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State of Tennessee v. Sedrick Clayton
Citation: 535 S.W.3d 829Docket: W2015-00158-SC-DDT-DD
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court; November 19, 2017; Tennessee; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Sedrick Clayton was convicted by a Shelby County jury of three counts of first-degree murder (Arithio Fisher, Patricia Fisher, and Pashea Fisher), one count of attempted first-degree murder (A’Reco Fisher), and additional charges related to firearm possession and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. He received death sentences for the murders, with concurrent sentences for the other convictions, resulting in a total effective sentence of death plus six years. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, ruling that the evidence supported premeditation, the defendant waived his Fourth Amendment challenge regarding his statements, and the death sentences met statutory review requirements. The Court also attached relevant findings from the lower court’s decision regarding other issues raised by the defendant. Oral arguments were presented on June 1, 2017, as part of the S.C.A.L.E.S. project. The opinion was delivered by Justice Roger A. Page, with a concurrence from Justice Sharon G. Lee. The defendant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, raising multiple arguments: the insufficiency of evidence for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted murder; the trial court's improper denial of his motion to suppress police statements; double jeopardy issues regarding dual firearm convictions; errors in admitting victim photographs and 9-1-1 call recordings during the penalty phase; improper testimony from Lieutenant Goods; claims that Tennessee's death penalty scheme is cruel and unusual punishment and unconstitutional; and the disproportionality of his death sentences. The Court affirmed the trial court's decisions but remanded for correction of merged firearm convictions. In the automatic appeal to the higher court, the defendant reiterated many of these points, emphasizing the lack of premeditation evidence, the admission of victim photographs, the comparison of his case to others by Lieutenant Goods, disproportionality of the death sentence, and constitutional issues with the death penalty scheme. The court specified four issues for oral argument: evidence sufficiency, the suppression of the defendant’s statement due to detention delays, the exclusion of 9-1-1 recordings, and the mandatory review of the death sentence. The factual background describes events on January 19, 2012, when A’Reco Fisher, asleep in his family home, was awakened by an altercation and gunfire involving the defendant, who was the boyfriend of A’Reco’s sister, Pashea. The defendant entered the home without residing there and was allowed in by Pashea. A’Reco heard an argument followed by gunshots, indicating a violent incident in the household. The defendant forcibly entered a residence, brandished a weapon, and shot Pashea while she pleaded for help. A’Reco witnessed the defendant drag Pashea to the living room, where she attempted to resist and called for 9-1-1. A’Reco heard the defendant threaten to shoot Pashea before he shot her in the head, approximately twelve feet away from him. The defendant fled the scene with a child, J.C., after which A’Reco called emergency services, discovering Pashea was critically injured and that his parents were also in distress—one unconscious and the other severely injured. A 9-1-1 dispatcher received an open line call at 5:40 a.m. from the Fishers' residence, capturing background sounds of a struggle, a child crying, and gunshots. Another caller reported the incident, prompting the dispatch of police and emergency services. Following the shooting, the defendant contacted Adrienne Lewis, an acquaintance and mother of one of his children, expressing fear and confusion about the incident. He abandoned Pashea’s car and drove with Lewis and their children to her home, where he described having “flipped out” and shooting individuals in the house. They later drove to the defendant's sister's house, where they learned from a news report that two victims had died. Jesse Clements, the defendant's brother-in-law, then transported them to a police precinct. At the scene, Sergeant Richard Borden was approached by the defendant's mother, Lillian Harvey, who relayed the defendant's intention to surrender. Following communication between the defendant and law enforcement, he turned himself in, leading to his arrest at 8:47 a.m. A .40 caliber pistol and magazines were found in the vehicle he arrived in, which was occupied by another male, a female, and two young girls. MPD Officer Chase Merritt was the first to arrive at the crime scene, where he observed a motionless female with a gunshot wound to her temple. A’Reco Fisher, identified as a witness, informed officers that the defendant had taken J.C. against her will. Following Merritt, Officers Matthew Biggs and Michael Tran entered and had to step over the body of Pashea Fisher. In the master bedroom, they found another male victim with significant blood loss and a female victim who was unresponsive but still moving. Bullet holes and casings were present, but no firearms were found. Lieutenant Anthony Mullins assessed the scene, concluding that the shooting originated in the bedroom and moved toward the front door, with specific observations of a bullet hole in the sofa where A’Reco was sleeping. Emergency personnel declared Pashea and Arithio Fisher dead at the scene, while Patricia Fisher died later at the hospital due to her injuries. The forensic pathologist confirmed that all three victims died from multiple gunshot wounds, classifying their deaths as homicides. A firearms expert linked the cartridge cases and bullets to a firearm recovered during the defendant's arrest, confirming it was operational. Lieutenant Darren Goods interviewed the defendant following a delay for procedural reasons, including the use of an alternative light source to check for gunshot residue. The defendant was shackled and coherent during the interview, understanding the situation and providing his biographical information, including his education level. The defendant denied consuming alcohol or prescription drugs before the interview but admitted to smoking marijuana the previous evening. He claimed no mental health issues. Lieutenant Goods, with twenty-nine years of experience, observed that the defendant showed no signs of marijuana after-effects. During the interview, before reviewing the Advice of Rights form, the defendant expressed remorse by stating variations of "I’m sorry." Once the form was reviewed and signed, the official interview began at 4:32 p.m., wherein the defendant's initial account was inconsistent with evidence, prompting officers to confront him with 9-1-1 recordings that captured Pashea pleading for her parents' safety. The defendant dismissed her pleas as a game. The verbal statement lasted one hour, with a restroom break, during which the defendant changed his narrative multiple times but never requested to stop or an attorney. He acknowledged being under arrest and not free to leave. In his final account, the defendant described a relationship with Pashea that escalated into an argument over infidelity, followed by a period of “makeup sex.” As he attempted to leave, a confrontation ensued, culminating in an altercation with Pashea and her parents, resulting in him dropping his firearm. He claimed he fired the weapon out of fear for his life during the struggle. Arithio forced his way into a bedroom, using his shoulder to break down the door and began shooting. He saw Patricia crawling across the bed and fired in her direction, mistakenly believing she was hiding. After initially leaving the room, he returned to reload and shot in the general direction of where A’Reco, the Fishers' son, typically slept. During this, Pashea pleaded with him not to kill her parents, while a child, J.C., screamed. The defendant claimed that Pashea grabbed him, causing the gun to discharge and fatally wound her. He then took J.C. and called another girlfriend, admitting to shooting the Fishers and Pashea. During police interviews, the defendant made numerous corrections to his statement, attempting to minimize his involvement. He expressed a desire to continue speaking with officers despite being advised of his right to an attorney. His demeanor was described as "cavalier," downplaying the serious nature of the events. The jury subsequently convicted him on all counts: first-degree murder for Arithio, Patricia, and Pashea Fisher; attempted first-degree murder of A’Reco; possession of a firearm during a felony; employing a firearm in a felony; and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. In the penalty phase, family members of the victims described the profound impact of the murders. In mitigation, the defendant's sister Tawana spoke about his challenging early life and loss of his stepfather, portraying him as not inherently bad but rather a joking person. She argued against the death penalty's impact on his children. Another sister, Tameka, discussed the emotional toll on their mother, while Adrienne Lewis testified about how a death penalty could harm her daughter, Y.C., who had a close relationship with the defendant. A defense team member testified that the defendant proposed a plea deal for consecutive life sentences without parole, which the State rejected in favor of pursuing the death penalty. Lieutenant Mullins, an expert in blood stain pattern analysis, stated that the incident originated near the master bedroom, where Pashea was shot, evidenced by wood splinters found on her clothing. Blood spatter analysis indicated Pashea was not standing when the blood landed on her, suggesting an argument between her and the defendant before Arithio intervened. All victims were found in the master bedroom with the door closed when the shooting commenced, with bullets fired through the door and powder residue found on the door frame. Mullins concluded Arithio was shot first while attempting to hold the door closed, followed by Patricia, who was shot on the bed and again on the floor near the television as she attempted to escape. Pashea was fatally shot near the front door, and the defendant deliberately aimed at the sofa, knowing A’Reco typically slept there. Stippling around Pashea’s head wound indicated she was shot from close range. Lieutenant Goods testified that the defendant broke down the bedroom door before shooting Patricia and Arithio, demonstrating intent to harm A’Reco. The jury found two aggravating circumstances for each murder: creation of a great risk of death to multiple persons and the act of mass murder, leading to a death sentence for all three first-degree murder convictions. The trial court also imposed agreed-upon sentences for other offenses: fifteen years for attempted first-degree murder, three years for possession of a firearm during a felony, six years for employing a firearm in a felony, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for unauthorized vehicle use. The defendant did not dispute the shootings but challenged the premeditation required for his murder convictions. The standard for appellate review regarding claims of insufficient evidence requires assessing whether any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, as established in Jackson v. Virginia. Defendants challenging sufficiency must demonstrate that no rational trier of fact could reach such a conclusion. This review applies equally to direct and circumstantial evidence. During appellate review, the state is afforded the strongest legitimate interpretation of the evidence, along with any reasonable inferences. Credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are determined by the trier of fact, with the appellate court presuming that all reasonable inferences and conflicts have been resolved in favor of the state. A jury's guilty verdict, approved by the trial court, endorses the state's testimony and theory, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, who must show that the evidence fails to support the verdict. The defendant, convicted of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder and one count of attempted premeditated murder, argues that the evidence does not sufficiently support the jury's finding of premeditation. Under Tennessee law, first-degree murder is defined as a premeditated and intentional killing, which also applies to the definition of attempted first-degree murder. Premeditation involves the intentional decision to kill made after reflection and judgment, with the crucial requirement that the intent must exist prior to the act. The duration of this intent does not need to be fixed in the accused's mind for any specific time, but the mental state at the moment of decision is essential to assess premeditation. A jury determines whether premeditation occurred, considering the context and circumstances of the killing. Evidence of premeditation can be direct or circumstantial, supported by factors such as using a deadly weapon on an unarmed victim, deliberate cruelty, prior declarations of intent, weapon procurement, crime concealment preparations, and the defendant’s calmness post-incident. Additional factors include the absence of provocation from the victim and the defendant's lack of assistance to the victim. In the specific case described, the defendant entered the Fishers’ home and, after an argument with Pashea, shot her and then entered her parents' bedroom, where he killed Arithio and Patricia. He subsequently attempted to shoot A’Reco and fatally shot Pashea after reloading. The evidence indicated the defendant fired upon four unarmed victims without provocation and failed to assist any of them, supporting a finding of premeditation. Regarding the motion to suppress the defendant's statements made to police, he claimed violations of his constitutional rights, particularly focusing on the Fourth Amendment. However, he noted that this claim was not addressed by the trial court, leading to a failure to obtain an adverse ruling. The omission of the Fourth Amendment argument in his new trial motion meant the court did not consider it in its denial of that motion. The defendant seeks to have his Fourth Amendment claims considered despite procedural challenges, arguing for plain error review. The State contends that the defendant waived this claim, a conclusion upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeals, which noted that the defendant failed to provide argument or analysis regarding the Fourth Amendment in his suppression motion and did not request the trial court to address it post-order. The Court of Criminal Appeals conducted a plain error review and found no error occurred. The standard of review for suppression hearings is established: findings of fact by the trial court are binding unless evidence strongly contradicts them. The trial judge has discretion over witness credibility and evidence weight, and appellate courts can review the entire record, including trial evidence, when assessing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. The defendant claimed his statement was inadmissible due to violations of multiple constitutional amendments, specifically alleging unlawful detention before being presented to a magistrate. Testimony indicated the defendant was placed in custody at 8:47 a.m. on January 19, 2012, with his interview starting later that day at 4:00 p.m. He signed a rights waiver at 4:32 p.m., and the statement was recorded at 6:55 p.m. The affidavit against him was sworn the next day at 11:34 a.m., almost 27 hours after his arrest. However, the defendant did not elaborate on this Fourth Amendment issue in his motion to suppress or provide legal support for his claims. Counsel did not question Lieutenant Goods about the alleged delay during the trial, nor did he raise this issue in the motion for a new trial or during the hearing on that motion. Consequently, the trial court did not have the opportunity to address this argument before denying the motion for a new trial. The court highlighted that when a trial judge has definitively ruled on a suppression motion, further objections are typically unnecessary, as established in State v. McGhee. However, in cases with only partially developed records, failing to renew objections poses risks for counsel. In this instance, the failure to secure a ruling on the Fourth Amendment argument after the suppression hearing and the omission of this argument during the new trial motion resulted in a waiver of the claim. Nonetheless, Tennessee appellate courts can exercise discretion to consider unraised errors under "plain error" review, which can apply even when no contemporaneous objection is made. For plain error to be recognized, five factors must be met: the trial record must clearly outline what occurred, there must be a breach of a clear legal principle, a substantial right of the accused must be affected, the issue must not have been waived for strategic reasons, and addressing the error must be essential for achieving substantial justice. Failure to meet any of these criteria precludes the need for further consideration of the remaining factors. The defendant must demonstrate to the appellate court that the trial court committed plain error, which significantly affected the trial's outcome. The appellate record is unclear regarding the facts supporting the defendant’s motion to suppress, specifically concerning a claimed delay in swearing an affidavit of complaint post-arrest; the absence of the affidavit from the record undermines this assertion, as an accurate record is essential for appellate review. The defendant's claim of a breach of clear law due to delay in presenting him to a magistrate is also addressed. The law mandates that individuals arrested without a warrant must be taken before a magistrate promptly to determine probable cause. A delay under forty-eight hours is generally considered reasonable unless it is intended to gather more evidence, motivated by animosity, or simply for the sake of delay. The court has determined that violations of this requirement may lead to evidence being excluded under the exclusionary rule, applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. However, detention based on probable cause is not deemed illegal until it exceeds the period mandated by law, at which point it may become unconstitutional. A statement made by an arrestee prior to an unconstitutional detention is admissible and should not be suppressed. Probable cause for an arrest exists when law enforcement has sufficient trustworthy facts to warrant a reasonable belief that the individual committed or was committing an offense. This determination includes assessing the collective knowledge of law enforcement at the time of arrest, ensuring effective communication among officers regarding relevant information. In this case, officers had eyewitness accounts and recordings of 9-1-1 calls that established probable cause for the defendant's arrest, which occurred at 8:47 a.m. His police interview began approximately seven hours later, and he was presented before a magistrate after twenty-seven hours. Any potential violation of timely presentation would not constitute a Gerstein violation unless the delay exceeded forty-eight hours, and the defendant did not demonstrate that the delay was improper. The court is mandated to review death sentences under Tennessee law, which includes evaluating whether the sentence was imposed arbitrarily, if the evidence supports the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances, and if those circumstances outweigh any mitigating factors. The jury unanimously found that the State proved the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt for the defendant’s first-degree murder convictions. The trial court's conduct during the penalty phase adhered to statutory requirements, leading to the conclusion that the death sentences were not imposed arbitrarily. The sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury’s findings of statutory aggravating circumstances requires an evaluation of whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such circumstances exist. In the case at hand, the jury identified two aggravating circumstances in relation to the defendant's first-degree murder convictions involving three victims. 1. The first aggravating circumstance was that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons other than the murder victims. This finding, which the defendant did not contest, was supported by evidence showing that the defendant fired towards an area where another person often slept and that a four-year-old child was present during the shooting. 2. The second aggravating circumstance found by the jury was that the defendant committed "mass murder," defined as the murder of three or more persons in a single criminal episode. The evidence was unchallenged and clearly demonstrated that the defendant shot all three victims during the same incident. In addition to evaluating the aggravating circumstances, the jury also weighed these against any mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase. The statutory requirement on appeal is to determine if the evidence supports the jury's conclusion that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed on various mitigating circumstances, including the defendant’s lack of a significant criminal history, claims of provocation, his relationship with the victims, his cooperation with law enforcement, and his role as a family member. The document addresses factors influencing the determination of a defendant's death sentence, particularly focusing on the impact of the defendant's death on his family, any expressions of remorse, and other mitigating factors. The jury's finding of two aggravating circumstances is supported by undisputed evidence, indicating that this evidence outweighs any mitigation claims beyond a reasonable doubt. A statutory requirement mandates a review of the death sentence's proportionality, assessing if it is excessive or disproportionate compared to similar cases. This review aims to prevent arbitrary or capricious sentencing by comparing the case in question with other first-degree murder cases where the death penalty was sought. Key considerations for the proportionality review include the circumstances of the crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and specific aggravating and mitigating factors. The document outlines the factors to evaluate, including means and manner of death, motivation, victim characteristics, premeditation, provocation, and the defendant's prior criminal record, demographics, mental state, cooperation with authorities, level of remorse, awareness of the victim's helplessness, and rehabilitation potential. In this case, the defendant argues for a broader comparison pool for the proportionality analysis, a request that has been previously rejected by the court. The legislature has not defined “similar cases” for this review, and the court has examined approaches from other jurisdictions in its decision-making process. Three primary categories for analyzing death penalty cases have been identified in other jurisdictions: (1) cases where the death penalty was imposed, (2) cases where the State sought the death penalty and a sentencing hearing occurred, regardless of the outcome, and (3) all death-eligible convictions without regard to whether the death penalty was sought. The Court has rejected both the first and third categories, opting instead for a comparison of first-degree murder cases where a capital sentencing hearing was conducted to determine the appropriate sentence. This approach aligns Tennessee with several other states. The issues were revisited in the Godsey case, reaffirming the pool defined by a previous decision in Bland. The Court dismissed arguments advocating for broader pools, emphasizing the difficulty in comparing death penalty cases with those where the death penalty was not sought due to prosecutorial discretion. The Court maintains that the appropriate pool for proportionality review includes only cases where the State pursued the death penalty, a hearing was held, and a jury returned a verdict, regardless of the sentence outcome. The analysis then shifts to a statutory proportionality comparison, assessing whether the defendant's death sentence is disproportionate to sentences for similar crimes and defendants, considering various factors. The aim is to identify and invalidate any aberrant death sentence, defined as one that lacks circumstances consistent with cases where the death penalty was imposed. The review of the case concludes that the death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared to similar cases involving mass murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals cited multiple precedents where death sentences were upheld under comparable circumstances, highlighting specific instances of mass murder with aggravating factors such as the number of victims and the nature of the crimes. Notable cases include Dotson (killing four adults and two nephews), Jordan (shooting estranged wife and two men), and Holton (murdering four children), among others. Several cases of domestic violence resulting in murder were also acknowledged. The analysis emphasizes that the evaluation of the death penalty must consider not only the crime's circumstances but also the defendant's personal factors, including prior criminal history, demographics, mental and emotional state, involvement in the crime, cooperation with law enforcement, remorse, awareness of the victim's helplessness, and potential for rehabilitation. Additionally, adherence to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12 mandates detailed reporting on cases of first-degree murder, encompassing crime and defendant-related data. The Court has upheld death sentences for defendants without prior criminal histories in previous cases, citing Terry v. State, where a minister murdered a handyman, and State v. Keen, where a defendant raped and killed a victim. In these instances, the lack of a prior record did not preclude a death sentence. The Court rejected claims for relief based on cooperation with law enforcement, emphasizing that cooperation occurring only after family urging and during a manhunt does not merit leniency. The Court clarified that cases do not need to be identical for sentencing comparisons and that a close examination of the entire record supports the jury's findings of statutory aggravating circumstances, which outweigh any mitigating factors. The death sentence is deemed not arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate. After reviewing all issues raised by the defendant, the Court affirms the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals, including the death sentence set for November 28, 2018, with costs of appeal assigned to the State due to the defendant’s indigence. An appendix containing excerpts from the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is included, confirming the proceedings and opinions of the judges involved. The Defendant argues that having dual convictions for possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during a dangerous felony and employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates double jeopardy principles. The State agrees that these convictions should merge. Under the current double jeopardy analysis established in State v. Watkins, the critical inquiries are whether the convictions arise from the same act or transaction and whether the elements of the offenses are the same or if one is a lesser included offense of the other. In this case, both firearm convictions stem from the same act—attempted first-degree murder—and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed is a lesser included offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Therefore, the dual convictions violate double jeopardy principles, and the case is remanded for the trial court to merge the convictions accordingly. In addition, the Defendant challenges the admission of three photographs of the victims during the penalty phase, claiming it was an error by the trial court. The State argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the photographs, which were introduced to support the mass murder aggravating circumstance. The photographs included crime scene images and one taken at the medical facility, despite objections from trial counsel regarding their necessity since the jury had already convicted the Defendant of the murders. Counsel acknowledged the jury's establishment of the mass murder aggravator and offered to stipulate to it. The prosecutor, however, rejected the stipulation, asserting that the State must prove its case and that photographs would have a stronger impact than a stipulation. The trial court deemed the photographs "extremely, highly prejudicial" but allowed their admission during the penalty phase, emphasizing the necessity for the State to prove aggravating circumstances. The court expressed concern about potential reactions from victims' families but was assured by the prosecutor that no outbursts would occur. During the penalty phase, Lieutenant Mullins testified about the aggravating circumstances, and three photographs were introduced to support his statements without any reported spectator outbursts. The Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the photographs, claiming they were redundant to evidence presented earlier and that the stipulation should suffice. Reference was made to State v. Banks, which outlines criteria for the admissibility of photographic evidence, including the accuracy, clarity, relevance, and necessity of the images for establishing facts. The supreme court noted that demonstrating the probative value of particularly gruesome photographs against their prejudicial effect is challenging, especially when a stipulation is offered. However, this standard applies mainly during the guilt phase of the trial, with the penalty phase governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c), which permits the admission of any relevant evidence for punishment determination, including aggravating and mitigating circumstances, regardless of its adherence to the rules of evidence. The court can consider the Tennessee Rules of Evidence for guidance but should not exclude reliable evidence relevant to punishment-related issues. The trial court must evaluate the reliability, relevance, value, and prejudicial impact of the evidence presented. The trial court has broad discretion in admitting photographs, which will not be overturned on appeal unless there is evidence of an abuse of that discretion. In this case, the court properly allowed the State to introduce photographs relevant to establishing the aggravating circumstance of mass murder. The photographs were not excessively gruesome or prejudicial, with only one photograph per victim being presented. Regarding the audio recordings of two 9-1-1 calls, the Defendant argued for their exclusion, claiming they were irrelevant and overly prejudicial. The trial court denied this motion, finding the recordings relevant for establishing identity, state of mind, and premeditation. The first call provided critical real-time details about the murders, including the identification of the perpetrator. Although the second call was chaotic and distressing, with background screams and moans, the court determined it was not overly inflammatory when considering its probative value. The trial court concluded that both calls contributed significant context to the events, justifying their admission into evidence. The court found the 911 call relevant to issues of identity and premeditation in a shooting case, as it provided a real-time account of events and included statements from the defendant that could counter his police testimony. It was deemed essential for establishing a timeline of events. The trial court ruled that the statements in the calls fell under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. While a redacted transcript of A’Reco's call was permitted, a transcript of the "open line" call was excluded. The court emphasized that evidence is relevant if it influences the likelihood of a fact in the case, and while relevant evidence is generally admissible, it can be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by potential prejudice or confusion. The admissibility of evidence is largely at the trial court's discretion. The court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the 911 recordings, despite the defendant's argument that identity was not at issue. The state must prove all elements of the offenses, including identity, regardless of whether it is disputed. The recordings were relevant to intent and premeditation, detailing the shooting timeline and countering the defendant’s statements. The defendant did not contest the trial court's ruling on the excited utterance exception or the decisions regarding transcripts. The court noted that A’Reco's call was calm and not overly inflammatory, contrasting with the chaotic nature of the "open line" call. J.C.'s recording captured her screams, alongside Pashea and the Defendant yelling, with Pashea pleading for her parents' lives before two shots were fired, after which Pashea's voice ceased. The court determined that the recordings were relevant despite the contested issues of premeditation and intent, concluding that their probative value outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, thus denying the Defendant relief on this matter. Regarding the admission of Lieutenant Goods’ testimony, the Defendant claimed the trial court erred by allowing Goods to compare the victims’ homicides to other cases he had investigated and to discuss the emotional impact of these homicides on him. Goods recounted the Defendant's dismissive remarks about Pashea's pleas during a 9-1-1 call, describing the Defendant as cavalier about the incident and noting his anger during interactions with the Defendant. Although Goods initially misstated the timing of the Defendant's comments, he later clarified that the Defendant made a statement indicating the situation was "not a big deal" after the written statement was complete. On cross-examination, Goods faced questioning about the Memphis Police Department's policy on evidence preservation and the lack of notes during the interview, which he attributed to departmental practice. Goods admitted to using strong language towards the Defendant, which he justified as a reaction to the Defendant's demeanor. During redirect examination, Goods reiterated that he would have recorded the interview had departmental policy required it. Lieutenant Goods testified about his experience investigating approximately 200 homicides, specifically recalling the triple homicide in question due to the emotional impact of the 911 tapes and the rarity of such cases. The prosecutor's inquiry into Goods' reaction to the defendant was initially challenged by trial counsel for relevance, but the trial court permitted it after the prosecutor indicated she would establish relevance. Goods explained he asked the defendant if he was "f. crazy" because of the defendant's nonchalant attitude regarding the crime. The trial court maintained discretion over the admissibility of testimony, allowing redirect examination to introduce new facts. It clarified that the prosecutor did not compare the current homicides to others investigated. Goods' testimony regarding the specific circumstances of the case countered defense arguments questioning his memory, and the court underscored the principle that evidence may be admitted if the defendant introduces the issue. The principle of “opening the door” allows a party to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence in response to issues raised by the opposing party during trial. In this case, it was determined that counsel opened the door to Lieutenant Goods’s testimony about recalling a homicide during cross-examination, thus permitting its admission. Furthermore, Lieutenant Goods’s explanation for cursing at the Defendant was also admissible as it mirrored his earlier direct examination testimony, which was not objected to by the Defendant, resulting in a waiver of that issue. According to Tennessee Rules of Evidence, an error in admitting evidence does not warrant relief unless it affects a substantial right and a timely objection is made. The Defendant did not demonstrate that any potential error in admitting Lieutenant Goods’s redirect testimony affected the trial’s outcome or caused prejudice, as outlined in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b) regarding harmless error review. During the sentencing hearing for non-capital offenses, an agreement was reached between the parties. The prosecutor recommended a 15-year sentence for criminal attempted murder, a 3-year sentence for possession of a firearm (consecutive to the murder counts), a 6-year sentence for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony (also consecutive), and an 11-month and 29-day sentence for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (concurrent with all except the firearm-related counts). The trial court accepted these sentences; however, the final judgment did not accurately reflect the agreed-upon concurrent and consecutive nature of the sentences. The judgment for the conviction of attempt to commit first degree murder (count four) mandates a fifteen-year sentence served concurrently with counts one, two, three, and seven, but consecutively to counts five and six. The "Special Conditions" section indicates that this fifteen-year sentence will be concurrent with counts one, two, three, and six, and consecutive to count five. The conviction for possession of a firearm with intent during a dangerous felony (count five) imposes a three-year sentence to run concurrently with counts one, two, three, six, and seven, but consecutively to count four. The conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony (count six) results in a six-year sentence, also concurrent with counts one, two, three, and seven and consecutive to count four. The unauthorized use of a motor vehicle conviction (count seven) imposes an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence to be served concurrently with counts one, two, three, four, and seven, but consecutively to count five. During sentencing, trial counsel indicated that paperwork was ready, but details were not provided. After oral arguments, a court order was issued requiring supplementation of the appellate record with any sentencing orders for non-capital convictions. The trial court clerk later reported that no such orders were found. The court concluded that the trial court should have merged the convictions for possession of a firearm (count five) and employing a firearm (count six) and remanded for corrected judgments to reflect this merger and the agreed-upon sentences for the non-capital offenses.