Boyette v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

Citations: 954 S.W.2d 350; 1997 Mo. App. LEXIS 1257; 1997 WL 370689Docket: 71374

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; July 8, 1997; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Patricia Boyette, Mother of Joseph D. Rutherford, Jr. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Trans World Express (TWE) and the City of St. Louis, ruling that the defendants had no legal duty in the wrongful death claim of Rutherford. The court reviewed the facts in favor of Boyette, noting that on April 2, 1989, Rutherford, who had consumed alcohol during his travels, engaged in reckless behavior after deplaning in St. Louis. Following a flight from Memphis, Rutherford climbed onto an idling luggage tug and later stole an electric golf cart. Despite efforts by TWE gate agent Britney Callier to summon security, Rutherford evaded capture and ultimately entered an unlocked cleaning room (Room D-231). Inside, he accessed a trash chute leading to a compactor, where he sustained injuries after falling ten feet. The court found that the uncontested facts precluded establishing a duty on the part of TWE and the City, leading to the affirmation of the lower court's judgment.

Callier was unable to locate Rutherford and contacted his supervisor, who alerted airport police. Lake joined the search, and at 4:46 p.m., Officer Moton responded to the area where Rutherford had taken a golf cart. Moton searched the vicinity but did not find Rutherford. At 4:51 p.m., Traylor informed the group that Rutherford had fallen into a trash compactor. Moton, Callier, and Lake entered Room D-231 and saw Rutherford, who was bloodied and unresponsive. Moton went outside to call for emergency help, while Callier ran to assist Rutherford. At 4:52 p.m., Lake heard the trash compactor start and alerted Moton, who radioed for help. While they searched for a deactivation switch, Rutherford was compacted at 4:52 p.m. Emergency personnel found the switch and turned off the machine at 4:56 p.m. Rutherford was removed and pronounced dead at a nearby hospital.

On March 31, 1992, the appellant filed a wrongful death suit against TWE, the City of St. Louis, and others, alleging negligence on the part of TWE for pursuing Rutherford and failing to ensure his safety after discovering him. The City was accused of negligence for not having an emergency shut-off switch in Room D-231 and for lacking warning signs about the trash chute. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TWE and the City on November 14, 1994, from which the appellant appeals.

The court's review of the summary judgment is de novo, following the standards set in ITT Commercial Finance v. Mid-Am. Marine. Defendants can obtain summary judgment if they negate any element of the claimant's case, show the non-movant has not produced sufficient evidence after discovery, or demonstrate no genuine dispute exists regarding necessary facts for their affirmative defense. The appellant must establish duty, breach, and causation to maintain a negligence claim. Failure to demonstrate a duty owed to Rutherford by TWE or the City will preclude the negligence action.

TWE’s duty as a common carrier to Rutherford ended once he reached the airport terminal safely, as recognized by Missouri law, which requires that the duty exists only during the special relationship of passenger and carrier. The appellant claimed that TWE extended its duty by pursuing Rutherford after he commandeered a golf cart, but the court disagreed. Even if a new duty arose from the pursuit, TWE established that there was no proximate cause linking the pursuit to Rutherford’s death. Proximate cause requires a reasonable and probable connection between the actor's conduct and the resulting injury, whereas intervening causes can sever this connection. In this case, Rutherford’s actions—climbing into a trash chute and subsequently falling into a compactor—were deemed an intervening cause that broke the chain of events initiated by TWE’s pursuit. Consequently, the court determined that TWE’s conduct could only be seen as a remote cause of Rutherford’s injuries, and thus, there was no legal basis for liability under negligence. The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for TWE was upheld, and the appellant's first point was denied.

The City asserts sovereign immunity regarding its liability for operating the airport, contending that it only owes a duty of care if a dangerous condition exists under Missouri law (537.600 RSMo). The appellant argues that Rutherford was an invitee when he was injured, thus the City had a duty of care. However, the City claims that Rutherford became a trespasser upon entering room D-231 and the trash chute, negating any duty owed to him. Missouri law categorizes land entrants as invitees, licensees, or trespassers, with trespassers lacking permission to enter. The appellant acknowledged that Rutherford's status should be assessed at the time of the injury, which occurred in the trash compactor where he had no permission to be and was attempting to escape arrest. Although Missouri law holds that a duty of ordinary care exists for discovered trespassers in peril, it does not extend to a duty to rescue. Consequently, the City's failure to assist Rutherford did not constitute a breach of duty. Additionally, the claim regarding the lack of an emergency deactivation switch in Room D-231 as a dangerous condition is deemed without merit.

Rutherford was considered a trespasser when he entered the trash chute, meaning the City had a limited duty to him, primarily to avoid intentionally creating hidden dangers. Trespassers assume the risk of injury from the premises' condition, and the owner is only liable for intentional harm or willful force. The court determined that the City did not place the trash compactor to harm Rutherford, thus no duty was owed. The trial court's judgment was affirmed. The case is not focused on whether Rutherford was in a safe place upon deplaning, and the status of his entry into Room D-231 is irrelevant to the injury's determination. The court also did not address the condition of the trash compactor or the absence of warning signs due to the established legal precedent. Finally, the City's motion to strike parts of the appellant's brief was denied.