United States v. Daniel Wirsing

Citation: Not availableDocket: 19-6381

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; November 20, 2019; Federal Appellate Court

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Daniel W. Wirsing, also known as Big Dog or Ace, appeals the district court's denial of his Motion for a Reduced Sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. The First Step Act allows courts to impose reduced sentences as if the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 had been in effect at the time of the offense, specifically for offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Although both the Government and Wirsing agree he is entitled to relief, the district court concluded he was not sentenced for a "covered offense." The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagrees with this finding, reversing the district court's decision and remanding the case for a reconsideration of Wirsing's sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The opinion highlights the legislative history leading to the First Step Act, emphasizing its purpose to rectify disparities in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine, which arose from previous laws such as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that established mandatory minimums based on drug weight.

A defendant convicted of possessing 5 kilograms or more of cocaine or 50 grams of cocaine base faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, while a conviction for 500 grams of powder cocaine or 5 grams of cocaine base resulted in a five-year minimum. This 1986 statute established a controversial 100-to-1 sentencing ratio between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, subjecting crack dealers to the same penalties as those dealing in significantly larger quantities of powder cocaine. The Sentencing Guidelines reflected this ratio, which faced substantial criticism for being excessive and unjustified. Reports from the United States Sentencing Commission from 1995 to 2007 highlighted that the relative harm of crack versus powder cocaine was misrepresented, and the racial disparities in sentencing were notable, with a significant percentage of crack offense defendants being Black. The Supreme Court attempted to alleviate the harsh impacts of this disparity in its decisions in Booker and Kimbrough, establishing that sentencing judges could consider the unjust nature of the Guidelines when determining appropriate sentences. Following these rulings, some district courts began to deviate from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreements. However, mandatory minimum sentences remained in effect until Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act on August 3, 2010, aiming to rectify the sentencing inequities associated with the 100-to-1 ratio.

The Fair Sentencing Act revised cocaine sentencing by increasing the thresholds for mandatory minimum sentences: 280 grams for a ten-year minimum and 28 grams for a five-year minimum, thereby reducing the crack-to-powder cocaine ratio from 100–to–1 to 18–to–1. It also eliminated the mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of cocaine base. The Supreme Court ruled that these provisions applied to all crack cocaine offenders sentenced after August 3, 2010, regardless of when the offense occurred. However, those sentenced before this date could only benefit from the changes through a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), which allows reductions if the Sentencing Commission has lowered the sentencing range applicable to the case. The Sentencing Commission later implemented retroactive amendments to the Guidelines, specifically Amendments 750 and 782, allowing some pre-August 3, 2010 defendants to seek relief via 3582(c)(2). Importantly, no reduction was permitted if the amendments did not lower the defendant's applicable guideline range. Consequently, defendants whose guidelines were unaffected by these amendments, including those classified as career offenders, remained ineligible for relief, even if their sentences would likely have been different under the new standards.

Congress enacted the First Step Act in December 2018 to address gaps left by the Fair Sentencing Act. Prior to this Act, the defendant in United States v. Dean was ineligible for benefits under the Fair Sentencing Act due to his sentencing timing in June 2010. The First Step Act allowed the Dean district court to grant a motion for resentencing, resulting in a sentence of time served. The Act permits sentencing courts to impose reduced sentences as if the Fair Sentencing Act’s sections 2 and 3 were in effect when the offense occurred, specifically for "covered offenses"—violations of federal statutes whose penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act before August 3, 2010. Importantly, the decision to grant a sentence reduction is left to the discretion of the district court, with no obligation to reduce any sentence. The First Step Act allows for the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act's modifications in order to provide an opportunity for prisoners sentenced under the previous 100-to-1 disparity in crack versus powder cocaine sentencing to seek individualized case reviews. The appeal in question pertains to which defendants qualify for this retroactive relief. The excerpt also details a case involving a defendant indicted on multiple counts related to cocaine and firearms, who ultimately pleaded guilty to specific charges and was sentenced in January 2008 under the 2007 Guidelines Manual.

Defendant was indicted and sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, facing a statutory range of five to forty years due to possession of 60.135 grams as stipulated in the plea agreement. The district court accepted this quantity for sentencing, resulting in a base offense level of 30, which was adjusted to 32 after a two-level increase for firearm possession. As a career offender, his offense level increased to 34, placing him in criminal history category VI, leading to a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. He was sentenced to 188 months, plus a concurrent 120-month sentence for a separate charge.

In February 2019, under the First Step Act, Defendant sought a reduced sentence, arguing that his sentencing should reflect changes from the Fair Sentencing Act, which would categorize his offense under a lower maximum sentence. Under the amended law, the charge would fall under § 841(b)(1)(C) rather than § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), eliminating the mandatory minimum and reducing the maximum sentence to twenty years. This change would adjust his offense level to 32, and with acceptance of responsibility, it would drop to 29, establishing a new Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months.

Both parties agreed he was eligible for relief, with the Government supporting a sentence reduction leading to immediate release. However, the district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the sentencing quantity of 60.135 grams did not warrant a reduced Guidelines range, deeming him ineligible for relief.

The district court failed to analyze the First Step Act and did not determine whether it would grant relief to the Defendant if eligible. The Government later shifted its position, supporting the district court's decision on different grounds, specifically citing 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B) regarding eligibility criteria based on the Defendant's stipulated offense conduct of 60.135 grams of cocaine base. The Defendant contended that he was entitled to relief under the First Step Act due to modifications in statutory penalties by the Fair Sentencing Act related to his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). Subsequently, the Government moved to confess error and sought remand for reconsideration, asserting that only 16 grams of cocaine base from Count 14 should determine eligibility for relief. 

The court denied this motion and addressed the district court’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) instead of 3582(c)(1)(B). The court concluded that the district court erred in its application of the statutes and affirmed the Defendant's theory of eligibility based on his statute of conviction. This interpretation aligns with the majority of appellate and district court decisions on the matter. The parties acknowledged the district court's error in relying on 3582(c)(2), which pertains to a defendant’s Guidelines sentencing range, referencing cases that illustrate the distinction between statutes.

The court analyzed the appropriate legal framework for addressing motions under the First Step Act, referencing various cases to highlight differing judicial interpretations. It emphasized that under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B), courts are authorized to modify imposed sentences, distinguishing this from § 3582(c)(2), which applies only to situations where a sentencing range has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. The district court's decision to apply § 3582(c)(2) was criticized for failing to recognize that the First Step Act expressly allows for sentence modifications, unlike the Fair Sentencing Act, which only adjusted quantity thresholds without permitting changes to sentences themselves. Consequently, the First Step Act falls under the exceptions outlined in § 3582(c)(1)(B), allowing for the explicit modification of a sentence. The court noted that prior interpretations of § 3582(c)(1)(B) had been limited, primarily focusing on specific statutes and not recognizing the broader applicability introduced by the First Step Act.

United States v. Penson establishes that 28 U.S.C. §§ 2106 and 2255 are the statutes allowing for sentence modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). Other cases, such as United States v. Daily and United States v. Garcia-Quintanilla, clarify that certain statutes governing resentencing do not allow for modifications in the same way. The First Step Act explicitly permits courts to modify sentences, differing from the mandatory language of § 3742(g) and § 2255(b). Under the First Step Act, a court can reduce a sentence for a "covered offense," defined as a violation of federal law with modified penalties under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, committed before August 3, 2010. The interpretation of “covered offense” is crucial, as it determines eligibility for sentence reduction, with the defendant arguing that this term encompasses inmates serving sentences for specific pre-2010 violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841.

The First Step Act's interpretation is affirmed, establishing that "the statutory penalties for which" pertains to "a Federal criminal statute" rather than "a violation." The Government's interpretation relies on two assumptions that were not supported, leading to the conclusion that the most logical reading aligns with the statute's intent. Statutory interpretation principles, particularly the rule of the last antecedent, indicate that modifiers should attach to the nearest noun, reinforcing the connection between "penalties" and "statute." The term "statutory" clarifies potential ambiguities in sentencing, not indicating an alternative meaning. The legislative history supports that the First Step Act was designed to grant relief to pre-Fair Sentencing Act offenders, without imposing complex eligibility criteria. Consequently, the Defendant is deemed eligible for relief under the First Step Act, as he committed a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841 prior to August 3, 2010, and the penalties for this statute were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. The court reverses the district court's order and remands for consideration of the Defendant's motion to impose a reduced sentence.