Tuhy v. Tuhy

Citation: 2018 ND 53Docket: 20170214

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court; February 22, 2018; North Dakota; State Supreme Court

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Samantha Tuhy initiated divorce proceedings against Jason Tuhy in May 2016 after the couple separated in February 2016. The couple, married in June 2003 and having three children, reached an agreement on parental responsibilities and established a stipulated parenting plan in February 2017. A trial occurred on February 8 and 13, 2017, focusing on property division, spousal support, and attorney's fees. 

The district court issued a memorandum opinion in March 2017, which Jason later requested to reconsider regarding property, debts, and support calculations. An order clarifying these calculations was issued on March 31, 2017. Samantha filed a proposed judgment on May 1, 2017, to which Jason objected but did not contest the attorney's fees. The final judgment on May 4, 2017, mandated Jason to pay $2,439 monthly in child support, $1,000 monthly in spousal support for four years, and $5,956 in attorney's fees.

The court allocated the parties' remainder interests in real property based on family control of the life estate, granted Jason a larger portion of his retirement to balance the division, awarded Samantha half of Jason’s non-vested Whiting Oil shares, and 25% of his 401(k). Jason was ordered to pay Samantha $158,782.61, with $50,000 due within 60 days and the remainder within ten years at a 6.5% interest rate. Following the judgment, Jason sought a stay on the payment and property conveyance pending appeal, which was denied after a hearing on July 18, 2017.

Samantha filed a motion to strike Jason's appeal concerning the district court's division of property and debts, claiming that Jason accepted substantial benefits from the judgment prior to its entry, which she argued constituted a waiver of his right to appeal. She pointed out that the judgment awarded Jason the marital residence, which he subsequently listed for sale with her consent, and financial assets that he continues to control. Although Samantha contended she was not seeking to dismiss the entire appeal, she acknowledged that spousal support and property division are interrelated, referencing Paulson v. Paulson, 2010 ND 100. The court requires clear evidence of waiver for a motion to dismiss an appeal, as established in Lizakowski v. Lizakowski, 2017 ND 91, which states that a party must show the appealing party accepted a substantial benefit that would not have been available without the decree. The court emphasized that acceptance must be unconditional, voluntary, and conscious. Samantha did not demonstrate any unusual circumstances or prejudice affecting her, nor did she prove that Jason intended to waive his appeal rights. Consequently, the court concluded that Samantha failed to establish that Jason waived his right to appeal by accepting benefits from the judgment, resulting in the denial of her motion to strike. Jason contended that the district court erred in its handling of the parties' remainder interests and spousal support.

Jason contends that the district court improperly excluded the parties' remainder interests in real property while dividing marital property. The review standard for marital property distribution is established as a factual finding assessed under the clearly erroneous standard. A finding is deemed clearly erroneous if it stems from a misinterpretation of the law, lacks evidentiary support, or if, after evaluating all evidence, a firm conviction of error exists. The court must view evidence favorably towards the findings, which are presumed correct. 

Equitable distribution of marital property and debts is mandated, encompassing all property owned by either party, whether jointly or individually. The total value of marital property must be determined before distribution, typically assessed at trial. The court must follow the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, considering factors such as the parties' ages, earning abilities, marriage duration, conduct, lifestyle, circumstances, health, financial status, property value, and income-generating capacity. 

Notably, while property distribution does not need to be equal, significant disparities must be justified. The length of the marriage influences the division of gifts and inherited property, with longer marriages generally supporting an equal division. In this case, Samantha holds a remainder interest in four properties, and Jason holds a remainder interest in two properties with his siblings, both subject to life estates of their parents. Jason claims the court disregarded the remainder interests, but the record indicates that the court included all properties as marital and awarded the remainder interests based on their origin, consistent with the Ruff-Fischer guidelines.

The district court based its property distribution on the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, considering several factors: 1) the property interests originated from the parties' parents; 2) these interests were unrelated to the parties' conduct during marriage; 3) the interests are non-possessory, with benefits not realized for years; 4) the gifts were primarily for estate planning, not immediate benefit; 5) while a value could be assigned to the interests, the future market value is uncertain. To address disparities in the remainder interests' values, the court awarded Jason a larger share of his retirement account before equally dividing the remaining marital property. The court concluded that the distribution, while not equal, was equitable and did not err in awarding remainder interests. 

Regarding spousal support, Jason contested the court's $1,000 monthly award to Samantha for four years, asserting his inability to pay. According to N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1, spousal support decisions are factual findings that cannot be overturned unless clearly erroneous. The court must consider relevant factors under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, such as the parties' ages, earning abilities, marriage duration, conduct, financial circumstances, and health. While specific findings on each factor are not mandatory, the rationale behind the decision must be ascertainable. The support determination must balance the needs of both parties and the supporting spouse's ability to pay. The court's decisions will not be reversed simply due to differing interpretations of the evidence.

Samantha sought rehabilitative spousal support to help her obtain teaching credentials, leading the district court to apply the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. Key findings included: both parties' ages (Jason, 36; Samantha, 34), significant income disparity favoring Jason, a marriage duration of over 13 years, absence of significant marital misconduct, a comfortable standard of living for both, good health for both parties, and minimal debts or assets brought into the marriage aside from parental gifts. The court determined that even with credentials, Samantha would earn less than Jason and confirmed Jason's ability to pay. The court ordered Jason to pay $1,000 monthly in spousal support for four years, concluding there was no legal error in this decision.

Jason contested the district court's award of attorney’s fees to Samantha, claiming the lack of explanation constituted an abuse of discretion. The court has broad authority under N.D.C.C. 14-05-23 to award these fees, primarily based on one spouse’s needs and the other’s ability to pay, as well as the conduct that may have unnecessarily prolonged the case. The general principle follows the ‘American Rule,’ where parties typically bear their own fees unless a statute provides otherwise. Specific findings regarding the financial conditions and needs of both parties are required for awarding attorney’s fees. The court's decision can only be overturned if it was arbitrary or unreasonable. The judgment mandated Jason to pay $5,956 towards Samantha’s attorney’s fees, but the court failed to provide detailed reasoning for this award, despite evidence of both parties' financial needs and Jason's ability to pay. Both parties had documented their attorney fees during the trial, and Jason had already paid part of his fees without objection to the amounts listed.

Jason filed a "Request for Clarification and Reconsideration of Calculations in Memorandum Opinion" in district court following his trial, though North Dakota law does not formally recognize motions for reconsideration. Such motions are typically treated as either a motion to alter or amend a judgment under N.D.R.Civ. P. 59(j) or a motion for relief from a judgment under N.D.R.Civ. P. 60(b). Jason's motion was filed before the judgment was entered, failing to meet the criteria for either rule, as it did not seek relief from a final order or request to alter an existing judgment. The court may assess the substance of a motion rather than its label.

Jason's motion appears to be partly based on N.D.R.Civ. P. 60(a) for correcting clerical mistakes and partly on N.D.R.Civ. P. 59(b), implying a request for a new trial. His motion sought reconsideration of findings regarding spousal support based on his claim that Samantha could support herself, which are considered factual determinations. Although Jason did not explicitly request a new trial, the nature of his motion suggests that was his intent. A new trial allows for the re-examination of factual issues after a court’s decision.

Parties are not obligated to request a new trial before appealing, but issues not raised in a new trial motion cannot be appealed. In a similar case, Kosobud v. Kosobud, the court corrected some decisions but denied the post-trial motion, emphasizing that unchallenged issues, like attorney's fees, cannot be appealed if not included in the motion. Jason did not raise a challenge to attorney’s fees in his reconsideration motion, thus waiving that issue on appeal. The district court's judgment regarding the distribution of marital property and spousal support is affirmed.