State v. Collins

Citation: 216 P.3d 463Docket: 61646-3-I

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; September 21, 2009; Washington; State Appellate Court

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In the case of State of Washington v. Earnest Collins, the Court of Appeals upheld Collins' conviction for the murder of taxi driver Jagjit Singh, who was shot and subsequently found in a burning cab on July 10, 2007. Collins challenged the identification process used during the trial, claiming a violation of due process, but the court found no merit in his argument. 

Key facts include:

- Collins called for a taxi using a false name and phone number, which was traced back to a cell phone owned by his girlfriend, Melisa Washington.
- Surveillance footage from the cab captured the shooting, and evidence linked Collins to the crime scene, including bullets and burnt clothing found at his residence.
- Forensic analysis indicated a DNA match, with Collins as a possible contributor.
- Following the murder, Collins fled to Chicago with his brother, Vernell, using false identities.
- Witnesses, including family and acquaintances, identified Collins as both the caller and the shooter.
- Collins attempted to assert an alibi, claiming he was with his girlfriend at the time, but this testimony was contradicted by other witnesses.
- The jury found Collins guilty of first-degree murder, felony murder, and first-degree arson, with firearm enhancements. The court allowed the introduction of Collins’ refusal to provide a voice exemplar as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and an accomplice liability instruction was given regarding Vernell's potential involvement in the crime. 

The court affirmed the conviction on all counts.

Collins claims that his due process rights were violated due to suggestive identification procedures that influenced witnesses to identify him as the individual who summoned the cab and the shooter of Singh. He argues that witnesses were biased by prior knowledge of his status as a suspect before they viewed photographs or listened to recordings. This issue was not raised during earlier proceedings, but appellate courts may consider manifest errors affecting constitutional rights for the first time on appeal.

The reliability of eyewitness identification is critical to due process, as suggestive police practices can lead to wrongful identifications. Courts assess factors such as the witness's opportunity to observe the suspect, prior descriptions, certainty, and the time elapsed. The specific question of whether these factors apply when a witness recognizes someone from photographs is novel in Washington.

In *State v. Felder*, the Connecticut Appellate Court examined the identification of a known individual from surveillance footage. The court emphasized that identifying a known person from photographs generally does not carry the same risks of suggestiveness as identifying strangers under stressful conditions. The likelihood of distortion in recollection is reduced when the witness already knows the individual depicted. Thus, the due process analysis is less relevant in cases of acquaintance identification.

Collins's identification as the person in the cab photos and the caller on the recording did not violate due process rights. Additionally, Collins argues that testimony regarding the identity of the person in the taxicab photos constituted improper opinion on guilt. However, lay witness testimony is permitted if it is based on their perceptions and aids in understanding the evidence, provided it does not directly imply guilt. The identity testimony in this case did not suggest Collins's guilt, remaining focused solely on the witnesses' familiarity with him.

Collins argues that testimony regarding his identification, based on photographs available to the jury, improperly intruded on the jury's role. He cites State v. Jamison, which ruled that such testimony could be unnecessary if the jury could make their own comparisons. However, the court clarifies that identity opinion testimony is permissible when it aids the jury, especially if the witness has relevant familiarity with the defendant that the jury lacks. In this case, the photographs were of poor quality, being black and white, blurry, and taken under inadequate lighting, which justified the admission of testimony from Collins' acquaintances who had better familiarity with him.

Additionally, Collins contests the admission of his refusal to provide a voice exemplar as evidence of guilt, claiming it violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Washington Constitution, and Criminal Rule 4.7. The Washington Constitution protects private affairs from government intrusion without legal authority. Courts assess whether the information sought is intimate, the expectation of privacy involved, historical protections, and the purpose of the information's acquisition. Collins' argument primarily references cases related to blood or urine collection without adequately addressing these considerations, leading the court to find his argument unsubstantiated.

Collins' Fourth Amendment argument is dismissed, referencing United States v. Dionisio, which establishes that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their voice, as it is publicly exposed like facial features or handwriting. The court finds that voice exemplars can be authorized under the criminal discovery rule, CrR 4.7, even if not explicitly mentioned, as they align with provisions for physical examinations and handwriting exemplars. Collins contends that providing a voice exemplar for forensic comparison differs from speaking for witness identification, arguing that the rule's other sections do not apply. However, the court does not need to resolve this debate, as Collins' main argument centers on the admissibility of evidence regarding his refusal to provide the exemplar, which the court deems permissible. Collins had agreed to the order but later refused compliance without challenging it. His refusal to comply with both the search warrant and the order was admitted in court, but this evidence was considered minor relative to the overall case. The ruling is affirmed, and the opinion is deemed non-precedential for publication.

Doubt exists regarding the occurrence of impermissibly suggestive procedures in the case at hand. Collins did not object to witness testimony regarding suggestiveness at trial, so this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal; however, it involves a constitutional right, allowing for its consideration under RAP 2.5a. The admission of evidence that invades the jury's province is of constitutional significance. In prior cases, the admissibility of witness identification from surveillance video has been upheld when the witness had a significant prior relationship with the defendant, allowing the jury to assess credibility. The court may reference federal decisions when interpreting Washington's evidentiary rules, as they are analogous. Additionally, claims under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution can be pursued independently without requiring a Gunwall analysis. Collins references cases that address the constitutionality of drug testing conditions and searches related to pretrial release and paternity proceedings, highlighting the evolving legal standards around privacy and due process.

In State v. Curran, it was determined that a blood test mandated by RCW 46.20.308(3) for drivers suspected of vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol constitutes a search, but is not deemed unreasonable under both state and federal constitutions. This ruling was later overruled on different grounds in State v. Berlin. The court emphasized that a superficial treatment of an issue or lack of substantial argument does not warrant judicial review, as highlighted in Palmer v. Jensen. Additionally, Collins contended that evidence of his refusal to comply with the blood test was inadmissible under ER 404(b); however, he failed to raise this objection during the trial, and the court did not address it on its own initiative. The application of ER 404(b) necessitates a trial court's balancing of interests, as established in State v. Kelly. Collins also introduced a new argument in his reply brief regarding the legitimacy of the search warrant's authority under the Fourth Amendment, asserting that the State did not demonstrate the admissibility of evidence obtained through voice comparison analysis. This argument was rejected as it was raised too late, following King v. Rice. The court noted in State v. Bourgeois that the improper admission of evidence may still be considered harmless error if it is of minor significance relative to the overall evidence presented.