Amber Orlean Willemsen v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 14-17-00781-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 22, 2019; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Amber Orlean Willemsen was found guilty of intoxication manslaughter following a collision that resulted in the death of Officer Endy Ekpanya. The jury sentenced her to 32 years of confinement. Willemsen raised two issues on appeal: the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on intoxication by drugs when there was insufficient evidence for it, and the denial of her motion to suppress blood-test results due to a lack of clear evidence that she voluntarily consented to the blood draw.

On June 12, 2016, at approximately 3 a.m., Willemsen’s vehicle collided with Ekpanya’s patrol car while she was speeding and driving in the wrong lane. First responders noted her abnormal behavior and signs of intoxication. After her arrest, Willemsen was taken to a hospital where her blood was drawn for testing. During the suppression hearing, State Trooper Darien Norman testified that Willemsen consented to the blood draw, although she expressed pain, which may have affected her understanding. Nurse Lindsay Katt confirmed there was no coercion involved in obtaining consent, despite Willemsen having received pain medication that night.

Trooper Nicolas Gassiott later obtained written consent from Willemsen, who appeared confused at the time. Willemsen testified that she was in significant pain and felt drugged, and she did not recall consenting to the blood draw. The trial court ultimately denied her motion to suppress, and the blood-test results indicated a blood-alcohol concentration between 0.139 and 0.163 grams per 100 milliliters, leading to the affirmation of her conviction on appeal.

Evidence indicating the appellant's intoxication during the collision includes her admissions of consuming multiple alcoholic drinks, surveillance videos from her workplace and a liquor store showing her purchasing alcohol, the discovery of alcohol in her vehicle, and witness accounts regarding her behavior and appearance that night. Additionally, the appellant's blood tested positive for Sertraline, an antidepressant, although the toxicologist could not determine its level in her system. A warning label on the medication advised that it could impair driving abilities when combined with alcohol. The trial court instructed the jury that they could convict the appellant of intoxication manslaughter if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that she operated a vehicle while intoxicated, resulting in the death of officer Endy Ekpanya due to a collision. The court defined "intoxicated" as either lacking normal use of mental or physical faculties due to alcohol or drugs, or having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher. The appellant argued that the evidence did not justify instructing the jury on intoxication from drugs or combinations of substances, asserting that the charge must reflect the law applicable to the case and the evidence presented. The court is required to include only those statutory definitions supported by evidence, and failure to do so constitutes an error, as established in relevant case law. The previous cases of Burnett and Ouellette highlight the importance of accurately instructing the jury on the basis of the evidence regarding intoxication.

The defendant in Ouellette faced charges of driving while intoxicated (DWI) after a rear-end collision. Evidence indicated intoxication, including alcohol consumption and the presence of various pills, including Soma, in her vehicle. An officer testified that Soma, like alcohol, is a central nervous system depressant, potentially causing symptoms observed during a sobriety test. Although the defendant claimed not to have taken medications recently and initially agreed to a blood test, she later retracted this offer when informed it could reveal her blood-alcohol level. The court rejected her argument that no evidence existed of intoxication from substances other than alcohol, stating that the DWI statute addresses the state of intoxication, not the intoxicant. The circumstantial evidence suggested ingestion of a depressant, supporting the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on drug-related intoxication. 

In Burnett, another DWI case with similar circumstances, the defendant also rear-ended a vehicle and had alcohol in his system. Although pills were found in his possession, there was no concrete evidence linking the pills (speculated to be hydrocodone) to intoxication symptoms. The court ruled that the jury could only consider intoxication from other substances if there was evidence of ingestion. Ultimately, the lack of such evidence led to the conclusion that the trial court erred in instructing on drug-related intoxication.

The current case, compared to Ouellette and Burnett, presents stronger evidence of drug-induced intoxication, as the appellant's post-collision blood test revealed Sertraline, an antidepressant, and a warning label indicated potential impairment when combined with alcohol. This aligns with precedents that recognize the significance of warning labels in establishing knowledge of intoxicating substances and allows for jury consideration of medications and their effects in determining intoxication.

In *Bryant v. State*, the court upheld the DWI conviction based on evidence that the defendant had taken medication on the day of her arrest, which included a warning label against alcohol consumption. Although the toxicologist could only confirm the presence of the drug in the defendant's system without quantifying it, substantial evidence indicated she was intoxicated. This included her causing a fatal collision while driving recklessly and exhibiting signs of impairment post-collision, such as bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. The jury was justified in concluding she was intoxicated by drugs, a combination of substances, or alcohol.

Regarding the motion to suppress blood-test results, the defendant claimed the trial court wrongly denied her motion by not establishing that she consented to the blood draw voluntarily. She argued that her consent was compromised due to the traumatic effects of the collision and her physical and mental state. The court applies a bifurcated standard of review for such motions, affording deference to the trial court's factual determinations while reviewing legal applications de novo. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches, and blood draws are considered searches. A warrantless search is generally deemed unreasonable unless it meets an exception, such as voluntary consent. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given; if an individual's will is overborne, consent may be ruled involuntary. The State bears the burden to prove voluntary consent by clear and convincing evidence.

The trial court must assess the voluntariness of consent to search by evaluating the totality of circumstances, carefully balancing the unique facts of each case. At a suppression hearing, the trial judge serves as the exclusive fact-finder and determines the credibility of witnesses. Testimony presented included that of Trooper Norman, who read the DIC–24 statutory warnings to the appellant before she consented to a blood draw, and Nurse Katt, who observed the consent and noted no signs of coercion. Trooper Gassiott testified that the appellant signed a written consent willingly and had previously orally consented. However, the appellant claimed she did not fully understand her rights, was in significant pain, and felt confused, asserting that she did not believe her consent was freely given. Witnesses corroborated her condition, with Norman acknowledging her serious injuries and pain, and Gassiott noting her confusion during the process. Despite the conflicting evidence regarding her state at the time of consent, the trial court found sufficient grounds to believe she consented voluntarily. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, affirming the denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress the blood-test results.