Fred Auston Wortman, III v. State of Tennessee Board Of Parole

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2020-01554-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; September 13, 2021; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Fred Auston Wortman, III filed a lawsuit against the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Board of Parole, several board members, and other state employees after being denied parole. The suit was initiated in the Chancery Court for Davidson County on June 30, 2020, following a parole hearing on September 19, 2019, where a low-risk assessment was conducted on Wortman. He alleges that a Board or TDOC employee, referred to as F/N/U Stewart, improperly influenced a counselor to alter this risk assessment negatively. Wortman claims that prosecutors Davidson and Hagerman testified at the hearing and that Faulcon, a Board member, quickly recommended deferring parole consideration until 2026. Additionally, Wortman contends that Davidson held a secret ex parte meeting with Board members to sway them against granting parole. Defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, and the trial court granted this motion. Wortman appealed, but the appeal was dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the trial court's order was not final. All non-entity defendants were sued in both their official and individual capacities, and the case was decided by memorandum opinion, which is not to be published or cited in unrelated cases.

On October 7, 2019, the Board notified Plaintiff of the denial of his parole request. Plaintiff alleges multiple causes of action, including tortious interference with an administrative hearing, civil and criminal conspiracy, bribery, fraud, undue influence of government employees, violations of the Double Jeopardy doctrine, bad faith, breach of contract, and separation of powers violations. The central claim is that ex-parte communication occurred between defendants Davidson and Faulcon before Plaintiff’s parole hearing, violating his due process rights, and that other defendants conspired to cover this up. 

On July 13, 2020, several defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming sovereign immunity and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They indicated that service was accepted only in their official capacities. The motion did not address issues of insufficient service or personal jurisdiction, nor did it mention defendants Barbee or Stewart. Plaintiff responded by repeating his allegations. On August 11, 2020, the defendants filed a reply, asserting they were only served in their official capacities. They also made alternative arguments for dismissing the claims against them individually. 

On August 21, 2020, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that claims against the State, the Board, and certain defendants in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity. The court noted that all defendants except Davidson and Hagerman were served only in their official capacities, leading to their dismissal alongside the State and Board based on sovereign immunity.

The trial court determined that the defendants were served in their official capacities but did not explicitly dismiss them in their individual capacities due to insufficient service. Instead, it ruled that claims against the parole board members and defendant Clark were barred by quasi-judicial immunity, while claims against defendants Davidson and Hagerman were barred by absolute witness immunity. The court found no factual allegations against defendants Purviance or O’Bryan and did not address defendants Barbee and Stewart in its order. The plaintiff appealed, raising several issues, primarily questioning whether the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief against the dismissed defendants. However, the court identified the critical issue as whether it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question without a presumption of correctness and is crucial for a court to adjudicate claims. It cannot be waived, and judgments issued without it are void. The court must evaluate the jurisdictional basis for the appeal, noting that appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction over final judgments unless explicitly provided by rules or statutes. The trial court's order did not address the claims against Barbee and Stewart, which raises jurisdictional concerns.

The State's motion to dismiss, filed on July 13, 2020, did not mention defendants Barbee or Stewart, nor did the reply to the Plaintiff’s response address them. Although Stewart is mentioned in a footnote, it states that the Attorney General did not accept service for Stewart in an official capacity and recommends Stewart's dismissal alongside other defendants. Barbee is not mentioned at all in the State's brief. It remains unclear whether the Attorney General's office represents Barbee and Stewart or if their omission was unintentional. Both defendants are named in the action but have not sought dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims against them. The trial court's order dismissed other defendants but did not address the claims against Stewart and Barbee, leaving those claims pending. As the trial court’s order does not resolve all claims against all parties, it is deemed nonfinal, resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction for this appeal, which is therefore dismissed. Costs are to be borne by the appellant, Fred Auston Wortman, III, with execution possible if necessary.