally funded programs, while Title II of the ADA similarly protects individuals from exclusion by public entities. Both statutes require plaintiffs to demonstrate specific elements to establish liability. However, the court found that the Timpsons failed to sufficiently articulate the specific conduct of the defendants, how this conduct caused injury to them, or how it violated the statutes. Additionally, they did not argue any harm resulting from the dismissal of their RA claims, leading to a lack of basis for overturning the lower court's judgment. The court typically considers unraised contentions in an opening brief as waived. The Timpsons' reference to Olmstead was also ineffective, as it reiterated that states must provide services in the most integrated setting but can determine eligibility based on professional assessments. The Supreme Court clarified that the ADA does not impose a standard of care for medical services nor require states to provide a specific level of benefits to individuals with disabilities. The Timpsons did not demonstrate in their opening brief how the alleged improper diversion of funds in South Carolina affected Johnny's treatment and care, leading to affirmation of the lower court's decision. Regarding their claims under Section 1983, the Timpsons contended that the district court incorrectly excluded evidence of the defendants' violations and ruled that officials could not be held liable for their subordinates' actions if they were unaware of Johnny or the facilities he was in. The court reiterated that under Section 1983, there is no respondeat superior liability; liability arises only from personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violate constitutional norms. To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the supervisor had knowledge of their subordinate’s conduct posing a significant risk of constitutional injury, (2) the supervisor's response was inadequate, demonstrating deliberate indifference, and (3) a causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the constitutional injury suffered. The court emphasized that establishing a pervasive risk requires evidence of widespread conduct, and proving deliberate indifference necessitates showing inaction despite documented abuses. The Timpsons failed to meet these burdens of proof, resulting in a finding of no reversible error. No actionable claims or evidence of wrongdoing by the individually named Defendants were presented by the Timpsons, as they failed to name six of the ten Defendants in their Section 1983 claim and only mentioned the other four in a vague, boilerplate manner. The Court found that the practices cited by the Timpsons were too established to be considered isolated incidents, affirming that Defendants Haley, Danielson, Buscemi, and Soura held final policymaking authority. The Timpsons did not demonstrate personal involvement by any individual in the alleged violations, nor did they provide substantial counterarguments during summary judgment proceedings. The Court granted summary judgment due to the lack of evidence showing constitutional violations by officials. Liability was noted for certain Defendants based on their authority to govern and manage facilities. Previous case law was referenced to support the dismissal of claims against Defendants without specific allegations of misconduct. Furthermore, it was established that state officials acting in an official capacity are not considered “persons” under Section 1983, leading to the district court's favorable judgment for the agency Defendants. The district court's decision was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.