Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
State v. Matthew Douglas Cox
Citation: Not availableDocket: E1999-00351-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; June 27, 2000; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Matthew Douglas Cox appeals his jury convictions in the Knox County Criminal Court for two counts of aggravated rape and one count of incest, resulting in concurrent sentences of twenty years for the rapes and three years for incest, all to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appeal presents several issues: 1. The sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions. 2. The admissibility of a tape recording of the victim’s 911 call. 3. Limitations placed on defense counsel's cross-examination of the State’s DNA expert. 4. The admission of testimony regarding the circumstances of the appellant's arrest. 5. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. 6. Whether the cumulative effect of these alleged errors warrants reversal of the convictions. The court, after reviewing the record and briefs, affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s judgments. The case involved incidents from March 2, 1996, when the appellant allegedly raped his sister, PC, after a close sibling relationship developed despite their earlier separation due to their parents' divorce. Prior to the offenses, PC had moved to Knoxville to assist her brother with his plumbing business and pursue a career opportunity. She arrived at his home early on March 2, where they conversed for about one and a half hours after he awoke. PC consumed two beers, while the appellant had a mixed alcoholic beverage before going to sleep in the master bedroom around 3:00 a.m. or 3:30 a.m. She was awakened between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. when the appellant began to fondle her. After asking him to stop and receiving an apology, PC left for the living room, where she eventually fell asleep on the couch. She was again awakened around 7:00 a.m. by the appellant fondling her, and after another request for him to stop and another apology, she attempted to distance herself from him. After brewing coffee and retrieving the newspaper, PC waved to a neighbor and sat by the swimming pool. Upon returning inside, the appellant asked if she intended to continue living with him, which she declined to discuss. At about 10:30 a.m., after taking a shower, PC found the appellant in the bathroom holding a knife, threatening her by saying, "You have always said, 'I hate you.' Well, I am going to make it true." He then forced her into a bedroom, where he attempted to sexually assault her. PC struggled against him, trying to escape and scream for help, but the appellant restrained her, threatened to kill her if she tried to run, and choked her until she requested a drink. They went to the kitchen, where PC drank vodka and orange juice, believing it would numb her impending fate. After returning to the bedroom, the appellant tried to force her into oral sex, and when unsuccessful, he performed oral sex on her and used an object on her, causing her pain. Eventually, the appellant succeeded in penetrating her vagina with his penis, though PC was unsure if he ejaculated. Throughout the ordeal, PC expressed a sense of despair and a loss of will to fight back. After the rapes, the appellant allowed PC to leave, but they shared coffee before her departure. PC collected her belongings and briefly returned inside for a Mary Kay Cosmetics bag and a bottle of vodka. At trial, PC testified she never indicated an intention to report the rapes, fearing for her life due to threats from the appellant, who expressed suicidal thoughts. As she left, PC heard a sound resembling a gunshot and called 911, believing her brother had attempted suicide. During the call, she reported the assaults, stating her brother had held her hostage for about two hours. PC's son, Ray Pope, found her in distress when he arrived home, describing her as curled up and crying, visibly shaken and unkempt. She disclosed the rapes to him, prompting a police response that transported them to the hospital. Pope noted ongoing terror and distress in his mother, who exhibited signs of trauma, including bruises. Testimonies from police officers confirmed PC’s emotional state at the time they encountered her. At the hospital, Dr. Christopher Brooks examined PC, who was agitated but coherent. She recounted details of the assaults, specifying both vaginal and rectal penetration, and described physical abuse, including choking and being struck on the head, although she did not lose consciousness. PC reported no trauma to her chest, abdomen, or extremities but mentioned biting her right forearm during an attack. Dr. Brooks’ examination revealed a small bruise on her neck and a bite mark on her forearm, with no significant external injuries noted. He indicated that bruising varies among assault victims and that the absence of rectal trauma does not rule out penetration. Although no trauma to the external genitalia was observed, Dr. Brooks noted abrasions at the vaginal cuff consistent with recent vaginal penetration. He collected vaginal swabs, which later showed rare nonmotile sperm; factors like illness or drugs can affect sperm motility, and sperm typically lose motility within three hours of leaving the male body. On March 4, 1996, PC returned for follow-up, complaining of neck pain, and was diagnosed with situational anxiety, which Dr. Brooks stated is common in rape victims. Kelly Smith from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs. Joe Minor, a DNA analyst, found the semen insufficient for conclusive results but did not exclude the appellant as a potential source. Sergeant Larry Grant of the Knoxville Police Department visited the appellant’s home on March 2, following a report of a possible suicide. He found the appellant seemingly intoxicated but unresponsive to his inquiries about suicidal intentions. After determining there was no immediate threat, Grant left the residence. On March 4, the appellant was contacted by Detective Stair of the Knoxville Police Department, following a complaint made by PC alleging that the appellant had raped her. During the call, the appellant acknowledged, "Well, I probably did, but I don’t remember it," and declined to meet for questioning. Detective Stair noted that the appellant appeared intoxicated. On March 6, an arrest warrant was executed by Officers Kelvin Reed and Anthony Guida at the appellant's residence, where Reed observed the appellant carrying a rifle inside. The officers retreated and called for backup, leading to a stand-off. After approximately twenty minutes, the appellant surrendered to the police. At trial, the appellant, a master plumber living in Knoxville, testified about his heavy drinking following a temporary separation from his wife, beginning on March 1, which led to gaps in his memory for the events of March 2. He claimed he was unaware of PC's visit until March 3 and did not recall speaking with Detective Stair. He explained that he hesitated to surrender due to fear and advice from a friend, Dan Acosta, to remain inside until Acosta arrived. The appellant suggested that PC fabricated the rape accusations, citing a past incident in 1993 that caused familial tension. Despite this, he admitted to having a generally good relationship with PC prior to the accusations, including traveling together in January 1996 and discussing her potential move into his home. The appellant acknowledged that he had regularly dined with PC’s son after a 1993 incident. Dan Acosta, a close friend and business associate of the appellant, testified to the appellant's significant decline in mental health and excessive drinking beginning in late 1995. On March 1, 1996, the appellant missed work again, and Acosta found him intoxicated but cleaning for his sister's visit. During a conversation on March 4, the appellant revealed he was told he had raped his sister, though he only recalled having drinks with her earlier that morning. Acosta encouraged the appellant to speak with a detective, but the appellant hesitated. After Acosta realized the police might arrest the appellant, he contacted him, learning that police were surrounding his home. Acosta arrived to find multiple officers outside, and he relayed their instructions to the appellant, who subsequently surrendered. Additionally, James Leffew, a neighbor, testified he heard voices, not belonging to the appellant, coming from the appellant's home on March 2, and saw PC leaving with her belongings in the early morning hours. Leffew also noted hearing a loud noise from the appellant's residence later that morning. Leffew visited the appellant’s home, knocked on the door, and, after receiving no response, entered through an unlocked door, finding the appellant alone, intoxicated, and in the same clothes as the previous day. The loud noise that prompted Leffew’s visit was determined to be caused by "dividers" falling. After ensuring the appellant was okay, Leffew returned home. Later that day, police arrived, spoke with Leffew, and left upon learning of the appellant's intoxication. Lorene Leffew, James Leffew’s ex-wife, testified that she usually heard noises from the appellant’s house but heard nothing on the morning of March 2, 1996. She noted that her ex-husband had difficulty sleeping the previous night and spoke with the appellant's sister that morning. She and her ex-husband heard a loud noise from the appellant's home later that day, prompting a visit from her husband to check on the appellant. Lorene did not recall seeing police that day or any mention of them by her ex-husband. The appellant was indicted on September 18, 1996, for three counts of aggravated rape, with an additional charge of incest filed on November 4, 1998. The trial resulted in acquittal on one count of aggravated rape, while the jury convicted the appellant on the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of twenty years for aggravated rape and three years for incest. The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, stating that the appellate review standard examines whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden lies with the appellant to demonstrate why the evidence does not support the jury's findings, while the state is entitled to the strongest view of the evidence. Issues of witness credibility and evidence weight are for the trier of fact to resolve. For aggravated rape, the jury needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant engaged in sexual penetration with PC, used force or coercion, was armed, and acted intentionally. The State's case for the appellant's conviction on incest relied on two types of penetration: the appellant's tongue penetrating PC's vagina and his penis penetrating her vagina. For a conviction, the jury needed to establish four elements: (1) sexual penetration of PC by the appellant; (2) PC being the appellant's sister; (3) the appellant's knowledge of this relationship; and (4) the appellant's intentional, knowing, or reckless actions. However, the State did not specify which incident of penetration it was relying on to establish incest, which constitutes plain error, regardless of the appellant's failure to raise this issue on appeal. The evidence presented at trial indicated three separate incidents of penetration occurring within a two-hour timeframe. Since the State only charged one count of incest despite multiple incidents, the court emphasized that specific conduct must be matched to specific counts in such cases. Consequently, the court reversed the incest conviction and ordered a new trial. Regarding the aggravated rape convictions, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence based partly on the credibility of PC's testimony, arguing that her account was not credible when compared to expert testimony about her injuries. The appellant invoked the "physical facts rule," which allows for the dismissal of witness testimony that is irreconcilable with physical evidence. This rule permits courts to disregard testimony that is inherently unbelievable or contradicts established physical laws. The Supreme Court in Hornsby emphasized the limited application of disregarding oral testimony, asserting that ambiguity in testimony should be resolved by the jury, which serves as the sole judge of credibility. The appellant failed to demonstrate any universally recognized physical law that would render the victim's account inconsistent with trial evidence regarding her injuries. Dr. Brooks testified that bruising varies based on the force used and victim characteristics, and the presence of nonmotile sperm on a vaginal swab did not negate the jury's acceptance of the victim's testimony under the "physical facts rule." Dr. Brooks's examination, conducted over three hours post-offense, indicated that while some sperm may remain motile, only a small amount was found on a single swab. The court upheld the jury's findings despite the appellant's argument that testimony from witnesses Lorene and James Leffew disproved the victim's claims, clarifying that the rejection of testimony based on improbability cannot solely rely on witness credibility comparisons. Additionally, the appellant contested the sufficiency of evidence for aggravated rape, claiming the State did not prove he was armed as required by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-502(a)(1). However, the court found that the indictment's phrasing regarding being "armed with a weapon" was surplusage and did not impact the State's burden of proof. The statute only requires evidence of weapon possession in connection with the unlawful sexual penetration, regardless of timing. The appellant committed aggravated rape against his sister, initiating the assault by threatening her with a knife. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. The appellant contested the trial court's admission of a 911 call recording made by the victim, PC, arguing that her statements were inadmissible as excited utterances or fresh complaints, and that the recording was cumulative of her trial testimony and prejudicial. The trial court, after a pre-trial hearing, ruled the tape an excited utterance, noting the emotional stress PC exhibited during the call without leading questions from the operator. The court did not specifically address the cumulative nature or weigh its probative value against potential prejudice. The admissibility of such statements is evaluated under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(2), which allows excited utterances—statements made under the stress of a startling event—to bypass hearsay restrictions. To qualify, the State must demonstrate a startling event occurred, which can include subsequent conditions related to the original event. In this case, the record confirmed that PC was raped shortly before her call. Rape, categorized as a profoundly distressing event, is addressed in the context of the legal standards for excited utterances. Following the rape, the appellant expressed suicidal intentions to the victim, PC. While PC was leaving the appellant's residence, she heard a loud noise resembling a gunshot, which was deemed a related startling event. The State needed to prove that PC’s statements to the 911 operator were connected to these startling occurrences and made under the stress of the events. The appellant contended that PC had regained her composure by the time of the call, citing her ability to dress, gather her belongings, and contact 911. However, legal precedent indicates that a declarant does not need to be entirely devoid of reason for excited utterances to apply. The court assesses the stress of the declarant based on several factors: the time since the startling event, the event's seriousness, the declarant's behavior, and the statement's content. In this case, the rape occurred within two hours prior to the call, and the nature of the event was grave. PC's emotional state during the call—evidenced by tears and inability to recall basic information—further confirmed her distress. Post-call observations noted her in a fetal position, crying and shaking. Thus, the trial court could reasonably conclude that PC's statements were made under the stress of both her rape and the subsequent noise that suggested her brother's suicide. The trial court's application of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(2) was upheld, confirming that the 911 tape recording was admissible as substantive evidence. There was no need to consider its admission under the fresh complaint doctrine, though a brief discussion was warranted. The fresh complaint doctrine allows the introduction of a victim's complaint of a sexual offense in the State's case-in-chief, as established in State v. Kendricks, but excludes the admission of complaint details until the victim's accuracy is impeached. This rule was established to prevent potential unfair prejudice against the defendant, as outlined in previous cases including Phillips v. State and Tizard. The court emphasized that premature admission of complaint details could mislead the jury and violate the defendant's right to a fair trial under constitutional guarantees. In this case, statements made by the victim (PC) to the 911 operator were made after she may have had a motive to lie, making their consistency with her testimony irrelevant for rebuttal against claims of fabrication. However, the relevance of the 911 tape's contents was not entirely dismissed, as the appellant argued that the emotional nature of the recording was inflammatory and added nothing of value to the testimony presented in court. The court's consideration of Tenn. R. Evid. 403 regarding the potential prejudicial impact of the recording remains ongoing. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that makes the existence of a consequential fact more or less probable. Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 402, relevant evidence is generally admissible, while Rule 403 prohibits the introduction of such evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or the presentation of cumulative evidence. In this case, two significant aspects of a 911 tape recording were discussed: (1) the timing of PC's mention of her brother's potential suicide before reporting her rape, indicating concern for him; and (2) her emotional state during the call. Although the brief account was cumulative of her trial testimony, the manner of delivery, particularly the two highlighted aspects, provided valuable context. The appellant claimed that this manner of delivery was unfairly prejudicial, arguing that evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it primarily aims to provoke emotional responses such as bias or sympathy. The State countered that the purpose of introducing the 911 tape was to present PC's demeanor post-offense, aiding jurors in assessing her credibility. The appellate court agreed with the State, deeming the issue meritless. The appellant also contested the trial court's admission of Agent Minor's testimony regarding inconclusive DNA analysis results from semen and blood samples. He argued that the court wrongly prevented defense counsel from questioning whether the analysis included the appellant, fearing it would lead to inadmissible testimony. Prior to the trial, the State had disclosed an inconclusive analysis report but later indicated that Minor would testify about matching faint DNA bands from the semen with the appellant's DNA, despite lacking statistical significance. Defense counsel objected to this testimony, citing inadmissibility under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702, and expressed unpreparedness to counter the new information not included in the initial report. The court determined that due to the absence of notice to the appellant and Minor's inability to assign statistical significance to the DNA matching bands, Minor could only state that his analysis results were inconclusive, which did not exclude the appellant as a potential source of the semen. The court allowed defense counsel to inquire whether Minor’s analysis conclusively included the appellant, clarifying that such questioning would enable Minor to discuss the similarities indicated by the matching bands, though this evidence was not conclusive. Despite this ruling, the defense was permitted to argue during closing statements that the DNA analysis did not conclusively include the appellant. Post-trial, defense counsel contested the ruling preventing inquiry into the conclusive nature of the DNA results, presenting an affidavit from Dr. Ronald T. Acton, who agreed with Minor’s conclusion of inconclusiveness but criticized Minor for not adhering to recommended protocols for RFLP DNA analysis as outlined by relevant authorities, including the National Research Council and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. Dr. Acton emphasized that visual observations of matching bands without statistical backing are insignificant. The trial court, upon reviewing Dr. Acton's affidavit, acknowledged that it might have reached a different decision had this information been available during the trial but ultimately deemed Minor's testimony as "innocuous" and lacking weight, thus denying relief to the appellant. The appeal identifies issues not contested by either party, including the admissibility of Minor’s inconclusive DNA test results and the trial court’s ruling that Minor’s testimony regarding matching DNA bands was generally inadmissible. The appellant acknowledged that inconclusive results imply he was neither included nor excluded as a source, thereby conceding that allowing the State to ask if he was excluded was not an error. The sole issue on appeal concerns whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce otherwise inadmissible testimony regarding DNA matching if the defense questioned Minor about whether his analysis included the appellant. The doctrine of curative admissibility allows the State to clarify or counteract negative inferences resulting from the defense’s cross-examination. This doctrine applies when a defendant introduces an issue, allowing the State to present contradictory evidence to mitigate potential prejudice. The court noted that while this doctrine can be invoked, it should not lead to the admission of evidence that could mislead the jury more than clarify issues. The court reviews the application of this doctrine for abuse of discretion. The trial court's decision to allow testimony from Minor regarding the inconclusive nature of his DNA analysis, which neither included nor excluded the appellant, was deemed a correct ruling, despite the defense's assertion that it would mislead the jury. The court found that introducing testimony about matching DNA bands was likely to be more harmful than beneficial, as the State had previously conceded its lack of measurable significance. While the trial court abused its discretion in suggesting that the defense would "open the door" to this testimony, it concluded that any resultant error was harmless, given that defense counsel could argue the inconclusiveness of the DNA analysis during closing statements. The appellant also challenged the trial court's admission of testimony regarding his arrest, claiming it was irrelevant and prejudicial. The court upheld the admission of this testimony, referencing established legal principles that the actions of an accused during arrest can be relevant to infer guilt. The court emphasized that distinguishing between significant and irrelevant actions can be challenging, and behaviors indicating a desire to evade prosecution may contribute to establishing guilt. The principle of inferring guilt from a defendant's refusal to provide court-ordered handwriting samples has been upheld for over 150 years and remains valid despite the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. This principle includes considerations of a defendant's arrest circumstances, such as attempts to resist arrest. Relevant evidence in this case included the defendant's knowledge of police attempts to contact him, his refusal to answer the door, acquiring a rifle upon police arrival, and delaying surrender for twenty minutes, all suggesting consciousness of guilt. Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the appellant's claim of prejudicial comments made by Detective Stair was deemed waived due to his failure to object contemporaneously. Detective Stair's comments arose during cross-examination by defense counsel and were not elicited by the prosecution. The defense did not request a curative instruction, and no plain error was identified. The appellant also argued that cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. While one error related to the incest conviction was acknowledged—specifically, the trial court's failure to require an election of offenses—this error led to the reversal of that conviction and a remand for a new trial. However, no cumulative errors were found regarding the aggravated rape convictions. Ultimately, the court reversed the incest conviction and remanded for a new trial while affirming the remaining judgments.