Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.

Citations: 187 L. Ed. 2d 729; 134 S. Ct. 870; 2014 U.S. LEXIS 799; 82 U.S.L.W. 4071; 571 U.S. 220; 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 535; 21 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1477; 2014 WL 273241Docket: 12–417.

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 27, 2014; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Petitioner Sandifer and others initiated a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) for back pay related to time spent donning and doffing protective gear. U.S. Steel argued that this time is noncompensable based on a provision in the collective-bargaining agreement, which references 29 U.S.C. §203(o). This provision permits collective bargaining over whether time spent changing clothes at the start or end of the workday must be compensated.

The District Court granted summary judgment to U.S. Steel, determining that the donning and doffing of protective gear qualifies as "changing clothes" under §203(o), and deemed any time spent on items not classified as 'clothes' as 'de minimis' and noncompensable. The Seventh Circuit upheld this ruling.

The Supreme Court concluded that the time spent by petitioners in donning and doffing their protective gear is not compensable under §203(o). The Court noted that the term "clothes" should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—denoting items designed to cover the body and recognized as articles of dress. Consequently, the term does not exclude protective clothing. The application of §203(o) only applies if changing clothes is an integral part of the employees' principal activities, which protective gear is in certain occupations. The Court's interpretation is consistent with historical context and Labor Department regulations, and it clarifies the distinction between clothes and other wearable items. The interpretation also acknowledges that "changing" can mean both substituting and altering, consistent with the understanding during the enactment of §203(o).

The interpretation of "time spent in changing clothes" under §203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act includes the time employees take to alter their dress, whether switching from street clothes to work clothes or layering garments. This section should not permit arbitrary decisions by workers to opt in or out of its coverage. In the case at hand, donning and doffing activities qualify as "changing clothes," with only safety glasses, earplugs, and respirators excluded from this definition. Although some Courts of Appeals have applied the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex to separate time spent on clothing from other activities, this approach is not suitable for this statute. Instead, courts should evaluate whether the majority of the time in question is spent changing clothes or washing. If most time is dedicated to clothing, then the entire duration qualifies; otherwise, it does not. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the time spent on safety glasses and earplugs was minimal, and the Court confirmed the District Court's finding that respirators were not covered by §203(o) since they were donned and doffed as needed during work hours. The ruling affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the classification of time spent changing clothes.

Petitioners are seeking backpay for the time spent donning and doffing protective gear required by U. S. Steel due to safety hazards in steel plants. They identify 12 specific items of protective gear, including a flame-retardant jacket, hardhat, safety glasses, and respirator. The crux of their claim is that this time should be compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). U. S. Steel argues that the time is noncompensable based on a provision in its collective-bargaining agreement, which states that time spent changing clothes is not compensable, contingent on the applicability of 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). This provision permits collective-bargaining agreements to designate time spent changing clothes as noncompensable. The District Court ruled that donning and doffing the protective gear constituted "changing clothes" under § 203(o) and assumed that items like hardhats and safety glasses, even if not considered "clothes," incurred "de minimis" time, thus also noncompensable. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld these rulings, leading to a certiorari granted by the Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's conclusions. The legal background highlights the FLSA's governance of employee compensation related to work, emphasizing its broad interpretation by the courts, particularly in the context of preliminary activities like donning protective gear, which historically prompted significant litigation and led to the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947.

The Portal-to-Portal Act restricts employer liability by excluding time spent on activities considered preliminary or postliminary to an employee's principal duties. Specifically, this includes time before starting or after finishing work. The Department of Labor clarified that the continuous workday rule remains unaffected, defining compensable time as the period between the start and end of an employee's principal activities, regardless of whether all that time is spent working. Notably, activities such as changing clothes and washing may be deemed preliminary or postliminary if performed outside the workday, but they can also be integral to the principal activities under certain conditions. 

In 1949, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to stipulate that time spent changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of the workday can be excluded from compensable hours if specified by a collective-bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court case Steiner v. Mitchell reinforced that such activities could be integral to principal work activities, echoing the Labor Department's earlier regulations. The Court's later decision in IBP confirmed that activities integral to principal work are themselves considered principal activities.

In the current case, U.S. Steel acknowledges that had the time spent changing clothes not been rendered noncompensable under §203(o), it would be classified as a principal activity. However, the petitioners dispute this, arguing that donning and doffing protective gear does not fall under the definition of "changing clothes." The analysis begins with defining "clothes," which, according to statutory construction principles, should be interpreted in its ordinary meaning, as items designed to cover the body, based on dictionary definitions from the time of §203(o)’s enactment.

The term "clothes" is defined as a covering for the human body, including dress and apparel, according to Webster's Second and the Oxford English Dictionary. The interpretation of "clothes" in §203(o) aligns with its ordinary meaning, as there is no indication in the statute's text or context that diverges from this understanding. Petitioners argue that "clothes" lacks a general meaning and excludes protective items used for workplace safety. They distinguish between "protection" and "decency or comfort," a view rooted in Webster's definition but flawed, as it implies that protective clothing is not included in the term. The argument overlooks that protection and comfort can be synonymous. 

Petitioners also claim that "protective clothing" is a more common term than "protective clothes," attributing this to euphonic preference rather than a difference in meaning. Their interpretation risks nullifying §203(o), which applies to changing clothes only when it is integral to employees' primary activities. However, protective gear is essential in many occupations, contradicting the petitioners' definition that would limit §203(o) to non-protective attire. Historical context indicates that changing clothes can be necessary for performing certain jobs, as noted in Labor Department regulations from 1947. Additionally, prior case law, such as Steiner, suggests that the statute applies when workers must change clothes due to health and safety requirements related to their work. Overall, petitioners' position lacks grounding and fails to account for the integral role of protective clothing in various jobs.

Petitioners argue that defining 'clothes' too broadly could unintentionally include various non-essential items, such as bandoliers and barrettes. However, they acknowledge the inherent challenges of defining such a broad term, asserting that the context of the statute clarifies that 'clothes' refers specifically to items essential for job performance. Donning and doffing items outside this definition would not warrant compensation under the Act, negating the need for the §203(o) exception. The document emphasizes that 'clothes' are defined as items or garments worn by a person, excluding accessories and tools that do not serve the primary purpose of covering the body. While some courts have extended the definition of 'clothes' to encompass all attire worn for work, this interpretation lacks textual support. The Court asserts that it must adhere to the statutory language, which uses the narrower term 'clothes,' rather than a broader term that could include all work-related items.

Regarding the term 'changing,' petitioners claim it implies substitution, arguing that protective gear worn over street clothes does not qualify under §203(o). The Court disagrees, noting that 'changing' can also denote alteration, which is relevant to the context of the statute. The broader meaning of 'changing clothes' encompasses altering one's attire, allowing for scenarios where an employee may layer clothing rather than fully substituting one set for another. The aim of §203(o) is to facilitate collective bargaining over the compensability of time spent changing clothes, promoting predictability in negotiations. The Court concludes that the interpretation of 'changing' should not be limited to mere substitution, as this would hinder meaningful negotiation and predictability in workplace attire practices.

The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) suggests that a substitution requirement could lead to absurd compensation scenarios, highlighting that workers should not have the ability to arbitrarily opt in or out of coverage under §203(o). Exemptions under the FLSA are to be narrowly construed against employers, as established in prior case law. The exemptions are primarily codified in §213, while §203 focuses on definitions. 

In this case, the court determined that the donning and doffing of specific protective gear constitutes "changing clothes" as per §203(o). The petitioners identified 12 items, including jackets, pants, gloves, and boots, that clearly fit the definition of clothing. However, items such as safety glasses, earplugs, and respirators do not meet the standard for clothing. 

The court is tasked with deciding whether the time spent changing into and out of these items must be compensated. Some courts have invoked the de minimis doctrine to disregard minor amounts of time spent on non-clothing-related activities, arguing that small instances of work beyond scheduled hours should not be counted. While the court acknowledges the applicability of the de minimis rule in certain contexts, it expresses skepticism about its relevance to this case, given the nature of the activities involved.

The de minimis doctrine is not applicable to the statute in question, which focuses on minor time periods employees spend preparing for work, such as putting on safety equipment. The court emphasizes that disregarding short preparatory times, like putting on glasses or earplugs, is inconsistent with the statute's intent. The court agrees with the Courts of Appeals that Congress likely did not intend for §203(o) to require extensive judicial time studies on trivial matters. Instead, it allows the issue of compensation for these activities to be addressed through collective bargaining.

Section 203(o) pertains to "time spent" on changing clothes or washing, differing from its predecessor that focused on the activities themselves. Courts must determine if the majority of the time is spent on changing clothes; if so, that time qualifies under §203(o), regardless of other non-clothing items involved. The District Court found that the time spent donning safety glasses and earplugs was minimal and the Seventh Circuit agreed. Regarding respirators, the District Court noted they are used as needed at job sites, suggesting that their donning time is part of the normal workday and not covered by §203(o). The Seventh Circuit did not challenge this finding. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.