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Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell

Citations: 366 N.E.2d 717; 373 Mass. 178

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; August 4, 1977; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves a dispute between the Secretary of the Commonwealth and various city and town clerks concerning the recording of names in vital records. The plaintiffs, led by the Registrar of Vital Records and Statistics, sought to enforce the Attorney General's opinion that individuals could choose their names freely, without fraudulent intent. The city and town clerks, however, insisted on using traditional rules for surname determination. Legal action was initiated to resolve the conflict, with the plaintiffs moving for a class action and summary judgment. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the Attorney General, affirming the right of individuals to choose their names and invalidating the clerks' practice of imposing customary naming conventions. The decision emphasizes common law principles allowing individuals to change their names honestly without legal proceedings and reinforces parental rights in naming children. Although the court denied injunctive relief, it issued a declaratory judgment to clarify the rights of the parties. The dissenting opinion expressed concerns over the impact on statutory requirements for maintaining accurate vital records, highlighting the tension between personal name choice and public record-keeping mandates.

Legal Issues Addressed

Authority of City and Town Clerks in Recording Names

Application: City and town clerks do not have the authority to override individuals' chosen names based on customary rules.

Reasoning: The court ultimately sided with the Attorney General, asserting that the clerks' actions were incorrect and affirming individuals' rights to choose their names.

Correction of Vital Records

Application: Inaccuracies in vital records can be corrected through affidavits and documentary evidence as per statutory provisions.

Reasoning: In cases where the record lacks required facts or contains inaccuracies, G.L.c. 46. 13 allows for corrections through affidavits and documentary evidence.

Judicial Decree for Name Changes

Application: Statutes have influenced surname changes, such as allowing women to resume their maiden names post-divorce and enabling name changes through judicial decree for adoptions.

Reasoning: Statutes have influenced surname changes, such as allowing women to resume their maiden names post-divorce and enabling name changes through judicial decree for adoptions.

Parental Rights in Naming Children

Application: Parents have the right to choose a child's name, and this choice should prevail even if it differs from traditional naming conventions.

Reasoning: The right to name a child rests with the parents, and a father can assert legal rights on behalf of his minor children.

Recording of Birth Names for Legitimate and Illegitimate Children

Application: Legitimate births are typically recorded under the father's surname, while illegitimate births use the mother's surname, unless both parents request otherwise.

Reasoning: The Massachusetts City Clerks' Association adopted a policy stating that legitimate births would be recorded under the father's surname and illegitimate births under the mother's surname.

Right to Choose a Name at Common Law

Application: Individuals possess the right to change their names at will for honest purposes without legal proceedings.

Reasoning: At common law, individuals can change their names at will for honest purposes without legal proceedings.

Role of the Registrar and Attorney General

Application: The Registrar, after consulting the Attorney General on legal questions, is not obligated to substitute his judgment for that of the Attorney General.

Reasoning: The Registrar, after consulting the Attorney General on legal questions, is not obligated to substitute his judgment for that of the Attorney General.