Rochkind v. Stevenson

Citations: 145 A.3d 570; 229 Md. App. 422; 2016 Md. App. LEXIS 100Docket: 0418/15

Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; September 1, 2016; Maryland; State Appellate Court

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Starlena Stevenson sued S&S Partnership, Stanley Rochkind, and Dear Management Construction Company for negligence and violations of the Consumer Protection Act, alleging injuries from lead-based paint ingestion at the Fairview Property owned by Rochkind and S&S. The first jury trial in March 2014 resulted in a verdict for Stevenson, awarding $1,363,000 in total damages. Rochkind sought a new trial, leading to a partial retrial on damages in late 2014, where a second jury awarded her $1,453,000, later reduced to $1,103,000 due to statutory caps on non-economic damages.

Rochkind appealed the decision, raising several issues: 

1. Whether Judge Sfekas erred in ordering a partial new trial instead of a full one, and if Judge White improperly limited the re-trial issues.
2. Whether the courts erred by not conducting a Frye-Reed hearing regarding the admissibility of expert testimony from Dr. Hall-Carrington on the causation of Stevenson's elevated blood lead levels and related health issues.
3. Whether it was erroneous in the second trial to not hold a Frye-Reed hearing on Mark Lieberman’s methodologies and to allow him to testify about Stevenson's potential academic performance.
4. Whether allowing Dr. Conte’s economic loss opinions, based solely on Lieberman's testimony, constituted an error.
5. Whether it was incorrect to exclude Rochkind's expert from discussing research on the economic impact of lead exposure on lifetime earnings.
6. Whether limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Conte regarding evidence of Stevenson's eligibility for job coaching was an error.

Mr. Rochkind presents several claims of error regarding the lower court's decisions in the trial. Key points include:

A. The court improperly granted only a partial new trial after recognizing an error in allowing Dr. Conte to testify, despite the intertwined nature of liability and damages.

B. The court erred by permitting Dr. Cynthia Hall-Carrington to testify that lead paint from 3823 Fairview Avenue was a significant factor in the Appellee’s elevated blood lead levels, despite her lack of experience in lead risk assessment, failure to investigate other lead sources, and reliance solely on records provided by the Appellee’s counsel.

C. The court incorrectly allowed Dr. Hall-Carrington to opine that lead exposure could cause ADHD and that it specifically caused the Appellee's ADHD, contrary to the prevailing medical opinion that heredity is the primary cause, and given that she never examined the Appellee or performed a differential diagnosis.

D. The court allowed Dr. Hall-Carrington to claim that the Appellee's injuries were due to lead exposure at the Appellant’s property, despite her reliance on general epidemiological studies rather than individual diagnosis, and her failure to account for non-lead-related issues.

E. The court erred in permitting Dr. Hall-Carrington to assert a specific loss of IQ points due to alleged lead exposure from any source, without her having the expertise in IQ testing or a proper foundation for her opinion, contradicting prior appellate rulings.

F. The lower courts improperly denied the Appellant’s request for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the qualifications and methodologies of Appellee’s experts under Frye-Reed and Rule 5-702.

G. The trial court’s decision to allow a partial new trial on damages only was erroneous due to the interrelation of liability and damages.

H. The trial court made a mistake in allowing the Appellee’s vocational expert to claim that the Appellee would have functioned as an ‘average high school graduate’ based on an unqualified methodology.

I. The trial court also erred by excluding the Appellant’s expert economist from testifying on established scientific research related to the economic impact of lead exposure.

Additionally, Ms. Stevenson noted a cross-appeal concerning the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Ultimately, the judgments of the circuit court were affirmed.

The trial court erred by allowing the Appellee to introduce evidence indicating eligibility for free job coaching while simultaneously preventing the Appellant from using this evidence to cross-examine the Appellee’s expert economist. The economist based his loss of income calculations on the assumption that the Appellee would not earn future income due to an inability to afford job coaching. Additionally, the trial court incorrectly permitted the Appellee’s expert economist to provide economic loss opinions solely derived from the opinions of the Appellee’s vocational expert, which should have been excluded.

Ms. Stevenson, born on December 22, 1990, was primarily raised by her mother, Charlena Montgomery, and her maternal grandmother, Lorena Cooks, with her father being largely absent. From birth to nine months, she lived at the 2110 Clifton Property, which had no deteriorated paint. In October 1991, the family moved to the Fairview Property, where Ms. Stevenson lived for fifteen months. This property had deteriorated paint covered over by new paint, which soon deteriorated. During this time, Ms. Stevenson was observed touching and licking the windowsills. She spent weekdays at a nearby babysitter's house, which was free of deteriorated paint.

In January 1993, the family moved to a newer apartment on Pennsylvania Avenue, where there was also no deteriorated paint. Ms. Stevenson underwent four blood lead tests between the ages of two and seven, showing decreasing levels of lead exposure. At five years old, she was evaluated at the Kennedy Krieger Institute for attention issues, where she was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and prescribed Adderall, with recommendations for further testing to rule out a developmental language disorder.

Ms. Stevenson was on Adderall until age 14 and was placed in special education classes starting in third grade, receiving one-on-one aide support. At 13, she attempted suicide, leading to an evaluation at Mount Washington Pediatric Hospital (MWPH) in 2005, where she reported auditory hallucinations and depression. Psychological testing revealed an IQ of 65, categorizing her in the 'Extremely Low' range, and she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Despite these challenges, Ms. Stevenson graduated high school in 2008 and participated in a job training program, which led to employment at the University of Maryland Medical Systems and part-time work at Royal Farms, both of which she left for various reasons. By the time of the trials, she was unemployed.

On December 19, 2011, Ms. Stevenson filed a lawsuit against Mr. Rochkind and others for negligence and unfair trade practices, with the First Trial commencing on March 6, 2014. During the trial, Ms. Stevenson presented her case alongside three fact witnesses and nine expert witnesses. Expert testimony included Christopher White, who conducted lead testing at the Fairview Property, revealing 22 interior and nine exterior surfaces with lead-based paint. He asserted that given the property's age and the prohibition of lead-based paint in Baltimore since 1978, it was likely present in 1991 when Ms. Stevenson and her mother moved in. In contrast, Dr. Robert Simon, an industrial hygienist, provided evidence that ruled out other properties as sources of lead exposure for Ms. Stevenson, concluding that only the Fairview Property contained lead hazards during her residency based on the deteriorating paint observed between 1991 and 1993.

Robert Kraft, Psy.D., conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of Ms. Stevenson on August 4, 2012, revealing a full-scale IQ of 72 (borderline intelligence) and a verbal IQ of 66 (extremely low). Ms. Stevenson exhibited significant deficits in general intelligence, attention, language function, visual motor functioning, and academic achievement, while her memory and executive functioning were normal, and her motor skills were above average. Dr. Kraft indicated that these cognitive deficits are permanent and would adversely impact her employment prospects, financial management, and social relationships, but he did not determine the cause of her deficits.

Cynthia Hall-Carrington, M.D., attributed Ms. Stevenson’s elevated blood lead levels to the Fairview Property, ruling out other properties as sources of exposure. She stated that the lead exposure resulted in a loss of 5 to 6 IQ points, along with ADHD and academic impairments. Mark Lieberman, a certified rehabilitation counselor, assessed Ms. Stevenson’s vocational abilities and concluded that, despite her high school graduation, she would only qualify for basic minimum-wage jobs, requiring ongoing job coaching to maintain employment.

Dr. Conte, an economist, used Lieberman’s vocational assessment to estimate Ms. Stevenson’s potential lifetime earnings as an average high school graduate at $1,636,458, contrasting this with her projected minimum wage earnings of $806,753. The resulting lost future earnings were calculated at $829,705. Testimony was also provided by Mr. Rochkind, who incorporated Dear in 1984 and managed the Fairview Property, noting a lack of records regarding the property’s condition during Ms. Stevenson’s residency. Rochkind called expert witnesses, including Dr. Neil Blumberg, who reviewed Ms. Stevenson’s medical history and conducted a two-hour meeting with her in May 2013.

Ms. Stevenson was diagnosed with 'borderline intellectual functioning' and 'major depressive disorder, single episode severe with psychotic features currently in full remission' by Dr. Munro, who attributed her cognitive impairment to her home environment and genetic predisposition. Dr. Munro assessed Ms. Stevenson’s full-scale IQ at 74, falling within the borderline range, and noted that her mild lead exposure did not significantly contribute to her cognitive impairment or depressive disorder. No evidence of brain injury was identified, and Dr. Munro did not diagnose her with ADHD, citing depression's impact on attention and concerns about the accuracy of previous ADHD diagnoses.

Dr. Sheller, who reviewed Ms. Stevenson’s medical records, also diagnosed her with borderline intellectual functioning. He suggested that her lead exposure might have reduced her IQ by one to two points, but emphasized that such a difference would not significantly affect cognitive functioning. He acknowledged a strong genetic link for ADHD in Ms. Stevenson’s family but stated that symptoms often diminish with age.

The case was submitted to the jury with specific inquiries regarding the presence of lead-based paint at the Fairview Property, the negligence of various defendants in property management, and whether Ms. Stevenson had proven her injuries and entitlement to non-economic damages.

Ms. Stevenson was awarded $539,000 in non-economic damages and $829,000 in economic damages by the jury on March 18, 2014. Following the verdict, defendants Mr. Rochkind, S&S, and Dear sought to amend the judgment or for a new trial, arguing that the court improperly allowed Mr. Lieberman to present an undisclosed opinion at trial, which Dr. Conte subsequently relied upon to introduce a new opinion. On April 28, 2014, the court determined that Dr. Conte's testimony constituted a new, undisclosed opinion that unfairly disadvantaged the defense, leading to the granting of a new trial for both economic and non-economic damages, while keeping the jurors' liability findings intact. 

In the Second Trial, Judge White denied the defendants' renewed motions regarding Mr. Lieberman and Drs. Hall-Carrington and Conte. Ms. Stevenson presented her case, including testimonies from five witnesses from the First Trial and two new lay witnesses, Alice Crowder and Jamie Weaver. Mr. Lieberman reiterated his assessment of Ms. Stevenson’s employability in low-skill, part-time jobs at minimum wage, requiring job coaching. Dr. Conte introduced a new economic loss opinion, estimating Ms. Stevenson could have earned $1,595,114 over her lifetime absent cognitive deficits, which, when accounting for job coaching costs, resulted in a net negative earnings scenario. Ms. Crowder testified about her work with Ms. Stevenson to facilitate her training and employment transition.

Once a DORS client secures a job and maintains it for 90 days, their case is typically closed. If a client encounters job difficulties, they can request post-employment services, including job coaching. Ms. Stevenson, a DORS client, was informed about her eligibility for cost-free services due to her entitlement to supplemental security income (SSI). Ms. Weaver, who managed the Royal Farms store where Ms. Stevenson worked in 2012, described Ms. Stevenson’s performance as "okay," noting she required daily instructions and struggled with attendance and job retention, especially at the cash register. Royal Farms had a no rehire policy preventing her from returning.

In the case, expert testimonies were provided by Drs. Blumberg, Munro, and Scheller, with Dr. Blumberg slightly modifying his diagnosis of Ms. Stevenson’s depression to recurrent major depressive disorder. Dr. Munro posited that Ms. Stevenson’s cognitive impairments stemmed from genetic predisposition, a chaotic home environment, and depression, rather than lead exposure. Mr. Taylor, a vocational rehabilitation counselor, testified that Ms. Stevenson could work full-time in various roles, earning between $18,000 and $21,000 annually, and asserted that her lead exposure did not impact her earning capacity, which was affected by other life factors.

Dr. Brookshire agreed that Ms. Stevenson sustained no loss of earning capacity due to lead exposure and estimated the cost of additional rehabilitation services needed for full-time employment at $3,453 to $6,036. After evaluating the evidence, a jury awarded Ms. Stevenson $753,000 in economic damages and $700,000 in non-economic damages on November 3, 2014. Subsequently, Mr. Rochkind, S&S, and Dear sought a new trial or a remittitur, while Ms. Stevenson filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, which the court denied on March 18, 2015. Ms. Stevenson then moved for reconsideration of the fees denial within ten days.

On June 8, 2015, the court denied a motion, having previously denied a motion for a new trial on April 2, 2015. The court subsequently amended the judgment to $1,103,000, in accordance with the cap on non-economic damages. Rochkind noted an appeal on April 29, 2015, while S&S and Dear did not appeal. Ms. Stevenson alleged lead paint exposure and injuries from multiple properties, naming the Mayor, City Council of Baltimore, Edgewood Management Corporation, and Lawrence Polakoff as defendants. She filed a 'Partial Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice' against the Mayor, City Council, and Edgewood on June 19, 2012. Polakoff was served on November 29, 2012, and HABC was served on December 3, 2012, following which HABC filed an answer on December 12, 2012. A joint 'Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice' was filed concerning claims against HABC on February 20, 2013. The claims against Polakoff remained unresolved, rendering the judgment non-final under Md. Rule 2-602(a). Rule 2-602(b) allows a circuit court to enter a final judgment for fewer than all claims or parties if there is no just reason for delay. The court considered factors such as economic impact, potential for repeated appeals, and the relevance of outstanding claims to the current appeal. The appellate court, exercising its discretion, determined that the judgment could be certified as final, as the factors against certification did not apply. Ms. Stevenson made a timely cross-appeal regarding the denial of her attorneys' fees and the motion for reconsideration. Dr. Conte's reports indicated Ms. Stevenson’s lost future earnings as $1,010,319 in June 2013.

On January 21, 2014, a pre-trial evidentiary hearing resulted in the court barring Dr. Conte from presenting his initial opinion on Ms. Stevenson’s lost future earnings, which relied on the Gibson, Gamboa work-life expectancy tables deemed not generally accepted in the economic community. Subsequently, Dr. Conte submitted a revised report on January 22, later withdrawing it for a final report on February 2, 2014, which assessed Ms. Stevenson’s lost future earnings at $716,803, based on the Millimet work-life expectancy tables and categorizing her as having less than a high school degree. 

The defense sought to exclude Dr. Conte's February report at trial; however, the court allowed it but required Dr. Conte to apply the Millimet tables using the category for high school graduates. Dr. Conte testified that he relied on Mr. Lieberman’s vocational opinion, which indicated that despite Ms. Stevenson’s high school graduation, her cognitive deficits would hinder her ability to secure typical high school graduate jobs. Dr. Conte projected that, without her cognitive issues, Ms. Stevenson could earn an annual salary of $29,743, while her potential earnings in minimum wage jobs would be $15,080 annually. He estimated that, as an average high school graduate, she could have earned $1,636,459 over her lifetime, compared to $806,753 if working minimum wage, resulting in a lost future earning difference of $829,706.

The court ruled that Dr. Conte’s revised opinion had not been disclosed in discovery, constituting an unfair surprise, and thus ordered a partial new trial focused on economic and non-economic damages. The court clarified that certain established facts regarding Ms. Stevenson’s lead exposure and elevated blood levels would not require re-evaluation in the new trial, limiting the retrial to economic damages and the degree of injury sustained by Ms. Stevenson.

A five to six point loss in IQ is noted, alongside its vocational implications. Judge White informed the parties at the outset of the Second Trial that she had reviewed prior verdicts and determined that the jury would only address the quantification of economic and non-economic damages, as causation had already been established by the first jury. Mr. Rochkind, representing the defendants, contended that Judge White's interpretation of a prior ruling was overly restrictive. He sought to introduce evidence suggesting that Ms. Stevenson’s injuries could stem from various factors in her life beyond lead exposure and argued that the level of lead exposure was not significantly damaging. Judge White clarified that defendants would retain the right to cross-examine Ms. Stevenson’s experts and present their own, but she barred the relitigation of causation regarding the lead exposure. The Second Trial was thus confined to assessing the nature and severity of injuries for damages quantification.

On appeal, Mr. Rochkind argued that Judge Sfekas erred in granting only a partial new trial, claiming that the issues of liability and damages were interdependent and warranted a new trial on all counts. He also asserted that he should have been allowed to present evidence indicating that Ms. Stevenson’s damages could be attributed to lead from other sources. Ms. Stevenson countered that Mr. Rochkind failed to preserve this issue for appeal due to his lack of a motion for reconsideration regarding the judges' rulings. She maintained that the issues of damages were severable from liability, thus justifying the focus on damages in the Second Trial. Additionally, the court found no merit in Ms. Stevenson’s preservation argument, clarifying that Mr. Rochkind was not obliged to file for reconsideration to challenge earlier rulings on appeal.

Rule 2-533(c) allows a court to set aside any judgment and grant a new trial on all or some issues if they are fairly severable. Mr. Rochkind argues that Judge Sfekas abused his discretion by granting a partial new trial rather than a full retrial since the issues of liability and damages were not fairly severable. He cites Stickley v. Chisholm, where a jury found a doctor breached the standard of care but was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The appellate court rejected a partial new trial request, indicating that errors affecting one issue likely impacted all issues due to their interconnectedness. 

In the current case, the jury determined that Ms. Stevenson was exposed to deteriorated lead paint, contributing to her elevated blood lead levels, and that Mr. Rochkind and others violated their duty of care. These findings were distinct from the medical issues regarding the impact of lead exposure on Ms. Stevenson’s IQ and ADHD. The evidence regarding damages, including expert opinions on lost future earnings, was considered separate from liability. Judge Sfekas did not err in ruling that the damages issues were severable from liability issues. 

Judge White also did not misinterpret Judge Sfekas’s ruling by limiting the Second Trial to economic and non-economic damages. Mr. Rochkind was allowed to present evidence on Ms. Stevenson’s injuries and their causes, including expert testimony suggesting her cognitive issues stemmed from genetic factors, rather than lead exposure. The court appropriately restricted arguments linking her elevated blood lead levels to exposure from other properties or ambient sources.

Mr. Rochkind filed four motions in limine before the First Trial to prevent Dr. Hall-Carrington from providing specific expert opinions regarding lead causation related to Ms. Stevenson, including assertions that the Fairview Property significantly contributed to her elevated blood lead levels and that this exposure caused cognitive deficits, behavioral issues, a loss of IQ points, and ADHD. He requested Frye-Reed hearings for each motion, which Judge Sfekas denied. Subsequently, on January 13, 2014, Judge Sfekas heard arguments and denied the motions. Before the Second Trial, Mr. Rochkind renewed these motions, and Judge White also denied them after hearing arguments on the first trial day.

Expert testimony is governed by Rule 5-702, which allows admission if it aids in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue, requiring the court to assess the expert's qualifications, the appropriateness of the testimony, and the factual basis supporting it. The decision to admit or exclude such testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. For novel scientific methods, the Frye-Reed standard mandates that the proponent must establish general acceptance of the method in the relevant scientific community. The court may take judicial notice of the reliability of widely accepted scientific techniques, while less established methods must demonstrate reliability before admission.

Dr. Hall-Carrington, a pediatrician with over twenty years of experience in assessing lead exposure, testified in both trials regarding the common pathways of lead exposure in children. She opined that the Fairview Property was a substantial contributing factor to Ms. Stevenson’s elevated blood lead levels based on her review of relevant documents, including interrogatories and reports.

Ms. Montgomery testified that deteriorated paint was present at the Fairview Property and that Ms. Stevenson engaged in hand-to-mouth activities near this paint. An Arc report confirmed the presence of lead-based paint in various interior areas of the property. Montgomery's interrogatory responses ruled out other potential lead sources, including properties on Clifton and environmental sources like fishing weights and glazed pottery. Mr. Rochkind argued that the court erred by allowing Dr. Hall-Carrington, a pediatrician, to opine on the source of Ms. Stevenson’s lead exposure, asserting that she did not conduct tests on the Fairview Property or investigate other lead sources. He cited case law, including Taylor v. Fishkind and Roy v. Dackman, to support his claim that Dr. Hall-Carrington was unqualified to offer a lead source opinion without ruling out all alternative sources. In contrast, Ms. Stevenson maintained that Dr. Hall-Carrington was qualified due to her experience assessing lead exposure among children and that her opinion was well-founded, given the direct evidence of lead paint at multiple locations within the Fairview Property. She distinguished her case from Roy v. Dackman, where the expert lacked direct evidence of lead paint and relied on circumstantial evidence. The court in Roy emphasized that an expert must rule out other probable sources to testify about the source of lead exposure competently.

The Roy Court affirmed the admissibility of Dr. Hall-Carrington's testimony on the source of lead in relation to the Fairview Property, distinguishing it from previous cases like Ross v. Housing Authority. In Ross, a pediatrician's opinion was excluded due to lack of direct evidence of lead-based paint inside the property, with evidence only on one stair riser and external windows. In contrast, direct evidence in the Fairview Property included 22 interior surfaces tested for lead-based paint in 2012. Dr. Hall-Carrington's opinion was based on this direct evidence, alongside Dr. Simon's assertion that the lead detected would have been present when Ms. Stevenson resided there, and Ms. Montgomery's testimony regarding deteriorated paint and potential lead exposure. Unlike the speculative opinions in cases like Taylor and Hamilton, Dr. Hall-Carrington's conclusions were supported by factual evidence, leading the trial court to properly admit her testimony. 

Furthermore, Dr. Hall-Carrington did not examine Ms. Stevenson prior to the trials, which she justified by stating that childhood lead exposure often does not manifest symptoms in adults. She elaborated on the detrimental effects of lead on brain development, citing studies linking elevated blood lead levels to cognitive impairments and behavioral issues. Ultimately, she opined that Ms. Stevenson experienced brain impairment affecting her cognitive development and academic performance.

Ms. Stevenson lacks other cognitive impairment risk factors, such as premature birth or head injury. Dr. Hall-Carrington opines that her cognitive defects, academic challenges, learning disabilities, and ADHD are linked to lead exposure, noting that anxiety and depression may stem from her academic struggles. She quantifies the cognitive impairment as a loss of five to six IQ points due to lead poisoning, citing the ingestion of deteriorated lead-based paint during a critical developmental age. 

In a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Hall-Carrington's opinion on lead exposure causing ADHD, Mr. Rochkind argues that scientific consensus attributes ADHD primarily to genetics, referencing CDC reports, National Resource Center on ADHD information, a NIMH report, and a 2008 American Academy of Pediatrics article stating ADHD is highly heritable. He also cites a federal court decision (Palmer v. Asarco, Inc.) where a psychologist's opinion linking lead exposure to ADHD was excluded due to lack of scientific support.

In response, Ms. Stevenson asserts that scientific consensus recognizes lead exposure at certain levels as a cause of brain injury and behavioral changes, referencing a 2013 EPA publication produced by experts analyzing health effects of lead exposure through peer-reviewed studies.

The Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) serves as a scientific basis for reviewing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and involves a structured process that includes literature searches, study selection, evidence evaluation, and development of scientific conclusions. It categorizes health conditions related to lead exposure into five classifications: causal relationship, likely causal relationship, suggestive of a causal relationship, inadequate to infer a causal relationship, and not likely to be a causal relationship. The ISA finds a causal link between lead exposure and externalizing behaviors, specifically attention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity in children, supported by various evidence, including prospective studies and animal research. Table 4-17 in the ISA details associations from high-quality epidemiologic studies, indicating that children aged 30 months with blood lead levels of 10 µg/dL exhibit these adverse effects. The mechanisms by which lead impacts behavior are similar to those affecting cognitive functions, involving impaired neuron development and neurotransmitter changes. The ISA concludes there is a causal relationship between low-level lead exposure and cognitive decrements as well as externalizing behaviors, and a likely causal relationship with internalizing behaviors such as anxiety and depression. Additionally, a 2005 Policy Statement by the American Academy of Pediatrics highlights that lead exposure negatively affects IQ and behavior, noting that elevated lead concentrations in teeth and bones are linked to attentional dysfunction in children.

Ms. Stevenson argued that she was not obligated to demonstrate that her elevated blood lead levels were the sole cause of her ADHD, asserting that she only needed to prove that lead exposure was a substantial factor in contributing to her condition. She emphasized that it was unnecessary to exclude all other potential causes of ADHD or brain injury. Dr. Hall-Carrington supported this view, testifying that lead exposure contributed to Ms. Stevenson’s ADHD, although it was impossible to quantify the extent of this contribution relative to other social factors. The court denied motions in limine aimed at excluding Dr. Hall-Carrington's testimony.

At trial, Dr. Hall-Carrington referenced studies, including one by Bruce Lanphear, to substantiate her claims regarding the link between lead exposure, ADHD, and IQ. Mr. Rochkind contested the court's decision to admit Dr. Hall-Carrington's opinion, arguing three points: first, that a Frye-Reed hearing was necessary to assess the admissibility of her opinion, which he believed should have led to its exclusion; second, that her opinion did not meet the standard for general medical causation regarding low-level lead exposure and ADHD; and third, that she failed to establish specific medical causation linking Ms. Stevenson’s exposure to her ADHD.

The court found no merit in these arguments, citing a precedent from the Blackwell case where a similar challenge was made against an expert's testimony regarding vaccine-related autism. In that case, the court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible due to the lack of scientific consensus and the expert's reliance on discredited studies.

Without Dr. Geier's expert testimony, plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case, leading to a decision in favor of the defendant as a matter of law, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The court acknowledged that while Dr. Geier's methods for data collection were generally accepted, he applied this data to support a novel theory, which did not guarantee the acceptance of his conclusions. The court referenced Wilson v. State, where an expert's testimony regarding statistical probabilities related to SIDS was deemed unreliable due to the lack of scientific consensus on genetics' role in SIDS deaths, failing the Frye-Reed general acceptance test. The Blackwell Court noted that federal courts often scrutinize the reliability of analytical frameworks used by experts in novel scientific theories. In General Electric Company v. Joiner, the Supreme Court held that trial courts may exclude expert opinions if there is a significant gap between data and conclusions, which was applicable to Dr. Geier's assertion connecting thimerosal to autism. His conclusions were rejected by the scientific community and contradicted by extensive epidemiological studies. In contrast, it is widely accepted that even low levels of lead exposure can cause detrimental health effects, particularly cognitive deficits in children. The court concluded that the Blackwell decision did not support the plaintiffs' claims in this case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting a Frye-Reed hearing.

In lead paint exposure cases, the central issue is not whether lead paint can cause health issues in children, which is widely accepted, but rather which specific health deficits result from lead exposure and the levels required to cause them. Ms. Stevenson’s opposition to the motion in limine indicated that Dr. Hall-Carrington's opinion linking ADHD to lead exposure was grounded in established epidemiological studies, including those compiled in the EPA-ISA, which support a causal relationship between low-level lead exposure and ADHD symptoms. These methodologies are recognized in the scientific community and do not represent novel conclusions.

Mr. Rochkind argues against Dr. Hall-Carrington's causation opinion, asserting that ADHD's primary cause is genetic, as acknowledged by the expert, who estimated a 60% hereditary factor. While he contends that the EPA-ISA study contradicts this consensus, the studies he cites do not dismiss environmental factors, including lead, as contributors to ADHD.

The court, referencing Roy v. Dackman, stated that reliance on a particular study does not invalidate expert opinions; instead, it provides grounds for cross-examination and evaluation by the jury. Additionally, Rochkind posits that Ms. Stevenson’s family history of ADHD undermines the link between lead exposure and her condition. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in allowing Dr. Hall-Carrington to testify that lead exposure was a specific cause of Ms. Stevenson’s ADHD symptoms. Dr. Hall-Carrington confirmed a significant genetic component to ADHD while stating that lead exposure acted as an additive factor.

The substantial factor test governs the issue of specific medical causation, and Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinion that lead exposure substantially contributed to Ms. Stevenson’s ADHD was deemed to have a sufficient factual basis, enabling the jury to assess the causal connection.

Mr. Rochkind's motion in limine sought to exclude Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinion on Ms. Stevenson’s IQ loss, arguing that her calculations were unreliable under Frye-Reed standards and lacked a sufficient factual basis per Rule 5-702(3). He contended that: 1) Dr. Hall-Carrington improperly relied on general population studies to determine a specific IQ loss for Ms. Stevenson; 2) there is no scientific consensus on a methodology for calculating IQ loss in children exposed to lead; and 3) her reliance on Ms. Stevenson’s peak blood-lead level contradicted the studies she cited, which used lifetime averages. Despite attaching excerpts from Dr. Hall-Carrington's deposition that highlighted her inability to justify her choice of peak blood-lead level and her lack of understanding of “lifetime average,” Judge Sfekas denied the motion to exclude her opinion without holding a Frye-Reed hearing.

During trials, Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that she reviewed studies indicating a consensus that lead exposure causes IQ loss in children, estimating Ms. Stevenson lost between five and six IQ points due to lead. On cross-examination, she acknowledged other risk factors for cognitive impairment, including family background and living conditions, but could not quantify their effects. She stated that her calculation of 5.8 IQ points lost from Ms. Stevenson’s peak blood-lead level would not change if her average level were used.

Mr. Rochkind argued that allowing Dr. Hall-Carrington's specific IQ loss opinion constituted an abuse of discretion, emphasizing her reliance on general studies and lack of experience with IQ testing. He also claimed the trial court erred by not conducting a Frye-Reed or Rule 5-702 hearing. In contrast, Ms. Stevenson argued that the decision in Roy v. Dackman overruled the principles established in City Homes, Inc. v. Hazelwood, which Mr. Rochkind relied upon.

In the case of Hazelwood, the trial court allowed Dr. Eric Sundel, a pediatrician, to testify that a child lost 7 to 10 IQ points due to exposure to lead-based paint. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, determining Dr. Sundel lacked the necessary qualifications to provide an expert opinion on medical causation, as he had no relevant experience treating lead exposure, had never testified in a lead paint case, and lacked experience in evaluating brain impairment from lead exposure. The court deemed his testimony speculative, primarily based on literature rather than empirical evidence.

In Roy v. Dackman, the Court of Appeals considered whether the circuit court erred in excluding Dr. Sundel from testifying about the same issue. The court concluded that while he may not be the most qualified expert, he was competent to testify, noting significant differences in the records of the two cases. The court criticized the Hazelwood decision for being overly stringent regarding Dr. Sundel's qualifications and acknowledged his efforts to improve his expertise through continued education on lead poisoning research, including the controversial Lanphear Study. Ultimately, the court found that Dr. Sundel's qualifications, including his extensive pediatric training and practice, were sufficient to support his opinion on the plaintiff's injuries from lead exposure, emphasizing that the jury's assessment of his testimony would depend on the effectiveness of the defense's cross-examination and comparison with other testimonies.

A pediatrician can provide a medical causation opinion regarding IQ loss due to lead-based paint exposure without needing specialized knowledge in IQ test administration, as established in the case of Roy. The dispute does not necessitate a Frye-Reed hearing since there is a scientific consensus on the link between lead poisoning and IQ loss. The main issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Hall-Carrington to testify that Ms. Stevenson suffered a specific IQ loss of five to six points, based on extrapolation from epidemiological studies. The court found this methodology sound and not an abuse of discretion.

Dr. Hall-Carrington's opinion aligns with previous cases where similar IQ losses due to lead exposure were documented. Although her reasons for using Ms. Stevenson’s peak blood level were unclear, she indicated that using the average blood level would not change the estimated IQ loss range. Experts for Mr. Rochkind provided a smaller range of IQ loss based on blood lead levels. Unlike the vague opinion of Dr. Sundel in a prior case, Dr. Hall-Carrington's opinion was based on sufficient factual evidence.

Additionally, Mr. Rochkind challenged the trial court's decision to allow Mr. Lieberman, a certified rehabilitation counselor, to testify that Ms. Stevenson would have functioned as an "average high school graduate" without her cognitive deficits. He questioned Mr. Lieberman's qualifications and methodology, arguing that he improperly assumed all identified impairments were caused by lead exposure, contrary to Dr. Kraft’s report. However, Ms. Stevenson defended Mr. Lieberman’s testimony as being based on Dr. Hall-Carrington’s findings that linked her neuropsychological deficits to lead exposure. Mr. Lieberman reviewed relevant records and met with Ms. Stevenson following the death of a previous vocational counselor.

Ms. Stevenson’s employment capacity was evaluated using the RAPEL method, revealing she suffers from functional illiteracy, ADHD, and a low IQ, which necessitates high supervision in the workplace. She failed entrance exams for Baltimore City Community College and was advised to take remedial classes to improve her skills. Mr. Lieberman concluded that due to her cognitive deficits, she would only qualify for very low-skill jobs with minimal decision-making, likely earning minimum wage (approximately $15,000 annually) and would be limited to part-time work. He indicated that she would require job coaching for a few hours weekly, costing about $38 per hour. Lieberman compared her potential vocational performance to that of her parents, who had achieved moderate success, but believed her cognitive impairments precluded similar outcomes. The trial court properly admitted Lieberman’s expert testimony regarding her vocational prospects, as it was well-supported by evidence and not speculative. Mr. Rochkind's argument to exclude Dr. Conte’s opinion, which relied on Lieberman's assessment, was dismissed since Lieberman’s testimony was deemed admissible.

Dr. Brookshire, an economics expert for Mr. Rochkind, testified that Ms. Stevenson experienced no loss of earning capacity or work-life expectancy due to lead exposure. He referenced three studies regarding lead's impact on lifetime earnings, one quantifying earnings loss per blood lead level. However, when questioned about how he applied these studies in his opinion, Ms. Stevenson objected, arguing that Dr. Brookshire could not have used the studies to support his conclusion of no earnings loss, particularly since he had not disclosed reliance on these studies prior to trial. Mr. Rochkind's counsel contended that Dr. Brookshire's testimony was relevant to align his estimates with scientific literature and counter Dr. Conte's opinion. The court ruled in favor of Ms. Stevenson, stating that Dr. Brookshire did not rely on the studies for his expert opinion and, therefore, their data was inadmissible under Rule 5-703(b). The court's discretion in excluding the studies was upheld, as they were not reasonably relied upon by Dr. Brookshire in forming his opinion. Additionally, during Mr. Lieberman's testimony, Ms. Stevenson’s DORS program records were admitted, which indicated that clients eligible for SSI or SSDI benefits received services at no cost, including post-employment job coaching, as testified by Ms. Crowder from DORS.

Defense counsel aimed to question Dr. Conte regarding DORS records to assess whether he factored in the potential for Ms. Stevenson to receive free job coaching from DORS when forming his economic loss opinion, which suggested that Ms. Stevenson’s future earnings would be entirely offset by the cost of a permanent job coach. The court ruled that the collateral source rule barred any mention of the cost of DORS services. Mr. Rochkind argued this ruling was erroneous, claiming that since Ms. Stevenson submitted the DORS records into evidence without limitations, he should have been allowed to use them for cross-examination. Ms. Stevenson countered that the court correctly restricted cross-examination to avoid discussing payments from entities unrelated to the tortfeasor, adhering to Maryland's principle that an injured party can recover full provable damages regardless of unrelated compensation received. The court maintained that free job coaching services from DORS qualify as collateral source payments, thus inadmissible for offsetting damages. Ms. Stevenson’s introduction of DORS documents did not waive the collateral source rule, and the court acted within its discretion by preventing Dr. Conte from being questioned about these collateral sources.

Furthermore, regarding attorneys' fees under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), the CPA prohibits unfair and deceptive practices in realty transactions, including renting uninhabitable properties with deteriorated lead paint. Such violations must be present at the lease's inception for liability to arise. The CPA allows individuals to seek damages for injuries resulting from prohibited practices and grants the court discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees. Ms. Stevenson’s claims included negligence and unfair trade practices under the CPA. During the First Trial, jurors confirmed that the Fairview Property had chipping, flaking, or peeling paint at the tenancy's start.

Jurors determined that Mr. Rochkind engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice by renting the Fairview Property to Ms. Stevenson in an uninhabitable condition. Following the Second Trial on December 10, 2014, Ms. Stevenson filed a petition for prevailing party attorneys’ fees under CL section 13-408(b), requesting the full contingency fee of 40% of any recovery, plus expenses totaling $135,513.81, amounting to $572,713.81. Alternatively, she sought fees calculated using the lodestar method, providing a “Time Chart” detailing attorney hours worked: Mr. Nevin (116.5 hours pre-March 2014 and 62.75 hours post) and Mr. Leonard (221.25 hours pre-March 2014 and 105.5 hours post). Mr. Nevin, with nearly 30 years of experience, and Mr. Leonard, with 7 years, did not include paralegal and law clerk hours in their billing. Ms. Stevenson referenced the 2014-2015 Laffey Matrix, proposing hourly rates of $700 and $725 for Mr. Nevin, and $400 and $425 for Mr. Leonard, totaling $260,381.25 in fees and $135,513.81 in expenses, for a total of $395,895.06. Mr. Rochkind opposed the petition, contending that the fee-shifting provision of the CPA does not apply to personal injury claims framed as unfair trade practice actions, and argued against Ms. Stevenson’s entitlement to her contingency fee and expenses under the CPA.

Stevenson did not provide adequate information for the circuit court to perform the necessary analysis under Maryland law. After a hearing on January 30, 2015, the court denied Stevenson’s petition on March 18, 2015, setting forth guidelines for awarding attorneys' fees under the CPA. The court outlined a two-step lodestar analysis: first, calculating the total hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate; second, subtracting excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours and considering factors from Rule 1.5 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (MLRPC). The court recognized Stevenson as a prevailing party based on the jury's findings, noting her negligence and CPA claims were based on a common core of facts that were indivisible in both trials.

The court concluded that only attorneys' fees could be awarded under the CPA, finding Stevenson’s submitted "Time Chart" and Nevin Affidavit insufficiently detailed for applying the lodestar method. The Time Chart failed to specify actual time or tasks related to the litigation. Additionally, the court criticized Stevenson’s reliance on the "Laffey Matrix" for attorney’s fees, noting it was not applicable in Baltimore, and suggested that local rates as per the District Court’s Local Rules would be more appropriate.

The court determined that it could not evaluate the reasonableness of Ms. Stevenson’s attorney fee request due to insufficient information in the Nevin Affidavit, which did not clarify how conducting two trials hindered the ability to take on new cases. Consequently, the court found that Ms. Stevenson failed to provide adequate details for a thorough analysis of the fee award, leading to the denial of her petition for fees. Ms. Stevenson subsequently sought reconsideration, arguing that the court abused its discretion by not exercising it to assess the reasonableness of the requested hourly rates, referencing Appendix B's guidelines for appropriate rates based on years of bar admission. She claimed that her attorneys, Mr. Leonard and Mr. Nevin, warranted high-end rates of $300 and $475 per hour, respectively, and criticized the court for not calculating a lodestar figure to evaluate the fees. However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration, asserting that Ms. Stevenson did not contest its legal analysis but rather the application of that analysis to the facts. The court noted the Time Chart's failure to differentiate time spent on the CPA claim versus the negligence claim, indicating that without detailed evidence of time spent, it would be speculative to determine reasonable hours expended. On appeal, Ms. Stevenson argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by not awarding any attorney fees under the CPA, asserting that the court neglected to determine a reasonable hourly rate and failed to account for the indivisible nature of the CPA and negligence claims in its fee assessment.

The court properly denied Ms. Stevenson’s fee petition based on her failure to provide sufficient evidence for both the hourly rates and the number of hours claimed for her CPA action. Mr. Rochkind argued that Ms. Stevenson needed to present specific evidence, such as expert testimony or affidavits, to substantiate her claimed rates, which significantly exceeded the Laffey Matrix figures. Additionally, he criticized the Time Chart as inadequate for lacking detail and failing to separate hours spent on the CPA claim from other claims. He contended that attorney fees should not be awarded in personal injury cases, citing doubts from the Court of Appeals in Richwind regarding the legislative intent to allow such recoveries under the CPA. The trial court found no abuse of discretion in denying the petition, noting that Ms. Stevenson’s request included a total contingency fee and expenses, which are not permitted. Furthermore, her proposed hourly rates for attorneys were unjustified and above the Laffey Matrix, with no evidence provided to support these higher rates or to demonstrate the hours reasonably expended on her CPA claim. Overall, the lack of adequate documentation and justification led to the denial of the fee petition.

The Time Chart fails to differentiate hours spent on investigating claims against defendants. Ms. Stevenson established the CPA violation through testimony from Ms. Montgomery and Mr. White regarding deteriorated lead-based paint present at the start of her tenancy. A juror's potential ruling against her on this point would not have affected her separate negligence claim, which relied on Mr. Rochkind's knowledge of the deteriorated paint during her tenancy. However, Ms. Stevenson did not separate the time spent on the CPA claim from the overall personal injury negligence case, leading the court to lack sufficient evidence to evaluate the reasonableness of attorney fees related to the CPA claim. Consequently, the court did not err in denying the fee petition. Additionally, Ms. Stevenson did not justify why the hourly rates for Mr. Leonard and Mr. Nevin from December 2011 to June 2014 should not be adjusted according to Appendix B of the applicable Local Rules, which would have decreased their rates significantly. The judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City were affirmed, with costs split evenly between the appellant/cross-appellee and the appellee/cross-appellant.