California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Hoskin

Citations: 82 Cal. App. 3d 789; 147 Cal. Rptr. 348; 82 Cal. App. 2d 789; 1978 Cal. App. LEXIS 1719Docket: Civ. 3273

Court: California Court of Appeal; July 13, 1978; California; State Appellate Court

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California Casualty Indemnity Exchange filed a lawsuit against Carol Hoskin seeking a declaration that she was not entitled to liability coverage or uninsured motorist protection under her insurance policy for an accident on March 22, 1973. The case was based on an agreed statement of facts, which revealed that Kenneth Michael Hoskin, Carol's son, was driving her vehicle at the time of the accident involving an uninsured driver. The trial court ruled in favor of California Casualty, affirming that the policy validly excluded coverage for the named insured and family members, consistent with established California case law. This legal principle was reinforced by an amendment to the Insurance Code in 1970, which explicitly allowed such exclusions, and the court referenced previous rulings that supported this interpretation. The judgment was ultimately affirmed.

Section 11580.1, subdivision (c) of the Insurance Code allows automobile liability insurance policies to exclude coverage for bodily injury to an insured. Most policies include such exclusions, which, if clearly stated, prevent recovery by an owner under their own liability policy in any scenario, including the present case. The case of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober determined that an exclusion was ambiguous regarding whether the named insured could recover from a permissive user-driver who negligently caused injury. It is anticipated that insurers will clarify their exclusions to avoid ambiguity, following precedents established in Geyer and Brown. Any argument that such exclusions violate public policy contradicts the explicit legislative authorization.

Additionally, Insurance Code section 11580.2 specifies that an "uninsured motor vehicle" does not include automobiles owned by the named insured or residents of their household. The trial court found that the liability section of the insurance policy does not cover claims against Kenneth, who was driving with permission and was a resident of the appellant's household, thus qualifying as an insured. The policy explicitly excludes coverage for bodily injury claims by the named insured against another insured, which applies in this case. The judgment aligns with previous case law, confirming the exclusion's application.

Under the uninsured motorists section, the policy stipulates that "uninsured vehicle" excludes insured automobiles. The Datsun involved in the incident was covered under the policy, thus classifying it as an insured vehicle, not an uninsured one, confirming that the appellant cannot claim against the insurer for injuries sustained in that vehicle.

Respondent is not required to compensate appellant for injuries sustained while riding in her own vehicle, the Datsun, under the policy’s uninsured motorist provisions. Appellant's entitlement to recover damages from an uninsured motor vehicle is limited by Insurance Code section 11580.2, which specifies that an automobile owned by the named insured cannot be classified as an 'uninsured motor vehicle.' The Datsun, described in the policy and used with appellant's permission, is classified as an 'insured motor vehicle,' thus excluding it from uninsured motorist coverage.

The precedent set in Lofberg v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. supports this conclusion, where the court ruled that uninsured automobile coverage does not apply to the named insured's injuries in their own vehicle, even when driven by another with permission. Although appellant attempts to argue that a subsequent amendment to section 11580.2 provides coverage for injuries sustained in an insured vehicle, this argument is flawed. The amendment's exclusion language does not alter the policy's coverage definition, which is intended to cover injuries from 'uninsured' vehicles only. The exclusions explicitly limit the applicability of coverage without redefining the policy's core terms.

Support for a limited interpretation of exclusions is found in *Interinsurance Exchange v. Velji*, which indicates that such exclusions are meant to prevent one policy's coverage from extending to uninsured vehicles owned by the insured, emphasizing that each vehicle should have its own liability and uninsured motorist insurance. The exclusions are designed for specific scenarios and do not alter the overall coverage scope. The appellant acknowledges that the unique fact pattern triggering the exclusion does not exist in this case, rendering the exclusion inapplicable to the accident in question.

However, the inapplicability of the exclusion does not equate to coverage under the policy. Section 11580.2, subdivision (a)(2) defines uninsured motorist coverage as providing protection for damages from an uninsured vehicle not owned by the insured, clarifying that injuries sustained from the insured's vehicle do not fall under this coverage. The interpretation proposed by the appellant lacks justification, and prior case law, specifically the *Lofberg* case, remains authoritative and relevant.

The appellant contends that the policy's terms conflict with section 11580.2 regarding coverage under part IV, yet concedes that the Datsun in question is not classified as ‘uninsured’ under the relevant provisions. The appellant argues for a broader interpretation of ‘uninsured’ based on exclusions outlined in section 11580.2 and the policy, suggesting that the Datsun should be considered uninsured despite being covered under the policy. While some jurisdictions interpret the intent of uninsured motorist coverage as applicable when no insurance is available for a specific injury, the statute and policy terms stipulate that coverage exists only when no insurance is applicable overall. Thus, the current interpretation does not support coverage for an insured vehicle under a general policy, as this would misread the statute and policy's explicit terms.

Insurance companies are permitted to limit policy coverage under section 11580.2, and such limitations must be upheld when clearly articulated in the policy terms. Courts will not interpret insurance contracts in a way that imposes liabilities not explicitly stated. The Uninsured Motorist Statute, designed to protect Californians from losses due to accidents with uninsured drivers, is effectively served by the uninsured motorist coverage in the policy related to the appellant's claims against the uninsured driver, Hoffman. The judgment affirming this interpretation is upheld, with the trial judge's decision noted for reference. The policy explicitly excludes coverage for bodily injury to an insured while in a vehicle not defined as an insured automobile, with varying coverage practices across states.