Christopher Brantley v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-13-00218-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; February 22, 2015; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Christopher Brantley was convicted by a jury in the 140th District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, for possession with intent to deliver cocaine, specifically an amount between four and 200 grams. The jury sentenced him to life confinement, as the offense is classified as a first-degree felony under Texas law, punishable by life imprisonment or a term of 5 to 99 years, along with a potential fine of up to $10,000.

Brantley raised two main issues on appeal: (1) he was not informed of his Miranda rights before a custodial interrogation, and (2) he was unlawfully detained and searched, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the trial court's decision.

The background of the case details an encounter on November 29, 2011, when Lubbock police officers from the Anti-Gang Unit observed a vehicle in a high-crime area that failed to stop at a sign. After following the vehicle for several miles, a traffic stop was initiated in a residential parking lot. During the stop, the officers detected the smell of marijuana and sought consent to search the vehicle, which the driver granted. As the passenger, Brantley attempted to exit the vehicle, he was ordered to stay inside, leading to a confrontation with the officers.

After a uniformed officer arrived, Brantley was asked to exit the vehicle, during which a significant amount of cash fell from him. A subsequent search revealed crack cocaine hidden in his shoe. He was handcuffed and questioned without receiving Miranda warnings. The appellate court noted that the State argued Brantley did not preserve his complaint regarding the Miranda violation for appellate review, a contention the court agreed with.

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must timely present a specific request, objection, or motion to the trial court, unless the grounds are apparent from the context, as stated in TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) and TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1). This requirement serves to inform the trial court of the objection's basis and allows for a response from the opposing party. Complaints raised on appeal must align with those asserted at trial (Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537). This preservation of error requirement also applies to alleged Miranda violations (Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 157).

In the case at hand, the Appellant's written motion to suppress cited multiple constitutional provisions but lacked specific arguments regarding Miranda violations or the voluntariness of statements made. During the suppression hearing, the Appellant focused solely on the legality of the traffic stop and search. Furthermore, no objections were raised during trial to the officers’ testimony about potential Miranda violations. Consequently, the trial court and opposing counsel were not notified of any complaints, resulting in forfeiture of those issues on appeal (Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909). The reviewing court may dismiss appellate complaints if a party fails to communicate their objections effectively (Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365).

Regarding the Appellant's second issue, which asserts unlawful detention and search, the court found no violation of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments or relevant Texas statutes. The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9 protect against unreasonable searches and seizures (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1). To warrant a jury instruction on illegal evidence acquisition, a defendant must meet three criteria: (1) the evidence must raise a factual issue, (2) the evidence must be contested, and (3) the contested issue must be material to the legality of the conduct in question (Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159).

An officer may stop and temporarily detain an individual for investigatory purposes only if there are specific, articulable facts leading to a reasonable conclusion that the person is, has been, or will soon be engaged in criminal activity. Both investigative detentions and arrests are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment, with the distinction being the degree of intrusion and the legal justifications required. Reasonable suspicion, which is more than a mere hunch, is necessary for lawful temporary detentions, and it must be determined objectively based on the totality of the circumstances.

In this case, an officer lawfully stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation (failure to stop at a stop sign) and subsequently detected the odor of marijuana. The officer's observations of the passenger, who was acting nervously and making furtive movements, along with the smell of marijuana, raised reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Although the passenger contended he was not evading arrest, the focus is on whether the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in criminal conduct based on the circumstances.

Ultimately, the court found that the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to continue the investigatory detention, leading to the passenger's voluntary consent to search, which resulted in the discovery of crack cocaine. This provided probable cause for the passenger's arrest. The trial court's judgment was affirmed, indicating that both the investigatory detention and the subsequent arrest were lawful.