Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries

Citations: 657 F.3d 988; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19233; 2011 WL 4347029Docket: 10-35519

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 19, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves an appeal concerning the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and allegations of religious discrimination by Boise Rescue Mission Ministries, a Christian non-profit organization operating drug treatment programs and homeless shelters in Boise, Idaho. Plaintiffs Janene Cowles, Richard Chinn, and the Intermountain Fair Housing Council claim that the organization discriminates against individuals based on religion in its services. The district court ruled in favor of the Defendant, granting summary judgment.

Boise Rescue Mission, originally established to promote Christian worship and teachings, operates a residential drug treatment program that requires participants to be or desire to be Christian, mandating engagement in various religious activities such as worship services and Bible study. Participants, like Cowles, must adhere to strict program policies, including significant restrictions on communication and outside employment during the initial months of treatment. Cowles was encouraged by her judge to enroll in this program as part of her probation following a drug-related charge. The court's decision to affirm the Defendant's summary judgment indicates a legal determination that the organization's practices do not violate the FHA regarding religious discrimination.

Cowles expressed a desire to join Defendant's religiously oriented program, indicating her search for spiritual guidance and peace. Following an interview on March 2, 2006, she was accepted into the program on March 7, which mandated participation in religious activities, including attending church services, singing in the choir, and engaging in specific religious practices such as "casting out demons." Cowles was prohibited from consuming secular media and was pressured to convert to Christianity, with staff warning her of eternal consequences for non-compliance. She observed staff ridiculing Mormons and witnessed the conversion of a Mormon participant. After requesting a transfer to a non-religious facility, Cowles faced retaliation, including restrictions on her communication and encouragement from staff for other participants to exclude her. Additionally, she alleged sex discrimination, noting that male participants had more freedom to work and visit family. On June 7, 2006, the Women’s Ministry Director requested Cowles' removal from the program due to her lack of agreement with its religious teachings, although Cowles remained for two more months. Ultimately, on August 30, 2006, the director informed Cowles' probation officer that she could not complete the program, resulting in Cowles returning to jail.

Cowles filed a complaint with HUD, alleging sex and religious discrimination by the Defendant during her participation in a drug treatment program. She claimed unlawful retaliation following her complaints about the program's religious aspects. HUD's investigation revealed that, although Cowles was court-mandated to attend the program, she was aware it was faith-based. HUD found that the FHA's religious exemption allowed the Defendant to limit its program to Christians, negating Cowles' FHA claim. Additionally, HUD dismissed her sex discrimination claim due to insufficient evidence; Cowles admitted she never interacted with male participants and could not observe differences between men's and women's programs. The retaliation claim was also rejected, as a letter from Cowles to the state court contradicted her allegations, expressing gratitude for the program and indicating no hard feelings. As a result, HUD dismissed her complaint entirely.

Defendant operates two homeless shelters in Boise, the Front Street Men's Mission and the River of Life Rescue Mission, which serve individuals without safe accommodation. Guests must complete an intake form that acknowledges the shelters' Christian mission, though services are open to all faiths. While attendance at religious services is encouraged, it is not mandatory. Guests receive basic accommodations but may have to sleep on the floor if capacity exceeds available beds. They may stay for a maximum of seventeen consecutive nights in warmer months, with no limit during colder months, and are barred from services for thirty days if they fail to return as scheduled. The shelters offer spiritual guidance, Christian counseling, and numerous daily religious activities. Chinn utilized the Front Street Shelter and River of Life Shelter multiple times in 2005.

Chinn alleged that upon entering the Front Street Shelter, he was informed by Defendant's staff that participation in Christian religious activities was mandatory for staying and eating there. He observed that guests who did not attend these religious services were segregated, forced to wait outside or in the dining room until the services concluded, and were served inferior quality food when the main food supply ran out. Similar practices were noted at the River of Life Shelter. Chinn indicated that 15 to 20 of the 50 to 70 guests at Defendant’s shelters opted out of services, largely due to resentment towards the requirement. As a Mormon, Chinn felt particularly offended by derogatory remarks from the staff regarding his faith, including references to it as a "cult." Consequently, he ceased utilizing Defendant’s shelters and filed a complaint with HUD, alleging religious discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). HUD investigated but ultimately found "no reasonable cause" to support Chinn's claims, noting no significant repercussions for non-attendance at services and highlighting that nearly one-third of guests at one shelter did not participate. Following HUD's dismissal of his complaint, Chinn and another individual, Cowles, brought action in federal district court, where the court granted summary judgment to Defendant. The plaintiffs appealed the decision. The discussion introduces the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions, which prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin in the sale or rental of dwellings. It defines "dwelling" broadly but does not define "residence." Defendant conceded that the FHA's provisions apply to Cowles' residential drug treatment program but argued they do not extend to its homeless shelters for two reasons.

Defendant argues that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) provisions 3604(a) and (b), which refer to the "sale or rental of a dwelling," are intended solely for transactions involving the sale or rental of dwellings. Since Defendant operates its shelters at no charge, it contends that these shelters do not fall under the scope of 3604(a) and (b). Furthermore, Defendant claims that its shelters do not meet the FHA's definition of "dwelling" as they are not designed or occupied as residences. Citing Third and Eleventh Circuit rulings, Defendant interprets "residence" as a place intended for significant occupancy, thereby asserting that its shelters do not qualify since guests cannot stay long-term or treat them as homes.

Plaintiffs and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) contest Defendant’s interpretations, arguing that the FHA provisions do apply to the shelters. However, the court refrains from addressing the statutory interpretation questions raised by Defendant. Instead, it concludes that, even if the FHA provisions apply, the religious exemption in 42 U.S.C. 3607(a) permits the practices challenged by Plaintiffs. This exemption allows religious organizations to limit access to their services based on religion, as long as such limitations do not discriminate based on race, color, or national origin. The court notes that Defendant, a bona fide Christian organization operating for non-commercial purposes, meets the criteria for this exemption, thus applying 3607(a) to the situation without delving into the merits of Defendant's arguments regarding the scope of 3604(a) and (b) or the definition of "residence."

Defendant's drug treatment program is legally permissible under 3607(a) of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which allows religious organizations to limit participation to individuals of the same faith. Cowles alleges that she was required to engage in religious activities as a condition of her participation, including attending church services and religiously-based treatment. After expressing her non-Christian beliefs, her participation was terminated, supporting Defendant's claim that it restricts its program to Christians and those wanting to convert. Cowles’ assertion that her admission contradicts this restriction is unfounded, as the records indicate that she presented herself as seeking a Christian experience. 

Additionally, Chinn's claim regarding Defendant's homeless shelters, where attendees of religious services receive preferential treatment, also fails. The court finds that even if non-Christians attend services, the exemption still applies since Defendant can reasonably assume that participants intend to engage with its religious mission. Plaintiffs argue for a narrower interpretation of 3607(a), but the court concludes that requiring participants to engage in Christian practices does not violate the FHA as it aligns with the exemption allowing preference for those of the same religion. Thus, both Cowles' and Chinn's religious discrimination claims are legally unfounded.

Cowles' sex discrimination claim was affirmed as dismissed due to lack of competent evidence. She failed to demonstrate that the treatment of men in the parallel drug treatment program differed from that of women in her program. The only evidence presented was her affidavit, which claimed men had more work opportunities and visitation privileges. However, Cowles did not clarify how she knew about these differences, lacking personal knowledge necessary to support her assertions. Her affidavit was deemed conclusory and insufficient to counter the summary judgment.

Furthermore, the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which addresses coercion, intimidation, or interference related to rights under § 3604, were dependent on the validity of the plaintiffs' religious discrimination claims. Since Chinn had no right to equal treatment compared to Christian guests and Cowles could only participate in the program by agreeing to Christian beliefs, neither was exercising a right protected by § 3604. Thus, the district court's summary judgment favoring the defendant on the retaliation claims was upheld.