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Smith v. Carpenter
Citations: 198 Va. 91; 92 S.E.2d 275; 1956 Va. LEXIS 178Docket: Record 4500
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; April 23, 1956; Virginia; State Supreme Court
Carpenter secured a jury verdict against Smith for personal injuries from an automobile accident that occurred at the intersection of Sheppard and Helen streets in Norfolk. Carpenter approached the intersection at 15 miles per hour and saw Smith's vehicle approximately 150 feet away, initially appearing to travel at a reasonable speed. After entering the intersection, Carpenter noted Smith's vehicle was approaching rapidly, estimated at 50 miles per hour, striking the rear of Carpenter's car just as he cleared the intersection. Smith claimed he could not stop due to wet conditions, while Carpenter contended the street was dry at the time of the accident. Smith's motion to set aside the jury's verdict on the grounds of Carpenter's alleged contributory negligence was overruled, leading to the appeal. The primary legal question was whether Carpenter was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court noted that negligence and contributory negligence are typically jury questions; since reasonable minds could differ on the evidence, the jury's finding that Carpenter was not contributorily negligent was upheld. Smith's negligence was acknowledged, and the jury was instructed that if they found Carpenter negligent, he could not recover, which they did not. Both parties were aware of the 25-mile-per-hour speed limit, and Carpenter had reasonable grounds to believe he could safely navigate the intersection. He was entitled to assume the defendant would comply with the speed limit, as the law does not demand absolute certainty of safety before taking action, only ordinary care akin to what a prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances. The defendant's reliance on previous case law was challenged due to differences in facts. If the defendant had approached the intersection at a lawful speed, Carpenter would not have been wrong in assuming he could cross safely. The issue of Carpenter's potential contributory negligence was deemed factual, suitable for jury determination unless evidence overwhelmingly dictated a single reasonable conclusion. Consequently, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was upheld.